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In the construction of their media infrastructure, most of the Arab countries are spending millions of 
dollars on US and Western contracts. Regarded as one of the fastest growing and dynamic markets 
for media technologies in the world, the region may lack a clear media policy as a guideline to shed 
light upon the mega million investments on the industry. Some critics suggest that the advanced 
media technologies provided to the Arab world are mostly initiated by Western sales/marketing 
strategy rather than Middle Eastern choice and initiative. They see the process as a reaction to the 
Western media practices, rather than a pre-planned policy. This study is directed toward constructing 
a critical understanding of the development, and current status, of media policy and infrastructure in 
the Arab world. Being undertaken as the basis of a Ph. D. thesis in an inter-disciplinary department, 
the research is informed by a strong inter-disciplinary perspective, but with a clear political economy 
emphasis. The study seeks to examine whether there is a clear media policy in the Arab world, either 
at a national or regional level. Within this context, ARABSAT, perhaps the most popular media 
system in the Arab world, constitutes a specific case study. Inaugurated in 1985, the system has 
been the subject of extensive debate, sometimes heatedly discussing its pros and cons. Its long period 
of operation, the extensive contribution of most Arab/Muslim countries in the process of the creation 
and operation of ARABSAT, as well as the footprint coverage of the system including the Middle 
East, most parts of Asia, the Indian subcontinent and some parts of Europe, make the contribution of 
ARABSAT within the Middle East media environment of particular interest. Now, nearly 15 years 
after the advent of ARABSAT, established and supported by the overwhelming majority of the Arab 
states, a critical assessment of the system in terms of policy/strategy is timely. 
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In order to understand the structure of our culture, its production, consumption and 
reproduction, and the role of mass media in that process we need to confront some of the 
central questions of political economy in general (Garnham, 1979: 129). 
It is not yet clear whether the nations caught up in the rush to acquire these new tools 
(communications systems) have any clear idea themselves of what they will use them 
for... We are being encouraged to make a choice of tools before we know what we want 
from them (Murphy, 1983: 11). 
Today, the information needs of many countries are manipulated primarily by market 
interests and the media and by the dominant global powers, and not necessarily by the 
articulation of the genuine needs of individuals, groups and societies (Mowlana, 1993: 20). 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Background 
During the last two to three decades a fundamental media transformation has swept through 
the Arab world. Huge investments on terrestrial and transnational channels have ranked the 
region as one of the fastest growing and most dynamic markets for media in the world. 
Many new media facilities are planned or under construction, and huge new opportunities 
exist for both equipment and programme suppliers. While during the 1960s and early 1970s 
the region was noted for its low level of usage of electronic media, the 1980s saw a 
tremendous increase in traffic. The capacity and number of media channels available to 
Arab people within and outside the region is also set to rise rapidly in the coming years 
(Middle East Broadcast and Satellite, January 1995: 37). 
It is generally said that the media have never been more economically significant to 
governments than in the 1980s (Dyson & Humphreys, 1990: 1). The significance, however, 
differs essentially from one country to another. The perception of media economics, for 
instance, in the industrialised world, is not the same as it is in the developing countries. 
From the 1980s, Herbert Schiller (1993) argues, the industrialised West has become 
increasingly dependent on media technology and information flows to sustain and develop 
its position. The primary motivation behind this promotion is to sell their products and 
services to the international market. The global business system, with US corporations at 
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the forefront, Schiller (1983) further suggests, is seeking to connect as much of the world as 
possible into the transnational economic order. Advanced communication technologies are 
the most prominent and significant means by which the world business system is expanding 
and broadening its control (Schiller, 1983: x). 
Statement of the problem 
The situation of the developing countries generally and the Arab world in particular can be 
considered as the other side of the coin. In the construction of their media infrastructures, 
most of the Arab countries are spending millions of dollars on US and Western contracts. 
Regarded as one of the fastest growing markets for media technologies in the world, the 
Arab world may yet lack a clear media policy as a guideline to shed light upon the mega 
million investments in the industry. Optimism about the increase in number and capacity 
of, for example, broadcasting channels and stations, are blurred with scepticism on the lack 
of a genuine and independent media pattern consistent with their Arab/Islamic values and 
principles. Some critics suggest that the advanced media technologies provided to these 
countries are mostly initiated by a Western sales/marketing strategy rather than being their 
own choice and initiative. They see the process as, "a reaction to the Western media 
practices rather than a pre-planned policy". 
This study is directed toward constructing a critical understanding of the development, and 
current status, of media policy and infrastructure in the Arab world. Being undertaken as 
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the basis of a Ph. D. thesis in an inter-disciplinary department, the research is informed by a 
strong inter-disciplinary perspective, but with a clear political economy emphasis. Within 
this context, ARABSAT, the first Arab regional satellite communications system, 
constitutes a specific case study. Inaugurated in 1985, the system has been the subject of 
extensive debate; with sometimes heated discussions about its pros and cons. Its long 
period of operation, the extensive contribution of most Arab/Muslim countries in the 
process of the creation and operation of ARABSAT, as well as the footprint coverage of the 
system including the Middle East, most parts of Asia, the Indian subcontinent and some 
parts of Europe, make the contribution of ARABSAT within the Middle East media 
environment of particular interest. Now, nearly 15 years after the advent of ARABSAT, 
established and supported by the overwhelming majority of Arab states, a critical 
assessment of the system in terms of policy and strategy is timely. 
In examining ARABSAT, the global waves of liberalisation and deregulation, and its 
impact on the system as well as new trends towards commercialisation and privatisation of 
ARABSAT, constitute an important part. It will also be argued that globalisation and 
liberalisation of television world-wide has raised issues of the power and superiority of 
global media over ARABSAT. The Western political, economic, military and technological 
predominance in the region led to its cultural superiority. This cultural predominance, 
though important, must not be considered as the ultimate aim of Western media strategy but 
' This assessment was made by Douglas Boyd in a symposium organised by the London-based International 
Centre Censorship (ICAO) in March 1999. For further information, see Yasser Talaat's article `TV War 
Rages in the Middle East'. 
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just a catalyst to facilitate, in fact re-establish, its commercial, financial, political and 
economic interests throughout the region. In this context, the very close inter-connection of 
the media, politics, culture, economy and power is a matter of great concern. One of the 
major concerns of this study, therefore, is the philosophy and political economy of cultural 
protection. The analysis will contribute to an understanding of the current media 
environment in the Arab world, and will provide an informed basis for conceptualising 
future developments. 
Theoretical Questions 
In the early 1980s, Brian Murphy (1983) put forward a critical question regarding the 
demand and application of the new media in the Western countries: 
It is not yet clear whether the nations caught up in the rush to acquire these new tools 
(communications systems) have any clear idea themselves of what they will use them for. 
Many have not even asked whether increased information and entertainment demand is best 
served by satellites and cables, by using already existing technology, or by changing the 
political and economic rules which control communications. But to say these things is to 
stand in the path of a hurtling bandwagon: we are being encouraged to make a choice of 
tools before we know what we want from them (Murphy, 1983: 11). 
There was also concern regarding the content of the new media without a persuasive answer 
among the thoughtful, whether in developed or developing countries, to the question: 
"... whether these additional services enrich the menu or simply increase its length "? 
Ralph Negrine (1988) presents a clear image of this concern in Europe in the late 1980s: 
Alongside the increased competition, nations will find themselves exposed to foreign media. 
The long-term impact of these, usually, Anglo-American channels on local cultures is 
difficult to gauge, but it is clear that some concern is being expressed. Most European 
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nations are now exposed to such channels, as are Australia, Canada and to a much lesser 
extent Japan. Even the Third World can suffer from the popularity of satellite programming 
spilling over into its territory (Negrine, 1988: 5). 
This research will argue that these concerns are still valid and the questions raised by 
Murphy and Negrine, although at a different level, but of the same nature, apply to the 
contemporary Arab world. At the same time, there are a range of questions with which the 
Arab world is, or must be, confronted, and for which it must be prepared to find proper 
answers: 
Q1. How may one describe the development of the Arab media in terms of policy? 
Q2. Have the media organisations established by the Arabs since the 1950s played a 
significant part in developing media policy in the region? 
Q3. In what ways have politics and religion shaped the development of media in the 
Middle East? 
Q4. In this context, what has been the role of ARABSAT in providing better 
communications and exchanges within the Arab/Islamic world, and in helping 
member states resist the influx of Western programmes? 
Q5. In what ways have concerns over Western cultural predominance affected the 
financial and economic policies of ARABSAT and vice versa? 
Q6. What is the future of ARABSAT 
-in terms of programming: 
-in terms of economic viability? 
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Q7. Finally, what will be the consequences of different Middle East states launching 
their own satellites? 
The questions raised above will help to clarify the major lines of the study, establish a 
theoretical framework, and formulate the theoretical assumption(s) of the research. The 
study consists of nine structurally independent but conceptually interrelated chapters 
(including the present introductory chapter) as follows: 
Research Structure 
Chapter II contains the basic foundations of my argument and articulates its theoretical 
(analytical) framework. The most important concepts, theories and approaches applied 
throughout the research are explored and developed in this chapter. In order to establish a 
theoretical framework for the study, three factors have been identified as critical: oil, 
globalisation and Islam. The development of the Arab media will be examined in the 
context of the interaction, and in some instances confrontation, between these global and 
regional factors. Globalisation and its consequences; the media-cultural imperialism debate; 
oil and development, and finally the rising Islamic movements by which this area is 
distinguished from the other parts of the developing world; constitute the main theme of the 
theoretical discourses in this chapter. 
Chapter III intends to establish an interactive relationship between oil, the presence of the 
great powers and domestic developmental plans and strategies. The chapter will examine 
the paradoxical impacts of oil revenues on the region's politics and economy. It will be 
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argued that the regional oil resources, while providing an opportunity for the Arab states to 
develop their social and economic infrastructures, also attracted the foreign powers' 
attention and interference in the Arab world. The oil reserves and revenues have created a 
distinctive developmental pattern in the region, notably different from the other parts of the 
Third World. Yet, as will be noted, most of the states in the region have not been able to 
establish their own media policy and infrastructure independent of the external powers. The 
focus of the chapter is the development of the telecommunications sector, which is often 
taken as a valid index of economic growth, with Egypt and Saudi Arabia at the centre. 
Chapter IV, highlighting the ever-increasing confrontation between the West and the rest of 
the world, intends to further develop the theoretical debate on the globalisation of the 
economy, culture and the media. Seen from a political economy perspective, the major 
theme of this chapter is to investigate the ideological discourses over the world-wide 
processes of globalisation, the debates on media cultural imperialism and importantly, the 
forms of Islamic resistance to what one may call global media-cultural imperialism. The 
picture presented of the West in this chapter overall is one of predominance, imposing its 
global ends - political, economic, military and cultural - upon the rest of the world. Yet, 
since this assessment has its own critics, the other side of the story will not be left unsaid. 
Placing a great emphasis on the Islamic cultural and political movements, which are 
growing world-wide since the early 1980s, the ultimate aim of the chapter is to offer a 
clearer picture of the (unequal) power relations between the developed and developing 
world. 
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Chapter V, through a critical analysis of the development of the Arab media, intends to 
draw up an outline of the Arab media policy. Starting with the first communications 
facilities established by the Western powers in the 15`x' century, the chapter takes up the 
emergence of the printed media in the nineteenth century, and the advent of radio and 
television stations, respectively in the 1920s and 1950s throughout the region. The 
development of the first and the foremost collective media collaborations amongst the 22 
members of the Arab League in the 1950s, makes the decade a benchmark in the progress 
(and fate) of the Arab media. A chronological study of the Arab media since 1950, while 
identifying three key stages in the course of media development, will underline some 
important characteristics of each period. This chapter mainly reflects my concern about the 
absence of clarity in adopting media policies by the Arabs in the region. 
Chapter VI, in line with the major theme of the study, is seeking for a detailed analysis of 
ARABSAT. It is principally concerned with the political, economic and cultural 
implications of ARABSAT in terms of policy. Regarded as a breakthrough in the Middle 
East, ARABSAT has arguably several pros and cons. Since the early years of its 
establishment, media critics have questioned the performance of the system. In this 
context, there are several questions which need to be addressed. Why did ARABSAT 
emerge? What have been the main political, economic and cultural motives/aims behind the 
establishment of the system? What have been the major obstacles confronting ARABSAT? 
Has ARABSAT succeeded in achieving its proposed regional and global objectives? And 
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finally, how realistically was the system designed and implemented to meet its targets and 
the real media demands of the region? 
Chapter VII, continuing the study of ARABSAT, is intended to address one of the key areas 
in the process of development of the Arab media, namely the political economy of 
protection. Through a brief review of the previous debates, and from a different perspective, 
the chapter will argue that the protection policies, cultural or otherwise, imposing their 
financial burden on ARABSAT, have their own political economy. Yet, given the 
enormous investments on ARABSAT as a protective shield, the question is how successful 
the system has been in fulfilling its cultural and political ambitions. These will set the stage 
for the last two chapters within which, respectively, a picture of my own perspective on the 
future of Arab media (chapter VIII), and an overview and conclusion of my arguments 
(chapter IX) will be presented. 
Some points of importance 
There are a few points which I need to highlight. Amongst the most frequently asked 
questions concerning academic researches are the objective(s), the importance of the study 
(its contribution to the field) and also the methodology used to undertake it. For me the 
study of the media in the Middle East, and then in the Arab world, began some seven years 
ago (1993) when I was searching for data to conduct my MA on `Information from Satellite 
Televisions in the Middle East' in the University of North London (UNL). The study of the 
field, which led to an extensive literature review, brought me to the conclusion that there 
was much about the Middle East in the media, but little about the media in the Middle East. 
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The region, though the focus of contemporary political, economic, military and cultural 
consideration, has been a rather neglected area in terms of media investigation. In fact, 
despite growing interest in modern media, and some respectable academic efforts to explore 
the area, there are still many aspects of the Arab media, particularly in terms of policy, 
which have remained untouched (Kamalipour & Mowlana: 1994). Not surprisingly the 
technology fever in this part of the globe has not been accompanied with a clear strategy 
and long term planning. This research may be regarded as an academic endeavour to fill the 
existing gap. 
This is an analytical research which through the lens of political economy draws upon 
general media trends and processes in the Arab world. The study will not therefore be 
deeply involved in detailed facts and figures. This is perhaps a point of weakness for the 
study. The strength of the research, however, lies in its capacity to develop a logical and 
convincing relationship between those elements identified as important in the development 
of the Arab media. 
The study in its fundamental assumptions is highly influenced by the thinkers, mostly 
political economists, whose findings are cited throughout the work. Among the four 
intended interviews designed for the purpose of this study, only three were conducted 
successfully. While the three distinguished media specialists, Professor Douglas Boyd, 
Professor Hamid Mowlana and the well-known journalist and commentator Chris Forester 
generously responded to the research questions (Appendix 1) I had sent to them via the 
INTERNET, the reaction from the ARABSAT administrators was disappointing. Many of 
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the emails sent to the organisation were not responded to, and their eventual reply from the 
Director General's office convinced me that there was a sort of reluctance to be interviewed 
amongst the ARABSAT officials (Appendix 2). Interviewing the Director General of 
ARABSAT or any other member of the board could further enrich my arguments. 
Fortunately, I was able to respond to this problem by using the most updated data about the 
organisation available on the INTERNET 2. Thus, the methodology used in this research is 
characterised by: 
"A political economy approach 
"A case study: ARABSAT 
" Primary and secondary source materials 
" Interviewing media specialists and commentators. 
There are some points concerning terminology, as the frequent use of key terms such as 
`Arab media', `Middle East', `Arab world', `Muslim', `West', 'US dominated', `TNC', 
`Third World', 'secularism 'l and `civilisation' require more clarification from the outset. 
In this research the term `Arab media' refers both to terrestrial and transnational media, 
private or public, which are operated by the Arabs. It also embraces both areas of printed 
and electronic media with a certain emphasis on the latter. The term Middle East, 
according to Boyd (1993), is subject to varying geographical interpretation by both 
scholars and those who have a general idea about the area from newspapers, magazines, 
and broadcast media news reports. The term appears to be British in origin and describes 
2 Along with the published materials, the INTERNET has been a major source of information particularly 
concerned with the analysis of ARABSAT. This included the information about the most recent 
developments of ARABSAT in terms of capital, marketing, services and programming. 
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an area over which the British at one time had considerable influence. Indeed, it may 
cover the Arab world, plus the countries of Turkey, Iran, Israel and Cyprus (Boyd, 1993: 
3). The Arab world constitutes a major part of the Middle East3. Stretching from the 
Atlantic Ocean to the doorstep of the Indian sub-continent, with a recently estimated 
population of over 200 million, the Arab world occupies 13,738,000 square kilometres 
(5.25 million square miles) (Amin 1996 : 103, Butt 1997: 3). It includes 21 Arabic- 
speaking countries of Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Egypt, Sudan, 
Somalia, Djibouti, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab 
Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Yemen plus the Palestinian self-rule territory (Map of the 
Arab world). They are connected together by powerful linguistic, religious, cultural, 
historical and psychological links (Abu-Argoub 1988, Amin, 1996). More than 88 perdent 
of the population consider Arabic as their first language and 92 percent are Muslim (Al 
Saadoon, 1990: 36). 
The three main monotheistic religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, have their roots 
in the Middle East. Islam is a major world religion, second in number only to Christianity, 
with nearly a billion believers. There are many who use the words Muslim, Middle Eastern 
and Arabs interchangeably. This, as Gerner (2000) suggests, is incorrect and misleading 
(Gerner, 2000: 2). Not everyone who is a Muslim is an Arab. More than half of the world- 
wide Islamic community is African, Asian including Persians, Turks, Indians, Pakistanis, 
' Some terminologists separate what they call the `Mediterranean' Arab countries (Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, 
Libya and Egypt) from the remainder of the Middle East (chiefly, the Persian Gulf and Arabian peninsula). 
Thus, `Mediterranean' refers to those states on the southern shore. See the Middle East and Europe edited by 
Gred Nonneman (1993). 
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Indonesians, and Chinese. Only about 20 percent of Muslims are Arab, with the remainder 
spread throughout the former Soviet Union, Europe and North America. There are also 
Arabs who are Christians or Jewish or Druze (ibid. ). 
The term `West', as I have used it in this analysis, refers to the economically powerful, 
politically liberal and culturally secular countries in both side of the Atlantic Ocean, 
namely the European Union (EU) member states and the United States of America (USA). 
Conflict with and competition over the Middle East and Arab world has a long history in 
the West since before the Roman Empire, expressing itself variously in military, religious, 
economic and colonial contention. Even the `early' United States found itself engaged 
militarily and diplomatically in the Middle East in the early nineteenth century as it 
contested the power of the `Barbary pirates' of North Africa. Yet, the contacts between the 
West and the Middle East have not been always antagonistic' (Gerner, 2000: 2). 
The United States emerged from the Second World War stronger than ever, while its 
capitalist rivals were either defeated and devastated (former enemies, Germany and Japan) 
or allies who had suffered severe wartime damages and losses (Great Britain, France) 
(Herman and McChesney, 1997: 17). Since 1945 the strategic alliance between the United 
States of America and most Western European countries has been the foundation of one of 
the most profound and continuous mutual engagements in modern international relations. 
The strategic and security ties between the once great powers of Western Europe and the 
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acknowledged superpower across the Atlantic, born in the Cold War and continued in the 
era of detente, has been accompanied by a growth of unparalleled economic 
interdependence. The European-American relationship, as central to the affairs of global 
system as a whole, has been a constant source and focus of debate, both in academia and at 
the level of political practices. As Michael Smith (1984) in his `Western Europe and the 
United States' has noted, any shallow understanding of the complex and subtle 
relationship between the two may be risky with the danger of `oversimplification and 
superficiality'. At another level however, it can provide the interested but relatively 
uninitiated reader with the kind of perspective which will further stimulate interest, begin 
to give it a critical edge and provide a series of guideposts to further studies (Smith, 1984: 
2). 
The last five decades have been dominated by American political, economic and military 
might. The end of World War II in 1945 marked the beginning of a new era of rapid 
growth. The United States with its unique power established a new world order to facilitate 
its political and economic interests. Just as Great Britain, at the peak period of its 
competitive power and hegemonic status, wanted open markets, so did the United States 
after 1945. The US' attempt to organise a global media system in its own image was aided 
by its influence over the post-war reconstruction of German, Italian, and Japans media 
system. US officials pushed them as much as possible on the path to US -style commercial 
systems. It was in the post-war years that the outline of the contemporary global media 
' For further information on the issue see Deborah Gerner's 'Understanding the Contemporary Middle East' 
2000. 
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system became apparent. An important factor helping to shape this system was the 
combination of the global power of the United States and the imperial legacy of Britain, 
which effectively made English the global `second' language, if not the language of 
choice. It was of considerable value in assisting US media activities abroad. At the same 
time, the dominant US TNCSS began to invest heavily overseas, and US advertising 
agencies followed in their wake. The commercial media also moved abroad and began to 
consolidate and establish empires across formerly distinct media industries, with leading 
media firms acquiring significant holdings in film, music, publishing, and broadcasting 
(Herman and McChesney, 1997: 17,18). 
The emergence and rise of the transnational corporation (TNC) was crucial for global 
capitalism, which resulted in the rise of global media: The modem TNC emerged out of 
the constant growth of corporate enterprise in the wake of the Industrial Revolution in the 
nineteenth century. Increasing numbers of US firms began to think of foreign markets in 
the 1970s and 1980s as they became national companies, found themselves with 
manufacturing surplus, and sought to exploit their technical prowess and product 
differentiation advantages or to attain further economies of scale. British and continental 
European foreign direct investment (FDI) abroad also reached substantial levels before 
1914; that of Britain was heavily concentrated in the Empire and the United States, 
whereas the FDI of continental powers was most often in other parts of Europe. Money 
and capital markets among the Atlantic powers were already well integrated by the 1890s, 
5A TNC is one that sustains facilities in more than one country and plans its operations and investments with 
a multi-country perspective. 
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and financial industries were already spreading aggressively abroad. The first real general 
surge in US FDI and TNC growth came during and after the huge wave of mergers at the 
turn of the century. The TNC became increasingly significant during the twentieth 
century, and contributed most importantly to globalisation when its reach became wide, 
extending to many countries, when its facilities were more integrated and not independent, 
and when there developed many firms of this character, thus making for a more profound 
integration of economic activity across borders (ibid., 13). 
The 1970s witnessed the upsurge and revealed the nature of the emerging global media 
system. It was a largely profit-driven system dominated by TNCs based in the advanced 
capitalist nations, primarily the United States. At the same time, the world had changed 
remarkably in the last quarter of the twentieth century. During this period almost all of the 
European colonies in Asia and Africa gained political independence. And while the 1960s 
had seen growth in media usage in what came to be called the Third World, there was little 
reason to expect the disparity between the media haves and have-nots to diminish for 
generations, if at all (ibid., 22-23). 
The term `Third World' which is frequently used in this research, is one of those categories 
that is less self evident than it appears. Using the term Third World, Mosco (1996) argues 
that even in the `relatively more stable time' of the Cold War era its use was inadequate 
(Mosco, 1996: 14). Now with the collapse of Communism and the elimination of Eastern 
Bloc, the use of the term Third World seems to be problematic. The Third World simply 
denoted "the less developed or developing countries which were not part of the Second 
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World of nations closely aligned with the former Soviet Union" (Mosco, 1997: 19). The 
collapse of the Soviet Union eliminates the need to refer to a Third World "as distinct from 
a Second, but eases the use of the term simply as default, identifying what is not part of the 
core of developed nations" (ibid. ). Such an understanding of the `Third World' is still 
widely used in post Cold war literature (See for example, Schiller 1993, Mosco 1996, 
Herman and MaChsney 1997 among others). In chapter II of this research, discussing the 
role of the oil revenues in the process of development and socio-economic transformation 
in the Arab world, I will return to the question in more'detail. 
Given the growing media competition amongst the Western capitalist states, in chapter IV a 
new level of analysis will be proposed. As we shall see, the new global media 
infrastructures have established new international power relations, which are somehow 
unprecedented. In this new deployment of power, not only the Third World, the Middle 
East and Arab nations, but most of the European countries are now facing the commercial 
aggressiveness of the US. With the collapse of Communism, the assertive and powerful 
presence of the United States, as the main actor on the international scene, has pushed 
almost all of the rest of the world into a passive position, no matter how powerful they are. 
As far as the arising challenge within the industrialised world is concerned, neither 
European Germany nor Asian Japan have really been able to take a considerable part in the 
new international communications order. 
Secularism, the separation of religion and politics, accepted as the norm in political 
developments by many governments, policy makers, experts, and the media in the West has 
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never been given authority in the Muslim world including the Middle East. The 
intertwining of religion and politics occupies a distinctive position in the history and 
politics of the Middle East. The history of the Middle East is in many ways the history of 
monotheism, the belief in a single, supreme God. Islam spread throughout the Middle East, 
culturally expanding the territorial frontiers of the ancient Middle East to include North 
Africa, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, and Central Asian regions such as Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan. Secular values came to the Middle East following European 
colonisation. Tradition and religion, however, continued to play a major role in society and 
politics. There was no mass intellectual and political movement that explicitly sought to 
secularise the Middle East. European colonial governments attempted to impose secular 
political institutions on the Middle East and in response, some wars of independence were 
waged as jihad (divine struggle) against European secularism (Esposito and Muqtedar 
Khan, 2000: 319-20). 
Civilisation as a distinctive line to separate countries has been highlighted by scholars such 
as Samuel Huntington. This approach undermines the importance of national, political and 
economic differences among different nations after the Cold War (Huntington, 1993: 23). 
The civilisation is the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural 
identity people have, short of that which distinguishes humans from other species (ibid. 24). 
According to Huntington (1993) differences among civilisations are not only real; they are 
basic. Civilisations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, 
tradition, and most important, by religion. The people of different civilisations have 
different views on the relations between God and man, the individual and the group, the 
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citizen and the state, parents and children, husband and wife, as well as differing views of 
the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and 
hierarchy. These differences are the product of centuries. They will not soon disappear. 
They are far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies and political 
regimes (ibid. 25). 
The last point is concerned with my standpoint in conducting this research. Today, nobody 
can dispute the critical role of modem media in educating people, liberating them from 
traditionally closed societies, and, of course, opening up a new perception of the world and 
providing a more critically conscious interpretation of almost everything. There are 
supporting evidences in favour of the modern media, the transnational media in particular, 
as promoting people's social, political and economic condition, and enhancing their degree 
of freedom and political participation in both developed and developing countries. 
Furthermore, it is not difficult to acknowledge the fact that authoritarian regimes in the 
Middle East, as in many parts of the Third World, who have long controlled the media and 
censored the news and content of media programming, are often dissatisfied with these new 
developments. They do not like transnational media, mostly because they are not able to 
control them. While concerns over the hegemony of the Western media are real and 
understandable, most rhetoric about the preservation of national sovereignty, cultural values 
and religious beliefs on behalf of the regional states, privileged elite and religious 
conservatives, are nothing but trivial excuses to sustain their status, position and power. 
Beyond national borders, on a global level however, the international relationship is 
principally defined by power (soft power), and the media, as a main manifestation of this 
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power, are at the disposal of powerful nations. In these circumstances, complaints and 
concerns expressed by the less powerful nations about the one way flow of information and 
technology6, even if not fully accepted, must not be simply mocked or dismissed. In my 
judgement, the nations in the Middle East and the Arab/ Islamic world are presently in the 
middle of the critical phase of passing from their traditional societies to modern ones. 
Meanwhile, there is understandably a wide spectrum of ideas, interpretations and patterns 
of behaviour, on issues ranging from Western culture, global economy, technological 
achievements, freedom and democracy and modern media, which may cause some `cultural 
turbulence' within their societies; and in relation to the West. At least one version of the 
new developments, as Indonesian writer, Imam Prasodjo in his article `Islam and Western 
Civilisation' (1995) argues, is "a selective adaptation of modern conditions while 
maintaining the fundamental principles of Islam" (Prasodjo, 1995). My stance in this 
research is not at all against the progress of media technology, either in the Arab countries 
or in any other part of the developing world. What I argue for is an increasingly visible 
need for more clarification of media policy in the Arab world, which may help the 
development of the Arab media to be in harmony with national/regional interests and 
people's demands. This is to underline the fact that the financial investment on the media 
without foresight, feasibility studies and, at least being cautious about the negative aspects 
of the process, might not necessarily lead to a stable development in the region. Conversely 
the probability of degradation of resources, confusion, and ultimately national and regional 
misfortune cannot be completely ruled out. This study, in a sense, is a manifestation of the 
6I will discuss the issue of the free flow of information and the idea of globalisation as a one-way process in 
more detail in chapter II. 
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increasing concerns about the creation of new Western media empires in the Arab/Islamic 
world and, therefore, explicitly reflects the warning aspects of the process. I would like to 
end this introduction by admitting that if I had not already started this enquiry, my 
alternative choice of topic would have been the role of modern media in liberating the vast 
Muslim population in the Middle East. 
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CHAPTER II 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ARAB MEDIA 
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Introduction 
This chapter aims to establish a theoretical framework for the study of the political 
economy of the Arab media. The key concepts, theories and approaches applied throughout 
the research are also discussed in this chapter. Starting with some definitions of political 
economy, the first part of the analysis concentrates on a power-centred approach selected 
from amongst different theories of political economy. Mapping the area, and through a 
review of relevant literature, the next section seeks to provide a better understanding of the 
theoretical debates on the political economy of the media. From the perspective of political 
economy, the key factors involved in shaping media policy and infrastructure in the Arab 
world will be further elaborated. The last section of the chapter intends to provide a 
comprehensive review of the existing literature on the Arab media and particularly 
ARABSAT. 
A theoretical framework for the study 
The political economy of the Arab media since the 1980s has been dominated by three 
central facts: Oil, Globalisation and Islam. While the world-wide process of globalisation 
has been affecting the media policy and infrastructure all around the world (Appadurai, 
1996), oil and Islam have distinctively contributed in shaping the media in the Middle East 
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for the last two to three decades. The development of the Arab media and, therefore, my 
further debates in the following chapters, will be closely concerned with these three central 
facts/areas. 
Oil is the lifeblood of the Arab economy. Since the oil boom of 1973, almost no single 
sector of the Arab economy and industry has remained untouched by the impact of oil. 
Even now, despite some progress in promoting the non-oil sectors, oil, for most Arab 
economies, is a matter of life and death (Market Report, 1999: 34). One can confidently 
claim that no serious study of the contemporary Middle East and Arab world may be 
adequately conducted without taking into account the significance of the oil reserves and 
revenues. Structural change and development in the Arab world are, to a large degree, 
fuelled by the Arab oil revenues (Sharabi 1988, Richards and Waterbury 1990, Sluglett and 
Sluglett 1991). In this research, I would argue that the impact of oil on the region's politics 
and economy has been paradoxical. This second chapter of the research has been designed 
to examine the interaction between oil, the presence of the Western powers in the region, 
and the national and/or regional developmental strategies, particularly the development of 
the telecommunications sector. 
Globalisation has become an integral part of media-cultural studies (Robertson 1992, 
Morley and Robins 1995). The process is conceptualised as the growth and acceleration of 
cultural and economic networks which operate on a world-wide basis and scale. Central to 
this process has been the emergence of communications technologies and media networks, 
which facilitates faster, more extensive and interdependent forms of world-wide exchange 
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and interaction. Since the early 1980s, globalisation has affected every corner of the world 
and the Arab world is not an exception. Along with oil, the powerful forces of globalisation 
have been critical in shaping the media policy and infrastructure of the Arab world. The 
debate about globalisation and media-cultural imperialism constitutes a major part of this 
analysis. What actually distinguishes my arguments from the traditional discourse in this 
context, is the significance of the rising Islamic movements which are challenging the 
globalised, that is Western-dominated, forms of living all around the world. 
Islam is discussed in an effort to find some solution for the various problems facing the 
modern world. The powerful influence of Islam has led to social, political, economic and 
cultural changes all around the Arab/Islamic world as in the Western countries inhabited by 
established Arab and other Muslim immigrant communities (Prasodjo, 1995). Since the 
early 1980s, there has been a massive Muslim media movement in reaction to global media 
predominance. Launching a campaign against the prevailing position of the Western media, 
Muslims are attempting to develop their own media and restore their cultural and religious 
identity, defamed or devalued by the global media networks. The new Islamic movements 
have been reflected in the works of media critics both within and outside the Middle East 
(Mowlana 1990,1995, El-Affendi 1993, Siddiqi 1998, Alterman 1998, Eickelman 2000). 
Some media scholars, however, have regarded the new developments more specifically as a 
part of enhancing Arabic culture and civilisation (Alterman, 1998). 
In this research the development of the Arab media is seen as a by-product of the 
interaction between the external forces of globalisation, with Western political, economic 
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and cultural power at its heart, and the internal resources of oil (economic) and Islam 
(political and cultural). In fact, the role of oil in the formation of the developmental 
strategies is understood in conjunction with the Western powers' presence and interference 
in the region. Globalisation and its immediate correlates of liberalisation, deregulation and 
commercialisation are characteristics of Western hegemony over the rest of the world. 
And finally, Islam and, particularly, the rising Islamic political movements, are seen as the 
most formidable barriers' to the domination of Western culture and civilisation (Prasodjo, 
1995). The main theme of the study and, therefore, the central hypothesis dominating the 
whole story, is that the development of the Arab media a) has been directed and driven by 
the Western powers, though in a subtle way, and b) is characterised by reactionary internal 
policies fuelled by the oil revenues, and cultural and political sentiments, overwhelmingly 
Islamic, rather than being pre-thought and planned. This research, in its final analysis, 
reflects my concern about the absence of clarity in adopting media policies by the Arabs in 
the region; and claims that the existing theoretical and practical ambiguity has left the 
global powers unassailable in their influence on the Arab national and regional media 
market and policy. Since the Arab media, as I argue, are being developed in the context of 
a power confrontation between the Arab world and the West, the use of a political 
economy approach may appropriately serve the analysis. 
Political economy: definitions and approaches 
For nearly three hundred years, the term political economy' has been used to explain the 
interrelationship between the political and economic affairs of the state (Caparaso and 
Levine, 1992). For some critics of political economy, however, the science has not been 
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considered strictly political. The discipline, as they understood it, consists 'primarily in the 
industrial activities of individual men' and it is not limited to relationship between the 
administration and the public. Since the early twentieth century, the growing concern for 
public welfare once again put political economy in its political and governmental 
framework (Mosco, 1996: 24,25). The increasing interest in political economy contests the 
conventional idea that economics and politics behave separately or apply different methods 
(Caparaso and Levine, 1992). 
Dallas Smythe (1991) views political economy as `the body of practice and theory' and 
argues for a combination of a `sense of the descriptive and prescriptive' in political 
economy (Mosco, 1996: 24). In this view, the aim, of political economy is not only to 
describe the social facts as they are, but clearly to prescribe how they ought to be. On the 
same line, the principal purpose of political economy as a `branch of state craft' has been 
regarded by Gilpin (1977) as `a study in which moral judgements are made on particular 
issues' (Gilpin, 1977). The 'prescriptive' function of political economy held by Smythe, 
corresponding with Gilpin's making `moral judgements on particular issues', defies the 
conventional goal of social and scientific researches, which is often said to be value-fee. 
Since there is a "logical gap between empirical evidence and moral values ", it is argued 
that "social science is not in a privileged position to pronounce on social values" 
(Abercrombie, et al. , 1988: 263). It is, therefore, said that social scientists "have to strive 
for value neutrality with respect to research and policy formation ". In other words, 
empirical discoveries about social facts do not tell us what we ought to do (ibid. ). There are 
however three objections to the conventional idea of neutrality in science: 1) despite 
26 
personal declarations of neutrality, values may unwittingly obtrude in research; 2) it is not 
clear that neutrality, even in principle, is possible; 3) it is not always evident that value 
neutrality is desirable; on some questions nobody should be neutral (Abercrombie, et al. , 
1988: 264). 
Given the fact that any selection is based upon a particular tendency, this research, after all, 
is the reflection of my own background, values, and orientations. I strongly share the idea 
that 1) sociological judgements are coloured by the researcher's own experiences, 2) all 
observations are necessarily theory-laden, and 3) since researchers have different values, 
they will unconsciously, but necessarily, have their arguments influenced by their values 
(Abercrombie, et al., 1988: 170). Yet, throughout this research, I will try to distinguish 
between two different levels of value neutrality: personal and professional. As a Middle 
Eastern person with an Islamic background, I have, and, naturally make clear, my own 
values and orientations. As a social scientist, I will attempt not to allow my professional 
status to be dictated by these values. 
What makes a research reliable and academically acceptable is its reliance on documents, 
its objectivity in analysing fact and figures, its success in establishing a powerful 
relationship between the various factors involved, as well as strong reasoning and 
argument. Practically, however, this is not an easy task to undertake. As far as my position 
in this research is concerned, the force-centred relationships of the great powers with the 
Middle Eastern states during the last two centuries; the increasing domination of global 
forces over the natural and human resources of the region; the cultural, political and 
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historical background of the country which I have come from - Iran; and more importantly 
my own personal experiences of both the former pro-Western and secularly-oriented regime 
of Pahlavi, and the new established religious system in Iran, supported by the 
overwhelming majority, and disliked by the West, all may lead me to a certain direction and 
conclusion. This is perhaps natural. Yet, as will be found through the following chapters, I 
have tried to commit myself to the principles of reliable academic work. 
The last two definitions of political economy, held by Smythe and Gilpin, though 
controversial, may well comply with my approach to the study of the Arab media. There is 
still another important approach to political economy, which I regard as critical in this 
investigation. Mosco (1996) thinks of political economy as the "study of the social 
relations, particularly the power relations, that mutually constitute the production, 
distribution, and consumption of resources" (Mosco, 1996: 25). From this perspective, he 
seeks to connect political economy and media products, such as newspapers, books, videos, 
films and audiences, as the primary resources. This formulation, Mosco suggests, has a 
certain analytical value for students of communication because it calls attention to 
fundamental forces and processes at work in the marketplace. 
Political economy in this research 
For the purpose of this research, from among the most important theories of political 
economy, including the classical, neo-classical, Marxian, Keynsian, and so on, a power- 
centred approach has been selected. In this approach politics is identified by the use of 
power, and since economy maintains power, it is claimed that the economy is political 
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(Caporaso and Levine, 1992: 5). Power is defined by Max Weber as "the probability that 
an actor in a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his will despite 
resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests" (ibid.: 161). 
In a global context, the question of power, politically and economically, may well be 
identified by the wide gap between North and South, rich and poor. The crux of the matter 
"is power-sharing, that is, giving the Southern countries a more equitable share in power 
and decision-making within monetary and financial institutions" (Said, 1993: 343). The 
literature on power mainly focuses on the traditional discourse of the colonial 
predominance of great powers over less powerful nations mostly embodied in the forms of 
exclusion; and prevention of their access to the resources which they need for a meaningful 
participation in the global arena. 
In this research, however, I will switch to a new understanding of power. Indeed, once 
directly-exerted power (hard power) has now been replaced by `soft power'. Joseph Nye, a 
professor of international relations at Harvard University, finds some of the current 
American strengths in what he calls soft power: "Soft power - the ability to co-opt rather 
than command - rests on intangible resources: culture, ideology, the ability to use the 
international institutions to determine the framework of debate" (Schiller, 1993a: 104). 
Similarly, in Schiller's view the condition in the Middle East [Persian Gulf war (1990-9 1) 
reveals another aspect of contemporary imperialist strategy: "the ability to mobilise 
international organisations - now that the Soviet presence has been integrated into the 
West - for imperialist aims" (Schiller, 1993a: 103). President Bush explained it this way: 
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"Not since 1945 have we seen the real possibility of using the United Nations as it was 
designed, as a centre for international collective security" (ibid. ). The exciting point is 
that the control of the media and information, according to Nye, is at the core of soft power 
(ibid. ). Said (1993) identifies the essential connection between power and information in 
this way: 
This twinning of power and legitimacy, one force obtaining in the world of direct 
domination, the other in the cultural sphere, is the characteristic of classical imperial 
hegemony. Where it differs in the American century is the quantum leap in the reach of 
cultural authority, thanks in large measure to the unprecedented growth in the apparatus for 
the diffusion and control of information (Said, 1993: 352). 
Dominating the world, Western media have been the most effective instruments of exerting 
soft power. Not only the direct publicity and advertising, editorial and analytic materials, 
but the technology itself has been very attractive to target users/ audiences throughout the 
world. In this research, when soft power is mentioned, one implication is the Western use 
of the media to encourage the Arab regional states, public and private sectors and 
individuals in investing in what they do not necessarily need. In a sense, it appears that in 
the global media market the colonial commercial relationships have been replaced by new 
more efficient codes of conduct. Unlike perhaps 20 years ago, the global market and policy 
are being regulated so that the Third World nations including the Arabs are increasingly 
equipped with the latest versions of media technology, rather than being excluded. - 
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From a political economy perspective, the next section seeks to underline the role of 
transnational and co-operative media in the formation and development of a new 
international, economic, political, and media-cultural, order within which the Third World 
nations and media are increasingly driven to the periphery. Mapping the area and through 
the review of relevant literature, it also aims to provide a theoretical base for my further 
debates on the political economy of the Arab media. 
Political economy of the media: relevant literature 
Over the last half a century, political economy as a major approach in media research has 
directed the work of scholars in several centres around the world. In North America Schiller 
(1969-93) extended his political economy approach to media studies in relation to both the 
institutional and Marxian traditions. He developed the idea that a sense of injustice at the 
media industry has become an integral part of a wider corporate order, which is both 
exploitative and undemocratic (Mosco, 1996). Contrary to the conventional wisdom, 
Schiller (1993b) doubted that globalisation of the media has resulted in the formation of an 
international civil society as such. Rather he argued: 
This process has resulted in an international order organised by transnational economic 
interests that are largely unaccountable to the nation-states in which they operate. This 
transnational corporate system is the product of a rationalised and commercialised 
communications infrastructure, which transmits massive flows of information and has 
extended its marketing reach to every corner of every hemisphere (Schiller, 1993b: 47). 
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Since the 1980s two key factors - 'transnational corporations' and `communication 
revolution' have been dominating the scene. "The primary agent of globalisation is the 
transnational corporation. The primary driving force is the revolution in information and 
communication technologies" (Schiller, 1993b: 47). The exercise of military power in the 
Persian Gulf for Schiller is an unmistakable metaphor of the persisting age of imperialism, 
which is complemented by the widespread growth of a total cultural package that includes 
far more than television (Schiller, 1993a: 97). 
In Europe, Garnharn (1979-1990), Golding (1982-1991) and Murdock (1978-1993) have 
emphasised class power. Building their debate on the Frankfurt School tradition and 
inspired by the work of Raymond Williams (1958-83) they developed a great deal of 
research on the integration of media institutions. Their efforts include mainly business and 
state policy authorities, the resistance of lower classes and movements reflected in 
opposition to neo-conservative state practices promoting liberalisation, commercialisation 
and privatisation of the communication industries. 
The expansion of leading transnational media corporations to become new world power 
centres has been examined in the work of Cees Harnelink (1983). Controlling both wealth 
and technology they have accelerated the process of media globalisation to expand their 
interests into new realms. Alongside this process there is a danger of a new economic gap 
stemming from unequal access to the resources of new communications and information 
technologies. The new global communication technology is "the ineluctable spread of the 
American dream... a huge mega phone blaring American messages across the world" 
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(Hamelink, 1983: 4-5). Modern communication technology was offered to the world with 
the promise that the expression of cultural diversity would be guaranteed. In reality, 
however, the centrally controlled technology has been the main instrument of destruction of 
cultural diversity and replacement of a single global culture (ibid. ). 
In the 1990s the power of the United States, Europe and a few developed countries was 
strengthened even more. A major feature of the process, Dyson and Humphreys (1990) 
argued, was the emergence of some ten dominant international media equipment producers. 
The United States had three: AT&T, IBM and Motorola. Western Europe had four: Alcatel 
(France), Siemens (West Germany), Ericsson (Sweden) and Philips (The Netherlands). 
Japan had two: NEC and Fujitsu and Canada had Northern Telecom. Meanwhile, the 
unique strength of the American broadcasting and film industries, based on a huge home 
market and an established dominance in international programme flows, has been 
threatening not only the Third World but West European broadcasting markets. With the 
deregulation and internationalisation processes Europe is facing the prospect of a flood of 
American imports (Dyson and Humphreys, 1990). 
A research tradition, underlining power, control and class struggle, is most highlighted in 
the work of Armand Mattelart. Mattelart (1979) in his `Multinational Corporations and the 
Control of Culture; the ideological apparatuses of imperialism', documents how 
international marketing firms have strengthened their power in the media business by 
becoming primary producers of valuable information about consumers. This approach has 
been drawn from a range of traditions including dependency theory, Western Marxism, and 
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the world-wide experience of national liberation movements to understand the media as one 
among the principal sources of resistance to power. He viewed the multinational companies 
as responsible for the ideological apparatus of imperialism. It is vital to understand the 
ways in which the relations of capital have imposed themselves on cultural production and 
the mass media (Matterlart, 1979: x). In the process of industrial concentration, Mattelart 
(1979) argues, the owners of high technology have increasingly become the ones who 
determine not only the manufacture of hardware and the installation of systems, but also the 
development of programmes, the content of messages. He takes the example of education, 
which had not been previously affected by massive industrialisation but has now begun to 
be colonised by the newcomers (Mattelart, 1979: 2). The rise of a high technology looming 
up in the shadow of a war economy, can not be dissociated from the American monopoly 
capitalism which leads to the easing of boundaries between the Pentagon and the big 
industrialists. It is within this context that mega-million communication and military 
contracts between the USA and, for example, the Shah of Iran, as we shall see in chapter V, 
were concluded (Mattelart, 1979: 3). 
The relationship between information technology and national power is the central focus of 
Larry Martinez's debate (1985) in his 'Communication Satellites: Power Politics in Space'. 
Countries with superior information competence will have an advantage over others with 
low competence. This is shown to be the case in the 1982 Falklands War where British 
forces who had access to reconnaissance and weather satellite data, as well as expertise of 
the headquarters staff 8,000 miles away, defeated the Argentineans who had difficulties in 
maintaining contact with their forces only 400 miles offshore (Martinez, 1985: xiv). He 
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points to two axes in the geopolitics of information: use and access. Paradoxically, 
information alone does not represent power, but the distribution of access to 
communications and information technologies, and the ability to use the technologies does. 
The uneven distribution of access has created `information rich' and `information poor' 
countries (Martinez, 1985: xv). Use refers to the content, direction of flow, and end effects 
stemming from the utilisation of an information system or technology. Use is objectively 
political. Access signifies the ability to use the information technology. To complete the 
analytical framework, use corresponds to the political perspective, while an analysis of 
access requires the technological perspective. Use politicises access, while the reverse is 
less often the case (Martinez, 1985: xvi). My approach, however, contests his 
understanding of access in the particular political economy of the Arab world. In 1985, at 
the threshold of the creation of ARABSAT, Martinez (1985) viewed the system as a `very 
high prestige project' for the Arab countries. ARABSAT, he maintained, clearly reflected 
the political motivations behind regional and national satellite networks (Martinez, 1985: 9, 
10). 
From the vantage point of political economy, the development of the media in the Middle 
East and Persian Gulf, has been reflected in the work of Hamid Mowlana (1990,1996). In 
most parts of the region, particularly in oil exporting countries, the development of 
advanced media technology has been fundamental. The world-wide process of media 
development has given an even more critical role to this conventionally important area of 
the world. The primacy of oil production, once considered as the sole index of the area's 
trade and military communications flow, Mowlana (1990) argues, is now undergoing a shift 
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"toward information systems as they become more central to the socio-economic, military, 
and political infrastructures of the Persian Gulf states ". A key factor ranking the Middle 
East as one of the most sophisticated centres of telecommunications in world politics in his 
view is "geopolitics of information ecology wrapped in modern communication 
technology". In order to protect their world-wide interests, this process is being particularly 
accelerated by the increasing desires of foreign powers (Mowlana, 1990: 85,86). Indeed, 
the great powers, particularly the United States, have been the main beneficiaries of the 
modern communication technologies in the region. He takes the examples of Bahrain, 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia as laboratories for the complex process of intangible power 
resources that have been shaping the Arab media infrastructures. Along with the Saudis, 
high investment in economic, military, and intelligence matters, the two other countries of 
Kuwait and Bahrain "have established enough dependencies with the West to make the 
information and communication infrastructure of the region, at least technologically, 
vulnerable to the existing and future policies of external powers" (Mowlana, 1996: 83,84, 
85). 
Vincent Mosco (1996) in his `The Political Economy of Communication' overviews the 
discipline of political economy, its discourses, accomplishments and the interaction of the 
approach with other forms of communication research. Starting with an historical, 
descriptive, and critical overview of political economy as a general approach to social 
analysis, he scrutinises the political economy of communication and its relationship with 
cultural studies and policy studies. For Mosco, social change involves three dynamic 
processes of commodification, spatialisation and structuration. There is no single correct 
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approach that, by itself, constitutes a definitive political economy of communication. The 
political economy approach to communication, in his view, is one starting point or gateway 
among a range of others, such as cultural studies and policy studies, major approaches that 
reside on the borders of political economy. There is, in fact, a dialogue between this 
approach and the two other disciplines. Cultural studies draws on a range of disciplines, 
particularly literary criticism, hermeneutic social science, and various strands of 
structuralism and post-structuralism. Policy studies is built on research traditions in 
political science, economics, and institutional political economy. It aims to assess 
alternative courses of action, particularly, though not limited to, government or state 
actions, in communication. Political economy, within the study of social relations, tends to 
concentrate on the centrality of power in the analysis of communication. Power is 
understood both as a resource to achieve goals and an instrument of control within social 
hierarchies. This would lead the political economist of communication to look at shifting 
forms of control along the production, distribution, and consumption circuit (Mosco, 
1996: 2,3,257). 
The centralisation of media power, supplemented by the ever-increasing trend of 
commercialisation, and decline in the relative importance of public broadcasting, are the 
major themes in Herman and McChesney's (1997) `Global Media, the new missionaries of 
global capitalism'. They address a number of key questions which include: how the 
operation of the global media is affecting media in a number of countries around the world; 
and, what are the local and national responses to the spread of the global media system? 
The short-term effects of media globalisation, in their view, are complex, variable, and by 
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no means negative. Among the positive effects, they note the rapid dissemination of 
popular culture developed in the dominant commercial centres to the far corners of the 
earth. There is also some flow toward the cultural centres, and horizontal flows within 
regions as well, that may open new vistas and enhance understanding of different cultures 
within dominant and subordinate states. On the other hand, the process can be viewed less 
optimistically. They regard the primary effect of the globalisation process to be the 
implantation of the commercial model of communication, its extension to broadcasting and 
the new media and its gradual intensification under the force of competition and bottom- 
line pressures. The commercial model, relying on advertiser support, tends to erode the 
public sphere and to create a `culture of entertainment', that is incompatible with a 
democratic order. Media outputs are commoditised and are designed to serve market ends, 
not citizenship needs. Moreover, the commercial media, penetrating deeply into the global 
market system, means greater openness to foreign commerce in media products, channels 
and ownership (Herman and McChesney, 1997: 8,9). 
The idea of globalisation as a one-way flow and of Western superiority over the global 
media-cultural flow, has not gone without criticism. Some argue for an uneven 
development of globalisation and point to an increasing trend of `alternative' and `reverse' 
flows. Appadurai (1993) among others, argues that globalisation is far from an even 
process of Western expansion driven by economic imperatives. Instead, contemporary 
global conditions are best characterised by the dynamic movements of ethnic groups, 
technology, financial transactions, media images and ideological conflicts, which are not 
neatly determined by one harmonious `master plan'; rather, the speed, scope and impact of 
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these flows are fractured and disconnected (Appadurai, 1993: 328). Despite the fact that 
capitalist modernity does involve an element of cultural homogenisation, Robertson (1995) 
argues that mechanisms of fragmentation, hetrogenisation and hybridity are also at work. It 
is not a question of either homogenisation or hetrogenisation, but rather of the ways in 
which both of these two tendencies have become features of life across much of the late 
twentieth century world (Robertson, 1995: 27). Robertson also adopts the concept of 
`glocalisation', originally a marketing term, to express the global production of the local 
and the localisation of the global. In this view, the global and local are mutually 
constituting: that is, much which is considered to be local, and counterpoised to the global, 
is the outcome of trans-local processes. Thus, nation-states were forged within a global 
nation-state system and the contemporary rise in nationalist sentiment can be regarded as 
an aspect of globalisation, not just as a reaction to it. The global and local are relative 
terms. The idea of the local is produced within and by a globalising discourse which 
includes capitalist marketing and its increasing orientation to differentiated local markets 
(Robertson, 1992: 175). 
Barker (1999) argues that globalisation and global media-cultural flows, should not 
necessarily be understood in terms of `a set of neat linear determination' (Barker, 1999: 
42). The impact of Anglo-American television in a global context may be understood as 
the creation of a layer of western capitalist modernity. which overlays, but not necessarily 
obliterates, pre-existing cultural forms. Nationalism and the nation-state continue to coexist 
with cosmopolitanism and the weakening of national identity. Barker (1999) further points 
to an increasing trend of `reverse flow' : the impact of non-western ideas and practices on 
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the west, for example, the impact of African music and the export of telenovels from Latin 
American to the USA and Europe. All of which adds up not only to a general decentring 
of Western perspective about progress but increasingly to the deconstruction of the very 
idea of homogenous national cultures (ibid. ). 
However, this questioning of globalisation as a one-way flow, Barker (1999) confirms, 
should not lead us to abandon our core concern, which is power and inequality. He refers to 
Massey (1994: 149) when she suggests that in the 'power geometry' of globalisation, as 
she calls it, what is at stake is the fact that some people are more in charge of it than others; 
some initiate flows and movements, others don't (Barker 1999: 43). 
To conclude, the interaction between power and economic, political and cultural 
phenomena, has provided an appealing focus for political economy. The approach, as a 
quick revision of the above literature may reveal, primarily tends to underline the power 
imbalance between the major global media players and those who lack the financial or 
technical capacity, or both, to access, and more importantly to master, the technology, 
whether on a national or international level. Political economists are clearly concerned 
about the exploitative and imperial nature of the global media, the concentration and 
centralisation of capital, the new patterns of production and consumption, and the new 
ways in which cultural production and the media are subordinated to transnational 
corporations. The relationship between information technology and national power, the 
ways in which transnational corporations are transmitting massive flows of information 
and extending their marketing reach to diverse parts of the world, and the power of media 
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businesses in exploitation of their consumers are common themes in the literature on the 
political economy of the media. At the heart of their analysis are the implications of the 
globalisation, liberalisation and commercialisation processes, with a particular focus on the 
United States and some other powerful nations. 
The fact is that the media in the Third World countries are being formed as an integral part 
of this global process. The formation of the Arab media and the critical question of media 
policy in this `economically and strategically valuable region and a source of colossal 
profitability' as Schiller (1993a: 103-104) defines it, cannot be adequately analysed 
without taking into consideration these global facts. Yet, as noted at the beginning of this 
chapter, there are some indigenous factors involved in the process, which need to be 
addressed within the specific context of the Arab world. 
Oil, Development and the Great Powers 
A major stream of research on the political economy of the media in the Third World has 
grown in response to the development and dependency approach. The question is what 
really governs development in a Third World economy: external or internal factors? The 
notion of external conditions mechanically determining internal ones is related to the 
controversial metropolis-satellite model in which dependency can be traced from Wall 
Street to the remotest Indian villages. The notion of `satellite' implies a total lack of own 
dynamics. By contrast the evolutionist theory of development disregards international 
relations, and claims that the development of each national economy is basically internally 
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determined. Other analysts see interaction between external and internal factors, although 
the former is seen as dominant (Blomstrom & Hettne, 1984: 72). 
The dependency approach could once claim that most of the Third World nations were kept 
in a state of dependency to the great powers. With the collapse of the Soviet bloc and 
stagnation and transformation in capitalism, the geopolitical map of the Third World 
underwent dramatic changes. What for a long time was referred to as the Third World is 
breaking up into many worlds. Parts of it have achieved significant overall growth rates, 
higher than the West and Japan. As Mosco (1996) argues, some South East Asian nations 
using advanced technologies with the older means of authoritarian control, have put 
substantial economic distance between themselves and the rest of the underdeveloped 
world. These Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs) are seen as development models for 
the rest of the world. Their overall economic performance places them at a different level 
from much of the underdeveloped world (Mosco, 1996: 14). 
At the other extreme, the condition of most of the Third World nations as against the North 
(Western Europe, Japan, and the United States) is worsening. Schiller (1993a), among 
others, believes that they seem more helpless than ever in resisting the demands of their 
creditors and overseers. In his view "despite some variability in this condition and 
occasional balking by a recalcitrant ruling group, the general situation reveals practically 
an abandonment of the challenging economic and cultural positions this group advanced 
not so long ago" (Schiller, 1993a: 99,100). Even worse, in Mosco's (1997) view, many of 
the world's underdeveloped nations have dropped off the map of the global political 
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economy. Indeed, the poorest nations have grown so irrelevant to the global economy that 
it is no longer fitting to call them dependent on the developed nations, simply cut off from 
all but a trickle of global flows of goods, services, and people. The gap between the NICs 
and excluded nations is widening. The economic gap separating, for example, South Korea 
and Somalia is so wide that it makes less sense than ever to refer to a whole class of 
societies as the `Third World' (Mosco, 1996: 14,15). Current G7 initiatives toward 
cancelling `Third World Debt' shows both a sense of moral anxiety, and a concern that debt 
inhibits the growth of new markets. 
In this context, the Arab world occupies a distinctive position. Considered as a part of the 
Third World, the region has been treated with a different research tradition mainly due to its 
huge oil resources and incomes. Two-thirds of the world's known petroleum resources and 
half the world's present supply is held by the Middle Eastern countries (Sharabi 1988, 
Richards and Waterbury 1996). In the Arab world, unlike most Third World countries, lack 
of capital has not been a major obstacle in developmental plans. The wealth generated by 
oil provided a distinctive pattern of media development in the Arab world remarkably 
different from the other sections of the developing world. This rather privileged and 
exceptional condition was the major driving force behind Arab media enterprise and 
investment, particularly, by Saudi Arabia and the other oil rich countries of the Gulf Co- 
operation Council (GCC). 
Addressing the power relations which are involved in the construction of media enterprises 
in the Arab world, Chapter III seeks to determine whether the Arabs' privileged condition 
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in general led to their political autonomy from the great powers. It also aims to reveal how 
the Arab oil revenues out of mega-billion sales to the Western world return back again to 
Western financial institutions. This reflects the concerns over political and economic 
dependency of the Arab states to the West. 
In a broader context, as Brian Murphy (1983) argues, apart from the natural needs of many 
Third world countries to develop their political and economic situation, one can see some 
other factors involved. These factors do not guarantee the national/regional interests of 
these countries in many cases. Murphy (1983) points to "a kind of reaction to or protection 
against the poor political position rather than a pure economic or developmental strategy" 
in these countries. "A rather sophisticated level of double-think approach" prevails among 
Third World government officials. They are aware of their political and economic 
dependency on the West, yet they do not want to accept this state of affairs passively. 
There are two things they can do. They can decide for an individual deal, or unite with 
others to maintain some respect. Dealing with Western agencies and transnational 
corporations, in his view, at least they can forge a mechanism for saving face (Murphy, 
1983: 102). The development of the telecommunications sector in the Arab world will be 
examined in this general context (Chapter III, Oil, Development and Great Powers). 
Globalisation, Media-cultural Imperialism and Islam 
A significant part of this study involves the question of globalisation and its consequences. 
Chapter IV specifically underlines the ideological discourses over globalisation, media 
cultural imperialism as well as the forms of Islamic resistance to these powerful trends. The 
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world-wide growth and acceleration of cultural and economic networks, the expansion of 
world business systems and the subordination of the less developed countries raise 
questions about the inequality of power and the lack of intellectual and economic resources 
available in the Third World. Since the media are at the centre of these processes, the very 
close inter-connection of the media, culture, economy and power is a matter of great 
concern. Chapter IV is perhaps the most appropriate point in the study to examine the 
interaction of the sophisticated concepts of power, politics, economy, culture, and media 
technology as indivisible spheres. The rise of the Islamic movements which are challenging 
the Western paradigm is examined in this context. Despite the existence of other versions of 
interpretation, the most common idea about the process of globalisation amongst Muslims 
is that it is a serious threat. 
Globalisation: Threat or Opportunity? 
There are generally two different approaches towards the process of globalisation. One 
approach views globalisation as a positive and promising process. Barker (1999) holds the 
idea that globalisation, now an inevitable part of our day-to-day life, is providing the 
opportunity of exchanging views, information, commodities and cultures amongst 
individuals and nations alike. By the global expansion of the media, remote cultures 
separated by national borders and considered as alien are becoming more and more 
accessible. Today, we are "global armchair travellers" (Barker, 1999). Using the Internet 
and while sitting in our office we are able to call a library in Singapore, dispatch a bunch of 
flowers for a friend's wedding ceremony in Tehran, be informed about the latest 
developments in the American stock-market, and read Shakespeare's "Hamlet" without 
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even touching the book. At the same time, we can watch the Intifada movement and the 
Palestinian struggle against Israel with a few hours delay or even live on our TV screen. 
Not all nations perceive the trend as a threat to their economic, cultural and political 
independence and to their existing structures of media. Many welcome the additional 
channels of news, movies and entertainment and the diversity in telecommunications 
delivery systems. For example, Corinna Sturmer (1993) shows in her essay on MTV, that 
for Eastern Europeans, `Western culture' has had symbolic value as a resistance to 
totalitarianism, demonstrating that what for one community may be media imperialism can 
be a liberating force for another (Sturmer, 1993). 
In contrast to this openness, some view the process as a threat. Throughout the Arab/Islamic 
world the concern is overwhelmingly coloured by religious sentiments. Consider the fact 
that satellite dishes have been declared illegal in many Muslim countries including Saudi 
Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt and Iran on the ground of being offensive to their cultural and 
religious values (Barker, 1999). They denounce many Western, mainly American satellite 
broadcasts as pornographic and corrupting programmes. While the onslaught of secular 
media is seen by some as a growing danger to the Third World, particularly religious 
societies (as we shall discuss in chapter IV) within the West some European countries, and 
especially France, are expressing concern, and in some cases hostility, against the American 
media-cultural imperialism (Sardar 1997, Barker, 1999). 
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Globalisation as cultural imperialism 
Within the Third World countries the concern over globalisation of the media is mainly 
coloured by the imperialistic character of the process. There are two major approaches 
towards globalisation as cultural imperialism. The first approach has the idea that the 
process of globalisation tends to sustain the patterns of western economic and cultural 
dominance. Global notions of what constitutes freedom, individual choice, a good life and a 
desirable future come largely from the dominant media output. In this view, globalisation is 
a one-way flow from the West to the rest, which advocates new forms of cultural 
imperialism, disintegrates non-western local cultures and traditions and destroys indigenous 
media programmes. The process is efficiently enforced by Western movies, TV 
programmes, soap operas, pop music, fashion and life style (Barker, 1999). Attaching a 
negative evaluation to the process, this perspective underlines a loss of cultural diversity 
and the growth of sameness. Central to the concept of cultural imperialism is the 
domination of one culture by another (Hamelink, 1983: 22) In its boldest form, Schiller 
(1985) suggests that the media are at the service of American capitalism. The global media 
networks involve the perpetuation of the dominance of the United States and subordination 
of the small, poor nations. Consequently, it is feared that the increased global market for 
television programmes would be dominated by the Americans, who hold the top three 
positions in terms of global turnover for both traditional television companies and the world 
film industry (Schiller, 1985). 
The second approach resists the idea that globalisation is a one-way process. This approach 
underlines the impact of non-western cultures on the West. As examples Barker (1999) 
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points to the advent of Indian music on a world-wide scale, the global impact of Reggae, 
Hip-Hop and World Music and the creation of an ethnic Diaspora through population 
movement from the Third World into the West, the influence of Islam, Hinduism and other 
world religions within the West, and the commoditisation and sale of ethnic food and 
clothing. In this view, cosmopolitanism is an increasing aspect of day-to-day life through 
which different cultures, which had once been considered as alien and remote are becoming 
accessible today via our televisions, radio and shopping centres. As a consequence, we may 
choose to watch `American', eat `Indian', dress `Italian', and listen `African'. Furthermore, 
it is argued hybridisation of Western culture, as a new process underway, will eventually 
lead to the displacement of Western culture from its present peak (Barker, 1999). A 
complementary view of the complex impact of global media is offered by Morley and 
Roberts (1995). 
The opponents of globalisation as cultural imperialism raise three central difficulties with 
the thesis: 1) It is not necessarily the case that the global flows of cultural discourse are any 
longer constituted as one-way traffic from the `west-to-the-rest' 2) The predominant flow of 
cultural discourse from west to east and north to south is not necessarily to be understood as 
a form of domination, 3) Since the forces of fragmentation and hybridisation are equally 
strong, globalisation cannot simply be understood as a process of homogenisation (Barker, 
1999: 38). O'Sullivan, et al. (1994) also argue that the process of globalisation is 
distinguished from cultural imperialism in that it is conceived as more complex and total, 
and less organised or predictable in its outcomes (O'Sullivan, et al.: 1994). 
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Consequences of globalisation 
Globalisation is being accompanied by some significant trends. One of the major 
consequences of globalisation, in Sardar's (1997) view, is the wave of economic 
liberalisation which began in the 1980s. The process of liberalisation led to freedom of 
markets from state constraints and the expansion of multinational corporations from one 
country to another in quest for more profitability. Privatisation became the norm and 
consumption replaced production as the perceived motor of the economy. In the Middle 
East, as we shall see later (Chapter IV), competitive forces in the global communications 
industry are impacting upon Arab carriers, making a trend toward privatisation likely over 
the next 10 years. Sardar (1997) also argues that globalisation has resulted in the 
universalisation of Western culture. The trend has been enforced by transnational TVs, 
Western movies, American life style and global news networks such as CNN, News 
International and BBC World Service (Sardar, 1997: 163). This has provoked cultural and 
political anxieties among the Arab nations. The global wave of liberalisation, de-regulation 
and privatisation of the media constitute a significant part of the study, particularly, through 
an analysis of ARABSAT. The development of national and regional satellites in the region 
may be partly seen as a protection policy and a form of resistance to these overwhelming 
flows. The process, I would argue, has in fact puzzled the ARABSAT policy-makers, in 
trying to establish a balance between the economic and cultural objectives of their strategy. 
Additionally, regarded as important for the purpose of the study, globalisation and 
modernisation paradigm and the Third World's attempts to establish a New World 
Infonnation and Communication Order (NWICO) are the two other key areas which will be 
investigated within the following chapters. 
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Review of Literature on the Arab media 
Earlier in this chapter, I cited the major works on the media from a political economy 
perspective. A few such as Mowlana have carried out a great deal of research on the 
development of the media in the Middle East while others such as Schiller, Matterlart, 
Martinez and Hamelink, writing extensively on the development of the media in the Third 
World, have only touched the edge of the media in the Middle East. There are some other 
remarkable works on the Arab media, though not necessarily from a political economy 
perspective, without which a clear view of the field cannot be achieved. 
Douglas A. Boyd in his major academic work `Broadcasting in the Arab World: A survey 
of the Electronic media in the Middle East', (1982,1993) extends his analysis to the 
development of broadcasting systems in the Arab world. This includes Egypt, the Sudan, 
Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Yemen, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the United 
Arab Emirate, Oman, Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia. These countries are members 
of the Arab League - an association of Arab countries formed after World War II, with the 
exception of two countries, Somalia and Mauritania, which, while Islamic states, are not 
historically part of the Arab World (Boyd, 1993: 3). Boyd, among others, suggests that 
broadcasting systems in the Arab World are operated directly by the government, or 
indirectly, through a government-sanctioned broadcasting organisation. He underlines the 
role of Saudi Arabia and Egypt in the progress of electronic media in the Middle East. 
Egypt has a leading role in the development of broadcasting systems and Cairo is the Arab 
world film capital, the Hollywood of the Middle East. Since the time of Gamal Abdel 
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Nasser, broadcasting has been used as a means of social and economic change within 
Egypt and as a political tool of propaganda throughout the whole region. The importance 
of Saudi Arabia is mainly because of its wealth generated by the oil revenues, its vastness 
and its relationship with the West. Since the early 1980s, Boyd believes, Saudi Arabia has 
become even more important to the West. He points to the stationing of US and other 
Western military forces in and near the eastern part of the kingdom to support his 
assertion. Boyd also underlines the significance of Arab transnational radio broadcasting. 
The transistor revolution coincided with political movements in areas such as North 
Africa, Egypt, and Iraq that overthrew ruling royal families or were successful in gaining 
independence from colonial powers (Boyd, 1993). 
Abdelwahab El-Affendi (1993) in his article `Eclipse of Reason' explores the emergence, 
development and main characteristics of modern media in the Middle East and Muslim 
world. Looking back to the 18th and 19th centuries, he describes the background of the 
introduction of the first periodical publications in the Muslim world. Further, he goes a few 
centuries back in time when the poets and gifted orators, as the journalists of the time, 
possessed those indispensable skills that needed to be wooed, bought or intimidated by the 
seekers of power. Poets repaid this generosity by singing the praise of their benefactors and 
those few who expressed defiance usually suffered. He regards poetry and oratory as the 
primary vehicles of mass communication in Muslim culture; which may provide an 
interesting model for understanding the modern Muslim media. Along with poetry, books 
were another important medium for the dissemination of ideas. Their content was mainly 
religious, although later literature, poetry, philosophy and the sciences became popular 
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subjects. Yet, the role of books was limited because of widespread illiteracy and the 
absence of printing presses for mass reproduction. He underlines the role of the mosque as a 
central gathering place for learning and education, news distribution and cultural activities 
throughout Islamic history. The pulpit as a focal point for social communication in the 
Muslim world has been somewhat replaced by the modern media. He critically analyses the 
school of thought which questions the very compatibility of modern media with Islamic 
ethics. In this view, the introduction of modem media is seen as an intrinsic departure from 
traditional Muslim notions of morality. A major proponent of the idea, Professor Schleifer, 
for instance, argues that the dawn of mass communication in the late fifteenth/sixteenth 
centuries was associated with the overthrow of the pulpit by the printing press and the 
overthrow of the priest by the printer-businessman as the arbiter of what is relevant 
information and what values inform that information. But it is clearly inaccurate, El- 
Affendi argues, to claim that the modern mass media have displaced the mosque and the 
pulpit. There were many forms of social communication in traditional Muslim society, not 
all of which were religiously based, or even sanctioned (El-Affendi, 1993). 
Kamalipour and Mowlana (1994) in a jointly edited publication, `Mass Media in the Middle 
East, A Comprehensive Handbook', have attempted to systematically monitor the 
background, structure and functions of the governmental mass media bodies in each 
individual country in the Middle East. They view the Middle Eastern mass media as 
developing traits that are unique to the region's social and psychological framework which 
have evolved in support of independence and national development. At the same time, they 
detect a very close connection between the mass media and the states in the region. 
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Throughout the first decade of its existence, the press was restricted to official journals, the 
sole function of which was to communicate government announcements and proclamations 
and to provide certain technical information for the ruling class. Thus, the autocratic nature 
of the states of the region was instrumental in laying the basis for governmental media 
controls. During the second half of the nineteenth century, two types of publications were 
emerging in the Middle East: the press led mainly by the Western-trained and educated 
elite, who were promoting European ideas of secularism, and modern nationalism; and the 
press pioneered by Islamic thinkers and activists who were campaigning for a unified 
Islamic community throughout the Islamic lands. By the end of the nineteenth century, the 
press was transformed from a limited channel of communication to a genuine information 
medium of enormous impact. Today, media in the Middle East are a mixture of both private 
and governmental sectors, with the state, political parties, and upper strata of society 
playing an important role (Kamalipour and Mowlana, 1994). 
The more recent development of modern media services is the major theme of Hussein 
Amin's article `Egypt and the Arab World in the Satellite Age' published in 1996. Amin 
draws attention to several state-run television stations such as the Egyptian Space Channel 
(ESC, the Saudi Middle East Broadcasting Centre (MBC), the Kuwait Space Channel 
(KSC), the Jordanian Arab Space Channel (JASC), the Space Network of Dubai, Tunisia 
TV7, Moroccan Satellite Channel, Oman TV, and the United Arab Emirates TV. Some 
other Arab national television channels mainly dependent on Egypt and Saudi Arabia's 
political and financial support were later put on ARABSAT for direct-to-home (DTH) 
reception throughout the Arab world. He also points to the emergence of some private 
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specialised international television services such as Arab Radio and Television (ART) and 
the Orbit television package which broadcast programmes in Arabic and English for their 
audiences within and outside the Middle East. The primary purpose of the development of 
these services is to formulate a favourable image to the rest of the Arab world. These 
services are also for broadcasting Arabic language programming to Arab nationals living 
abroad, who are now estimated at over 5 million in Europe and nearly 2 million in the 
United States of America (Amin, 1996). 
Ali Mohammadi (1998) in his article "Islamic Perspective on the Globalisation of 
Electronic Empires ", in order to analyse the Islamic responses to the expansion and 
influence of the electronic empires, takes the example of ARABSAT. The Arab Satellite 
Communications Organisation (ASCO) is the sole organisation in the Islamic world that 
has acquired satellite launch vehicles and control systems and has full control of a pan- 
Arab orbital broadcasting and telecommunication system. Placing emphasis mainly on 
cultural and political aspects of the system, he views ARABSAT as in crisis. His main 
concern is the liberalisation of broadcasting systems world-wide as well as the advent of 
DBS (Direct Broadcasting Satellites) which may have a great impact on the Middle 
Eastern countries. Mohammadi, among others, assesses the impact of the Kuwait crisis on 
the Arab media and particularly ARABSAT as crucial. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
followed by the Persian Gulf War (90-91) transformed the communications ecology of the 
region. The Allied military strike against Iraq was followed by an unprecedented news 
coverage by international news agencies, which attracted domestic audiences and in effect 
facilitated their permanent presence in the region. Bahrain for the first time started to 
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rebroadcast CNN's 24 hours a day service on its traditional terrestrial broadcasting system. 
The signals were also received by Saudi Arabia and other Arab states. Along with the 
terrestrial communications systems the rapid development of satellite television has been 
particularly remarkable. In fact, war in the Middle East region caused a tremendous 
increase in the number and capacity of transnational broadcasting channels (Mohammadi, 
1998). 
In his `New Media, New Politics? From satellite Television to the Internet in the Arab 
world: a study', Jon B. Alterman (1998) explores the origins and implications of the media 
revolution in the Arab world. In this region, where television, radio, and the print media 
have been long controlled and censored by non-democratic regimes, the new technologies 
are also making their mark. From transnational newspapers and magazines published in 
Europe, to satellite television stations that broadcast political debates and call-in shows, to 
Internet web pages and e-mail messages that travel anonymously or with encryption over 
international telephone lines, these new media are confounding old-fashioned censors and 
posing new challenges to regimes across the region. Although still in their infancy, with 
high cost and still limited access, these new media have, in just a few years, changed the 
Arab news, information and entertainment markets beyond recognition. Alterman analyses 
the changing relationship between Arab governments, their own local media (which they 
control) and the new media (which are largely beyond their reach). He also assesses 
financial and sociological aspects of the new media, ranging from the critical role of 
commercial advertising in the future success of new media, to the ramifications of Arab 
reliance on Western - that is, American - movies and television shows for their viewing 
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fare. From an American perspective, Alterman does note some potentially negative trends 
in the new media phenomenon. These include the security challenges posed by terrorists 
exploiting the Internet for their own nefarious ends and the political challenges of the 
emergence of what he calls a `new Arabism'; a media driven transnational movement that is 
uniting Arabs across national boundaries, often in hostility to U. S. politics in the Middle 
East. For U. S. policy-makers he offers important advice: if satellites and web-pages are 
going to be the battlefield for the hearts and minds of the Arabs in the next century, then 
America needs to prepare a high-tech campaign of `information diplomacy' that is up to 
that challenge (Alterman, 1998). 
There are some other important studies on Arab/Muslim media cited in this research. 
While `The Media and Arab Integration', an article written by Hamdi Kandil, dates back 
to 1988, Eickelman and Anderson's `New Media in the Muslim World' is one of the latest 
editorial works, published in 1999. Also Heather E. Hudson in chapter 12 of her book 
`Communication Satellites; their development and impact' (1990) has briefly handled the 
development of satellite technology, particularly ARABSAT in the Arab world. As will 
be argued below, the information revolution in the Arab world, different from that 
occurring in the West, has its own pace and peculiarity. Signs of a technology 
transformation in the region are visible and in this context, the development of the media 
since the 1980s reveals a progressive trend. Academic efforts, though still insufficient, are 
underway to examine various aspects of the Arab/Muslim media, monitor the current 
developments in the field, and establish critical frameworks for the forthcoming changes 
and developments. In the general context of Arab media studies, ARABSAT, since the 
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early years of its establishment in 1985, has been a major focus of academic attention both 
from inside and outside the region. Interestingly, many, mostly Arabs, have taken the 
various aspects of the system, technical, historical, cultural, economic and political or a 
selected combination of these areas as an appropriate topic for their PhD projects. 
Leyla Akkad (1979) in her published PhD project `Towards An Open University Through 
The Arab Space Network' seeks to explore the possibility of establishing an Arab 
University serving the Arab world via an Arab space network. The study aims at 
explaining the various aspects of the Open University in Great Britain. Offering a model 
for an Arab University, she draws up its organisational, administrative, and financial 
outline, and proposes some suggestions to implement the system. In chapters nine and ten 
of the study, Akkad turns to ARABSAT and examines the possibility of using the system 
for such educational purposes. She covers the key areas concerned with the Arab space 
network and the prospects of utilising it in the service of education; such as the merits of 
communication satellites, the possible educational usage of the space network and 
preparation for such usage, estimating the basic requirements of the space network, and a 
working plan for educational TV. 
Another piece of research on ARABSAT was conducted by Elham Khalil (1983) through 
her later published doctoral dissertation, `The Arab Satellite and the Flow of Information 
in the Arab world'. Covering some of the most important aspects of the flow of 
information via mass communication in the region from 1960s to the early 1980s, her 
study dealt with the earlier stages of an experimental Arab television news exchange 
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system. The study began in September 1978 which, according to her, was a period of 
collapse of the communication development paradigm, and increasing reliance on 
communication satellites. The author's experience in the press and broadcasting fields led 
her to raise questions such as: How were the Arab media functioning?; What were the 
objectives of launching an Arab satellite?; What were the implications of the project, 
considering national and international circumstances such as the role of international news 
agencies, lack of local software production, cultural dependency and ways and means of 
promoting cultural identity in relation to the Arab world as a developing area in face of 
this modem technology?; To what extent would ARABSAT act and react, positively and 
negatively on both the international and national levels? To what extent would the Arab 
information concept be able to cope with the Arab satellite requirements and potentials? 
What would be the effects of the transfer of this modern technology into the Arab world? 
And finally, what was the relation between the then new and incomplete features of the 
new development paradigm, and ARABSAT? Khalil noted that the importation of 
television programmes into the Arab world was a natural result of the importation of 
hardware, which stemmed from their lack of resources of finance and technical experience. 
Besides the lack of capital and organised marketing, the absence of production co- 
ordination and long-term policy also contributed to the Arab programme production being 
handicapped. 
`A Proposal for Satellite Communications Utilisation in Higher Education in the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia' is yet another PhD project, conducted by Bakur Mohammad Ibrahim 
(1986). Reviewing the background and historical development of ARABSAT, he focuses 
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on the objectives, structure, membership, services, and space and earth segments of the 
organisation. In this context, Ibrahim explores the likelihood of using ARABSAT in 
higher education in the Persian Gulf, particularly in Saudi Arabia. The central question of 
the study is, therefore, how can a satellite communication centre for higher education 
institutions, be established and expanded to serve developmental goals in Saudi Arabia? 
Ibrahim A. Abu-Argoub (1988) in his doctoral thesis `Historical, Political, and Technical 
Development of ARABSAT', primarily focuses on the relationship and co-ordination 
between ARABSAT and INTELSAT. Abu-Argoub divides the process of the development 
of satellite communication in the Arab world into three stages; 1967-1980,1980-1985, and 
1985-1988 (when he finalised his project). Elham Khalil, in his view, had dealt with the 
two earlier stages of experimental Arab television news exchange systems, while his study 
deals with all three stages, with a particular emphasis on the third stage via ARABSAT, 
and compares the three stages. Addressing some critical questions such as why 
INTELSAT permitted the launch of ARABSAT?, is ARABSAT independent from 
INTELSAT?; what kind of co-ordination exists between the two?; and finally, will the 
Arab nations shift their services to ARABSAT in the future?, he offers a full account of the 
history and development of the project from the early years of its inception until the late 
1980s. Through his analysis of ARABSAT, Abu-Argoub has touched some key areas such 
as ARABSAT and development, ARABSAT and marketing, and ARABSAT and national 
integration. 
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`News Exchange Via ARABSAT and News Values of Arab Television News People' is 
another piece of work, which was presented by the doctoral candidate Ahmad S. Turkistani 
in 1988. Providing a detailed background of information on the Arab world, the Arab 
media structure and characteristics, Turkistani put Arab news values in perspective. As 
well as the technical and financial problems, he argues that Arab media lack media 
perception and policies for production and distribution. Arab media format and style is at 
best an imitation of western programming. Conducting a six month experimental survey 
on ARABSAT, he addresses the most important political, economic and cultural questions 
confronting the first Arab regional satellite system. The design of ARAB SAT, ARABSAT 
potential and reality, use of ARABSAT, and the problems facing the system, form a great 
part of this invaluable piece of research. A key area which has been covered by Turkistani, 
is the issue of hardware and software of news exchange. Satellite systems, as a part of the 
necessary hardware are discussed along with ARABSAT's particular role in the exchange 
of Arab news. The proliferation of mass media in the Arab world, the nature of Arab 
broadcasting systems, and Arab news values, are some other important areas discussed in 
this study. 
Hezab T. Al-Saadon (1990) another Arab research student, in his study of `The Role of 
ARABSAT in Television Programme Exchange in the Arab world', concentrates on the 
three Arab countries of Tunisia, Algeria and Saudi Arabia. In order to examine the media 
co-operation effort, Al-Saadon underlines the historical, political and socio-economic 
factors within the Arab region. The Arab world, as a sector of the Third World countries, 
in his view, is subjected to the domination of Western television news and programmes. 
60 
Al-Sadoon also believes that efforts to counter media dependency have received little 
attention particularly in the Arab world. In his study of ARABSAT, he identifies two 
major issues working simultaneously: a media co-operation effort on the regional level, 
and the role of satellite technology in news and television programme exchange in the 
Arab world. Giving a potential alternative to the existing one-way flow of information, 
these two are the focus of his analysis. ARABSAT, in order to contribute to television and 
programme exchange, requires some institutional arrangement which he believes should be 
examined by the Arab States Broadcasting Union (ASBU). `State's Policies Versus Arab 
Nationalism', `Arab Ethnic and Religious Minorities', and `Mass Media Policy 
Implications' are some other important areas highlighted in Al-Sadon's work. 
The above PhD projects, like most academic researches on ARABSAT, have been mainly 
conducted by Arab researchers who have had relatively better chances of accessing the 
Arab media personnel and institutions. They have, therefore, been able to provide 
important sources of reference for those Arab and non-Arab media scholars who have 
wished to take forward Arab media studies. As important secondary sources of information, 
the above researches, particularly the last three, have been frequently cited in my research. 
My work, however, is different in many aspects from these academic undertakings. 
Primarily, I have discussed the Arab media in a global context, and particularly in relation 
to the West, while the above researchers, emphasised the political, economic and cultural 
aspects of the Arab media, and have been mainly concerned with the context of the Arab 
world itself. Secondly, in an interaction with the global forces of liberalisation and 
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deregulation of the media, the main theme of my study is the necessity of the development 
of a true Arab media policy. The formation and development of ARABSAT, as a paradigm 
of development of the Arab media, has been analysed in this context. Thirdly, my 
preference for analysing the Arab media in a confrontational context, my emphasis on the 
power-based relationships between the Arab world and the West, my identification of the 
major factors involved in the development of Arab media (oil, globalisation and Islam) 
since the 1980s, and lastly my adoption of a political economy approach, may sufficiently 
imply a new vision and an original contribution to the field. Having said this, there are, 
however, some areas of common concern between my project and those of my Arab 
counterparts. These particularly include the Arabs' cultural and political dependency on the 
West and, perhaps, a form of cultural identity crisis in the face of modem technology, the 
Arabs' lack of competence in balancing hardware and software (highlighted in the works of 
Khalil and Turkistani); and the reliance of Arab television news and programs on the West 
(underlined by al-Saadon). Yet, I have benefited from these researches, and I would like to 
acknowledge my gratitude to all of them. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have established the theoretical foundations of my forthcoming arguments. 
The key concepts and ideas, different theories and approaches, including those of political 
economy, have been discussed. Oil, globalisation and Islam which have been identified as 
critical in shaping and developing the Arab media policy and infrastructures, will help in 
articulating my future arguments. The impact of oil on the Arabs' economics and politics 
has been widely acknowledged. In the next chapter, I will underline its role in the 
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development of the Arab media industry; the telecommunication sector in particular. There 
is no dispute about the influence of globalisation in the formulation of media policies and 
infrastructures world-wide, yet disagreements begin when the nature of this influence is 
assessed. My own judgement in this research has been mainly influenced by the imperial 
character of globalisation. However, instead of drawing on just the negative and positive 
sides of globalisation, perhaps we need to look for some grey areas of overlapping and 
agreement. The new perception of Islam as an important factor in contemporary social 
change, will also feature strongly in my arguments. 
I anticipate that my readership in this research, though likely to be convinced about the 
significance of oil and globalisation in the process of Arab media development, may be 
doubtful or unclear about the weight of the third factor, namely Islam, as crucial. 
Stereotypes dominating the Western media and literature about Islam have also caused 
misconceptions. Addressing this question is one of the major challenges in the following 
chapters. My extensive literature review both from a political economy perspective, and 
from other media disciplines such as cultural studies and media policies, illustrating what 
has already been done by other scholars in the field, at the same time, give the reader a 
general view on the background and development of the Arab media. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE ARAB WORLD: OIL, DEVELOPMENT AND 
THE GREAT POWERS 
Introduction 
Any adequate study concerning the political and economic aspects of the Arab world is 
almost impossible without considering the regional oil resources and revenues. The impact 
of oil on the region's politics and economics is paradoxically twofold. The regional oil 
resources, while attracting the foreign powers' attention and interference in the Arab world 
also created a distinctive developmental pattern in the region; notably different from the 
other parts of the Third World. The beginning of the twentieth century by coincidence saw 
both the discovery of oil and the presence of British Petroleum and later some other 
European and American oil companies in the Middle East. The Oil Boom of 1973 emerged 
as a turning point in the fate of the region. During the last three decades, in most parts of 
the Arab world, economic growth and structural change have been greatly affected by oil. 
This chapter intends to establish an interactive relationship between oil, the presence of 
great powers and developmental plans/strategies in the region. 
In this context, the traditional competition among state capitalist societies for a share in the 
wealth generated by oil may imply their currently increasing interest in Arab media 
markets. In other words, the Arab world in its course of transformation into a semi-modern 
society, may now be considered as a new arena for the industrial powers to develop their 
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interests in the field of communication policy and marketing. The focus of the study in this 
chapter is the development of the telecommunication sector, which is often taken as a valid 
index for economic growth, with Egypt and Saudi Arabia at the centre. 
Political economy of the Arab world 
The political economy of the Arab world can be best conceptualised as the product of the 
interaction of two important games: 1) An internal game played by the regional states, 
sometimes in co-operation but more often at odds, to develop their own economic and 
industrial infrastructures 2) The other and, more controversial, is a sophisticated game in 
which regional and superpower politics interact (Richards and Waterbury, 1996: 1). Oil has 
played a central role in the formation of these processes. The political economy of the Arab 
world, therefore, is unique mainly because most of the states of the region enjoy high levels 
of oil revenues. According to some estimates, the Middle East holds 667 billion barrels of 
proven oil reserves, around 67% of the total discovered in the world (Sluglett & Sluglett, 
1991). A huge enlargement in oil extraction led to the increasing dependence of Europe, 
Japan and, to a lesser extent, the United States on the region. As Korany (1988) noted: 
The United States still imports 49 percent of its total oil needs, Europe 96 percent, and 
Japan 100 percent: the ratio of oil imported from the (Persian) Gulf to total oil imports is 
34 percent, 61 percent, and 72 percent for those three regions respectively. As a result, 
the Arab world will not be allowed, even if it prefers, to steer its own course (Korany, 
1988: 68). 
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The Arab world is neither a political nor an economic unit (Amin, 1982). Politically, one 
may easily find an exhibition of diverse political regimes and attitudes in the region from 
the far right to the far left. This includes "monarchies and republics, conservatives and 
radicals, exponents of capitalism or socialism, supporters of the Western bloc, the Eastern 
bloc, and of a whole spectrum of shades of neutrality" (Lewis, 1994: 122). The Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia, for instance, is bounded on the north by the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan, 
the republic of Iraq, and the Sheikhdom of Kuwait; on the east by the Sheikhdoms of Qatar, 
and the United Arab Emirates; on the Southeast by the hereditary Sultanate of Oman; and 
on the south by the Republic of Yemen. Richards and Waterbury (1996) have classified 
regimes in the Arab world according to how they manage publicly owned assets. They 
propose three major categories: 1) regimes that use these assets to generate surplus for 
further state expansion at the expense of the private sector, 2) those that use assets to act as 
a handmaiden to private entrepreneurs, and 3) those that seek to transfer public assets to 
private hands. They extend their analysis to the major policy domains of the region's 
regimes in order to move beyond descriptive understandings of their dynamics. The most 
common of all the regime types in the Middle East since World War II, has been the state 
socialist republic: Egypt, Syria, Iraq, North Yemen, the Sudan, Tunisia, and Algeria, even 
Libya and former PDRY of South Yemen. All these countries have replicated to some 
extent the Turkish model of growth strategies and state intervention in the economy during 
the 1920s and 1930s. The second group headed by kings, princes and sheikhs of the Middle 
East, is distinguished by two main characteristics from those of the state socialist republics. 
They all claim some degree of Divine right to rule and believe in some forms of diversity 
and pluralism: Jordan, Morocco and Kuwait. In this group Saudi Arabia, United Arab 
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Emirates, Bahrain and Qatar have come under some pressure to put on a more liberal face. 
In this classification, Lebanon stands alone in a third group as the only country that has 
indulged in liberal electoral politics (Richards and Waterbury, 1996: 276,297,301). 
A great diversity in per capita income is evident throughout the region. The range of 
wealth, indeed, is extremely wide. While some wealthy countries such as Kuwait and the 
U. A. E. enjoy a high level of per-capita income some poor countries such as Sudan and 
Yemen live in poverty (Findlay, 1994: 1). An important fact that is frequently overlooked is 
that the Persian Gulf countries, possessing the overwhelming proportion of the region's 
wealth, account for only 10 percent of all Arabs (Butt, 1997: 5). Among them, the four 
small Arab states of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and United Arab Emirates are one of the most 
phenomenal features of the twentieth century. These countries instead of entering the 
modem world as impoverished outlying provinces of one of the bigger states in the region, 
"have become independent members of the United Nations with living standards which are 
among the highest in the world. Two of them - Kuwait and the UAE - are major financial 
powers" (Mansfield, 1992: 339). Meanwhile, the average Sudanese lives in a poverty as 
extreme as any in sub-Saharan Africa, and millions of Egyptians and Moroccans live very 
close to subsistence. At the end of 1970s, Butt (1997) suggests, most Arabs living outside 
of the Persian Gulf region found themselves spectators watching the wealth pile up in the 
Persian Gulf. He quotes the Egyptian politician and journalist, Mohammad Hassan Al 
Heikal, as saying: 
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A prize of unimaginable proportions had been handed to desert people who lacked the 
history or the culture to absorb it, while Egypt, the centre ofArab experience and culture, 
received only small change (Butt, 1997: 195). 
One must not, however, forget that the Arab economy, by and large, has been fuelled by oil, 
and the majority of Arab nations except Sudan, Jordan, Lebanon and Morocco enjoy oil 
revenues'. In a decade from 1970 to 1980, the oil revenues in major Arab producing 
countries was raised from less than US$5 billion a year to US$100 billion, a 2000 per cent 
increase (Butt, 1997: 185,195). 
The economic disparity in the region has been a major obstacle for their political 
unification. The Arab world in terms of culture is however a rather homogenous society. 
Arab nations share one language, one religion, a single civilisation and a sense of belonging 
to a main ethnic community. They are all members of the Arab League and shareholders of 
ARABSAT (Abu-Argoub 1988, Turkistani 1988, Kandil 1988, Warwick 1993, 
Mohammadi 1998). Many view the Arab world as a whole or try to define it in terms of 
how they perceive the region. "For the Arab people from Morocco in North Africa to the 
Persian Gulf, the common linguistic, cultural and historical inheritance is appreciated and 
treasured" (Butt, 1997: 85). The Oxford professor of Arabic, H. A. Gibb (1940), responding 
to the question of: Who are the Arabs?, affirms: 
' Even in poor Arab countries such as Yemen the role of oil has been important. Somalia, Djibouti and 
Mauritania while excluded from this study hold no oil reserves. 
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All those are Arabs for whom the central fact of history is the mission of Mohammed and the 
memory of the Arab empire, and who cherish the Arabic tongue and its cultural heritage as 
their common possession ( Findlay, 1994: 11). 
Findlay, however, argues that this Western view of the Arabs is strongly coloured by the 
contrasts in culture, which arise from linguistic and religious differences with the West. He 
warns us to be more cautious about the variety of ethnic and minority groups existing in the 
Arab world, who are not in reality all Arab or Muslim. For example, he points to 3.5 
million Christian Coptic communities in Egypt and many religious minorities in Lebanon 
(ibid. ). 
Yet, as we shall discuss in chapter V, the Arab cultural similarity more than any other factor 
can be used as an effective means of unification and collaboration. The Arab states are also 
linked economically and politically through joint-venture investments in oil-related 
activities and through organisations such as the Arab League, the Organisation of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) (Sluglett 
& Sluglett, 1991). Since these three organisations will be frequently cited through the 
research, a brief account of them seems to be necessary. 
The Arab League 
The league of Arab states is the largest forum through which Arab aspiration for unification 
came to be realised. On March 22,1945, the Arab countries of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, 
Lebanon, North Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Syria laid the foundation of the Arab League in 
Alexandria. Later, the league was enlarged and encompassed 21 members including 
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Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, Syria, 
Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirate, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman 
and Yemen, plus the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), which has been a full 
member since 1976. Following the signing of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty (Camp 
David Accord) the League's headquarters shifted to Tunis from Cairo in 1979. Political, 
economic and cultural specialist committees have been set up including the Defence 
Council (foreign secretaries and defence ministers) and the Economic Council (ministers of 
finance) and the Cultural Treaty of the Arab League. According to Article 11 of the 
Cultural Treaty (1946), the States of the Arab League agreed to consolidate relations and to 
facilitate co-operation between scientists, literary men, journalists, members of the 
professions, those connected with art, the stage, the cinema and broadcasting. Furthermore, 
the Arab Labour Organisation (ALO), the Arab Postal Union (APU) and the Arab 
Telecommunications Union (ATU), were established as the League's specialised and 
autonomous agencies. With the re-establishment of diplomatic relation between Cairo and 
other Arab states, Egypt returned to the League in May 1989 (Gresh & Vidal, 1990: 6). 
The Arab League, however, has been, at least in the political sphere, a gigantic fiasco. 
Political disintegration and ideological conflicts have kept the Arabs in a state of political 
disarray and social turmoil (Turkistani, 1988: 127). 
The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
OPEC was created at the Baghdad Conference of September 1960, by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. The five Founding Members were later joined by eight other 
Members: Qatar (1961); Indonesia (1962); Libya (1962); United Arab Emirates (1967); 
70 
Algeria (1969); Nigeria (1971); Ecuador (1973-1992) and Gabon (1975-1994). OPEC 
transferred its headquarters from Geneva, Switzerland, to Vienna, Austria in September 
1965. As a permanent, intergovernmental organisation, OPEC was established to co- 
ordinate and unify petroleum policies among member countries. The OPEC Conference of 
Ministers meets in ordinary session twice a year to formulate the general policy of the 
organisation. At present, OPEC has 11 Countries as Members: from Africa (Algeria, Libya 
and Nigeria); Asia (Indonesia); the Middle East (Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia 
and the United Arab Emirates); and Latin America (Venezuela). The OPEC Member 
Countries currently supply more than 40 per cent of the world's oil and they possess about 
78 percent of the world's total proven crude oil reserves (OPEC History, February 2001). 
The Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) 
The confederation of Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) was established by the heads of 
state of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirate and Oman, who 
met in Abu Dhabi in May 1981. The initiative was seen as inaugurating a series of 
practicable steps towards the kind of unity the Arab States had so often envisaged but failed 
to achieve. At the outset they declared simply their intention to co-ordinate their economic, 
political, cultural and security efforts. Their consensus was for a confederal structure based 
on the fact that each country wanted to retain its own characteristics. There were many 
points of method and objectives which resembled those of the European Economic 
Community, although with the important difference that the six have a common language 
and culture. Despite their relative lack of development, they constitute a formidable 
economic power, as they own half the world's known oil reserves. Since wealth does not 
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provide military security, the GCC members are aware of their military weakness despite 
their heavy arms expenditure, among the highest per capita in the world (Mansfield, 1992: 
369,370). These newly established nation-states have played a significant part in the 
region's contemporary politics and economy. As I will explain later in this chapter, these 
six wealthy and pro-Western countries, thanks to their huge incomes generated by oil, have 
provided an unprecedented market for Western modern media technologies. 
Arab-Western Relationship 
Historically, there has been a close relationship between the West and the Arab world. 
They were comparable in terms of their stage and level of development until the end of the 
Middle Ages. The gap between the two "began to grow during the mercantilist era from 
the 15th to the 18th Centuries... As a result, the Arab world was integrated into the world 
capitalist system, as a dominated periphery" (Amin, 1982: 48). 
The Arab world for more than two centuries has been consistently dominated by Western 
politics. Algeria and Tunisia were ruled by France, the Persian Gulf states of Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, parts of Iraq as well as Egypt in 
North Africa plus Jordan and Aden were under Britain's umbrella (Mansfield, 1992: 417, 
Butt, 1997: 5). The Sudan was a constant source of conflict between Britain and Egypt until 
1956 when both countries resigned themselves to Sudan's full independence (Mansfield, 
1992: 426). In World War I, Syria, one of the most disputed areas for colonial powers, was 
secretly discussed as to how it should be divided between Britain and France. After the 
Second World War the US and the former Soviet Union were fighting to "prevent it from 
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moving into another's satellite system" (Mansfield, 1992,384). Libya, the impoverished 
desert state of the 1950s, while it had become one of the world's leading oil-producers, 
remained a Western satellite with significant British and American military bases left on its 
soil until 1969 (ibid., 447). The twentieth century, Butt (1997) argues, began with Western 
European, particularly British, flags over the world, while ending in similar fashion with 
the American one (Butt, 1997: 1). 
By the closing decades of the century, the Arab nations had officially established their 
political independence. New nation-states, forged by the West, caused new individual 
nationalism and centralised systems of administration. The borders of the newly established 
states were mainly drawn up by the West, in connection with external interests and 
perceptions of the military, natural and human resources of the Arab lands. This caused 
increasing conflict rather than co-operation between rival Arab states, competing for access 
to divided physical resources and strategic positions. Findlay (1994) argues: 
Almost half a century after the official independence of most Arab lands, the continued 
fragmentation of the Arab world into the states units initially imposed by the West seems 
unlikely to he reversed in a substantial way. The Arab experience of the West has left a 
legacy of internal conflict and external distrust. The development implications have not only 
been economic extroversion, but also widespread political instability (Findlay, 1994: 43). 
The contemporary Arab world, more than any other developing area, has been crucial in the 
playing out of the Cold War and superpower rivalry. It has produced so many crises or 
stirred so much emotion in the West. Since the late 1970's, the attention of the world has 
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been focused on the Arab world due to events such as "... the hostage crisis in Lebanon, the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, the Iran-Iraq war, the Salman Rushdie affair, and the Persian Gulf 
War" (Richards and Waterbury, 1996: 2). It continues to be a significant factor in Western 
politics and apparently "will not be left alone". Richards and Waterbury (1996) argue: 
That is its curse and its blessing. Geopolitical significance draws resources and special 
treatment from outside powers, but it also draws interference, meddling, and occasionally 
invasion (Richards and Waterbury, 1996: 2). 
The most defining factor in the formation of the contemporary relationship between the 
Arabs and the West is the regional resources of oil. Oil, while strengthening the strategic 
importance of the region, opened up a new chapter of political interference and exploitation 
in the Arab lands. The development of the oil industry since the beginning of the twentieth 
century is permeated by Western politics in the region. To nationalise and take control of 
their oil reserves, some relatively successful national movements were launched by 
individual Arab nations since the 1950s. The creation of OPEC in 1960 helped forge 
mechanisms for controlling the oil market and prices and provided a stable forum for an 
economic, if not political, convergence of policy. 
The West, OPEC and Oil Prices 
The beginning of the century was accompanied by the discovery of oil and the first 
extraction operations took place in 1909 in Iran by British Petroleum. World War I was 
followed by the British companies (75%) and the French (25%) sharing Mosul between 
them. American penetration had already started in Turkish Petroleum in 1927, followed by 
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Ibn Saud's concession to Standard Oil of California in 1933. During a decade starting from 
1938 the United States' share climbed from 13.9% to 55.2% of Middle Eastern oil 
production (Gresh & Vidal, 1990: 134). Major oil companies, having the combined weight 
of all the components of power, intimidated and later effectively influenced the 
governments of oil-producing countries. This situation remained largely unchallenged until 
the early 1950s (Butt, 1997: 187). In 1951, the Iranian Prime Minister Dr. Hamid 
Mossadegh made his revolution famous and by nationalising the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company "signed its death warrant ". The movement was not tolerated by the United 
States and its Western allies; "in 1953 the intervention of the CIA would bring such 
sacrilege to an end" (Gresh & Vidal, 1990: 134). But the wave of nationalisation of the oil 
industry was continued by Iraq in 1972 with the removal of British companies but not 
French. The take-over of national oil resources was the next step. Iran (1973), Kuwait 
(1975), Qatar (1976), Bahrain (1978) and lastly Saudi Arabia (1980) took ownership. But 
ownership without control was useless. The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) was created to control the oil production and prices in 1961. By the end of the 
1970s all the Arab oil producers had at least majority control over their industries (Gresh & 
Vidal, 1990: 136). 
With the Arab-Israeli conflict as background, the national movements in the region led to 
the explosion of the Oil War of 1973, which is seen as a turning point in the processes of oil 
production, oil pricing and oil exportation from the Middle East. In 1973 oil prices 
quadrupled from 3 to 11.5 dollars a barrel. The Arab oil-producing countries decided on an 
increase of 100% and an embargo against allies of Israel. Some years later the war between 
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OPEC and non-OPEC producers along with OPEC's own internal disagreements regarding 
quantities and prices, blunted the oil weapon. The prices declined from 34 dollars in 1981 
to less than 10 dollars in 1986, and has since fluctuated widely. During the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait (1990-91) the price climbed back up to $30 a barrel (Gresh & Vidal, 1990: 134, 
135,136). Since then, until the closing years of the twentieth century, as the observations 
of the commentator show, there was an ongoing decline in oil prices to less than 10 dollars 
a barrel. In the second half of the year 2000, thanks to partial reunification of the OPEC 
member states and an increasing demand in the international oil market, the prices have 
risen again, exceeding 35 dollars a barrel. 
Higher oil prices for oil-producing countries is seen as a welcome relief, at least in the short 
term, from their recent financial restraints. Oil, for their economies, is a matter of life and 
death. Even in Saudi Arabia, despite its progress in promoting the non-oil sector, which 
currently accounts for about 45 per cent of GDP, oil still remains the lifeblood of the 
economy (Market Report, January 1999: 34). Saudi Arabia, among the oil producer 
countries, has played an important role in OPEC mainly in favour of the world market. Just 
as OPEC was the `residual supplier' to the world market, Saudi Arabia was the `residual 
supplier' within OPEC. Saudis were able to produce anything from a low of just above 2 
million barrels a day to a high of nearly 10 million barrels per day. In July and August 
1986, they opened the taps, producing about 6-7 million barrels per day. Prices collapsed, 
falling under US$10 in late summer 1986. Again, in July 2000, Saudi Arabia promised to 
raise production to keep prices at the $28-a-barrel level to help stabilise oil markets as 
prices had become, and still are, a national issue in the United States. Jim Hoagland (2000), 
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is wondering whether the Saudi's decision has been coincidental or a "result of the intense 
study the Saudi royal family makes of the US. political scene and its deep concern about 
the damage a campaign controversy could do to the Saudi strategic relationship with the 
United States"? His final answer is "no coincidence ": 
The experience of both Bush and Cheney in the Texas oil industry and Cheney's 
experience as defence secretary and manager of the 1991 war to free Kuwait's oil fields 
from Iraq, recommend them to the Arabs and other OPEC nations as men to do business 
with. That should put the Arab world firmly in the column of those who see the 
Republicans' combined laissez-faire, realpolitik ethos as easier to work with than the 
Democrats' unpredictable flirtations with human rights, labour standards and other 
causes (Hoagland, August, 2000). 
Before Saudi's decision in 1986 to increase the production, oil prices were stable at around 
US$28 a barrel. The sudden fluctuation served as a warning that the days of guaranteed 
high income and unrestricted spending might not last for ever. In the years that followed 
the price collapsed and the oil exporting countries began talking for the first time about the 
need to tighten their belts (Butt, 1997: 200). Like others in the region, though not the worst 
of them, the drop in oil prices affected Saudi's economy as a whole (Kelly, 1996). Again a 
sharp drop in oil prices in 1998 plunged Saudi Arabia's government budget deep into deficit 
- and prompted efforts to diversify the economy. Saudi Arabia has recently advocated 
privatisation and opening the country to foreign investment. In much the same way, the 
United Arab Emirates and Bahrain have diversified their economies the most, although oil- 
price fluctuations still heavily influence their economic fortunes (Elias, 2000). 
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Despite the instability of oil prices during the last three decades, the Arab countries in their 
course of development have been greatly dependent on the oil revenues. The wealth 
provided by oil, while it attracted the great powers attention and interference in the region, 
established new regional economic powers and a distinctive and unusual development 
pattern throughout the region. The next section intends to examine the impact of oil on the 
developmental programmes in the region, particularly, the development of 
telecommunication sector. 
Oil and the Development of the Telecommunication Sector 
A call for a more rational division of labour within the international community was voiced 
by the Third World countries at the UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development) during the 1970s. The campaigners, Turner and Bedore (1979) argue, were 
seeking to establish a New International Economic Order (NIEO). After the OPEC 
successes of 1973-4, the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO)'s 
`Lima Declaration', particularly called for the developing countries to enhance their share 
of world industrial production from the current 7 percent to at least 25 percent by the end of 
the century. Already in the decade, some Third World countries were clearly on the way to 
becoming industrial powers in their own rights. East Asia was witnessing the miracle 
economies of South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore, imitating the earlier 
Japanese example. Mexico, Brazil and Argentina were considered as industrial powers in 
Latin America as well as India in Asia. Given their privileged condition, it was expected 
that the Arab nations would be able to rewrite their own laws of economics: 
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If any group of Third World countries had the chance to catapult itself out of the non- 
industrialised ranks, it was the oil producers which, as a result of oil price increase 
culminating in the massive rises of 1973-4, had the financial resources to invest, the raw 
materials on which to base such industrialisation, and the self-confidence to insist that 
the industrialised world make way for their products (Turner and Bedore, 1979: 1). 
From 1970 to 1980, the oil revenues in major Arab producing countries was raised from 
less than US$5 billion a year to US$100 billion, a 2000 per cent increase (Butt, 1997: 195). 
In the decade ending in 1973, overall oil receipts of the seven major Arab oil-exporting 
countries of Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab 
Emirates rose eight-fold, from $1.5 billion in 1963 to $12.4 billion in 1973. In 1974 alone, 
such revenues rose by a further $38 billion, and between then and 1980 they quadrupled, to 
$206 billion (Abed, 1988: 92). Never before in human history had such an enormous 
amount of wealth been transferred in such a short amount of time to governments with such 
(typically) small populations (Richards and Waterbury, 1999: 60). This resulted in a 
dramatic change in most areas of industry and the economy. As part of the process of 
development, the oil exporting countries led the way in the purchase of the latest 
technology from the West. Much of the money received from the sale of oil is spent to 
build highways, airports, factories, schools, hospitals and, more importantly, in the 
purchase of weapons (Glasser, 1995). 
A considerable proportion of oil revenues is being spent on advanced communication 
technologies. The telecommunication sector, as the key index of development and 
economic growth, has undergone fundamental changes. With nearly 65 per cent of the 
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world's known oil reserves, the Middle East (Arab world plus Iran and Turkey) is a highly 
strategic region with advanced telecommunications demands (Middle East 
Communications, July, 1999). The Persian Gulf region, including the GCC states of Saudi 
Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait plus Iraq and Iran, stands as 
the world's fifth largest and the most sophisticated centre of digital communications 
networks after the United States, the Soviet Union, Western Europe, and the Pacific area 
including Japan (Mowlana, 1990: 94). These countries, along with Algeria, Libya, Egypt, 
Syria, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan and Lebanon are leading the transition towards modern 
telecommunication systems, providing great opportunities for transnational media 
corporations. Meanwhile, the wealthy states in the region continue to demand the latest in 
state-of-the-art technologies (Middle East Communications, July 1999). 
The uneven economic condition in the region has not provided equal opportunities for the 
members of the Arab League. The disparity in wealth is reflected in their proportion of 
investments on modern media technology. The pace of change and economic growth in the 
oil-rich countries of GCC in the last two three decades, compared with the non-oil 
producing nations such as Sudan, or poor countries with negligible oil income like Yemen, 
has been incredibly fast. Having discussed the general developmental condition of the Arab 
world, I am now going to offer a brief summary of developments in individual states to 
provide evidence of the variability in the region. 
Kuwait, with 9.3 percent of the world's known oil reserves, was the first state in the Persian 
Gulf to become the prototype of the tiny multimillionaire oil sheikhdom. With an estimated 
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population of 2 million in 1996 (Gemer, 2000: 241), it has enough crude to pump for 70 
more years. Kuwait has a foreign-investment safety net estimated at $50 billion (Elias, 
2000). Following the Persian Gulf war, the government announced ambitious plans to 
privatise its telecommunications sector. Initial plans were to privatise the Kuwaiti PTT by 
the end of 1993 and form a new company, Kuwait Communications Company, of which 51 
per cent would be owned by the private sector and the remainder government-controlled. 
However, the new company has yet to be formed and it appears as though the government 
is finding the privatisation process more complicated than initially envisaged. In February 
1994, Motorola announced that it will supply GSM cellular base stations to Kuwait, as part 
of a $32 million phase-one contract with the Kuwait Mobile Telephone Systems 
Corporation. Subsequent phases of the contract will expand coverage and increase capacity 
to 50,000, nation-wide (Market Opportunities in the Middle East, MEC, June 1994). 
According to the Strategists Group, Kuwaiti's cellular market added nearly 20,000 
subscribers during 1997, raising the installed subscriber base past 160,000 in March 1998 
(Kuwait, MEC, September 1998: 42). 
The United Arab Emirates' enormous wealth in relation to its 3 million population in 1996 
(Gerner, 2000: 241), ranks it as one of the richest countries in the world (Mansfield, 1992: 
354). As recently as 1960s, the United Arab Emirates was like a desert. Butt (1997) asserts, 
where a fast highway today sweeps cars between the two cities of Abu Dhabi and its 
neighbouring Dubai at top speeds, "in those days a four wheel-drive vehicle was needed to 
guarantee safe passage through the desert sand" (Butt, 1997: 183). The Emirates has 
recently established itself as the region's business and shopping centre. It is said that the 
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Emirates is gradually shedding its oil dependency. Oil accounted for 60 percent of its 
economy in the 1970s, but just 26 percent last year. The Emirates also has a foreign- 
investment safety net estimated at $25 billion (Elias, 2000). Like the other states of the 
Persian Gulf, the U. A. E. has invested largely in the telecommunication sector. Etisalat, the 
national public telecommunications network and services providers, has installed 50,000 
new lines a year since 1989, and fully digitised the network in 1990. Since then, Etisalat has 
invested millions of dollars to upgrade and expand the existing network. Planned projects 
include fibre optic links, cable systems, and a mobile radio system. AT&T completed one 
half of the country's GSM digital cellular network in 1994 (Market Opportunities in the 
Middle East, MEC, June 1994). The United Arab Emirates was the first country in the 
region to launch a commercial ATM service in 1997, with plans to expand the service over 
the next few years. Furthermore, the UAE's Jebel Ali Free Zone harbours some of the 
world's multinational IT giants, including Compaq and Acer. Investment is continuously 
pumped into their Middle East operations (Digital Challenges, 1998). 
Bahrain with a small population of nearly 600,000 in 1996 (Gerner, 2000: 241) was the 
first part of the Persian Gulf to be able to provide adequate services and national welfare for 
its people. Compared with massively oil rich countries such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, 
Bahrain has never been a major oil producer. This means that it has not enjoyed the 
doubtful benefit of becoming a rentier state (Mansfield, 1992: 347). Bahrain is an offshore 
banking hub and home to many multinational companies doing business in the Persian 
Gulf. Yet, its telecommunications infrastructure is probably the most sophisticated in the 
region. Batelco, the sole provider of national and international telecommunications 
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services, has completed its programme to fully digitise the national telephone network. As 
of 1992, all main exchanges were connected to the new national fibre optic circuit. In 
addition, a national ISDN service is now available to both business and residential 
customers in the country. U. S. companies have been involved in Bahrain's new GSM 
cellular network project (Market Opportunities in the Middle East, MEC, June 1994). In 
1997, switching apparatus and transmission equipment's delivery by US to Bahrain 
amounted to $1.5 million as against $0.7 million in 1996. At the beginning of 1998, 
American sales to Bahrain were well sustained and advanced to $200,000 in the first two 
months, compared to $74,000 twelve months earlier (Steel, June 1998: 28). 
Qatar, the smallest of all the independent Arab states, has more oil than Bahrain. It is the 
smallest of the big producers. Oil seemed to be the only excuse for its existence. When oil 
exports began in 1950 Qatar was a devastated peninsula with a tiny population reduced to 
hopeless poverty by the decline of the pearl-fishing industry. However, with its population 
of 30,000, the receiving of £20 million per year by the late 1950s was more than enough to 
provide public service and welfare for the population. The economic boom attracted 
immigrants and the population rose to 100,000 (Mansfield, 1992: 350). The national public 
communications operator of Qatar installed 15,657 new and replacement lines in 1992. 
However, the waiting list for connections has been increasing over the past few years and 
stood at 1421 at the end of 1992. Q-Tel replaced the former Qatar national telephone 
Service, which was a joint venture between Cable & Wireless and the Qatar Transport and 
Communications Ministry. Q-Tel is the sole operator of national and international services 
in Qatar (Market Opportunities in the Middle East, MEC, June 1994). Net profits at Q-Tel, 
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according to Middle East communication April 2000, rose by 13 percent to $US 171 
million in 1999. Total revenues increased by 6.8 percent to $US 350 million with the GSM 
services recording the highest growth of almost 30 percent to $US 53.4 million (Regional 
News, MEC, April 2000: 4). 
The sultanate of Oman, with an estimated population of 2 million in 1996 (Gerner, 2000: 
241) stretches for some 500 miles along the toe of the Arabian peninsula and island to the 
edge of the great Empty Quarter. It was until recently the most inaccessible part of the Arab 
world. Oman refused to join OPEC or its Arab equivalent OAPEC. Oil production 
remained modest in the 1980s at about 500,000 barrels per day, but economic and social 
development have proceeded actively from very low levels during the last two decades 
(Mansfield, 1992: 355-58). In Oman the General Telecommunications Organisation (GTO), 
the national telecommunications provider, is a government-owned commercial enterprise 
run by the PTT. For the period 1991-1995, the GTO has budgeted $345 million for new and 
existing projects to expand and upgrade the already sophisticated telecommunications 
network. The programme includes projects to increase the number of telephone lines and 
exchanges, a digital networking system for integrated and packet-switched transfer services, 
and the expansion of the fibre optic network (Market Opportunities in the Middle East, 
MEC, June 1994). The General Telecommunications Organisation (GTO ) -now Oman Tel- 
is expanding the country's GSM network. In May 1999, Ericsson and Motorola were 
awarded two contracts for the expansion of the GSM network in Oman. The joint value of 
the contracts was $US44 million (Oman, December 1999: 38). 
84 
Algeria is not a producer of crude oil on the scale of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, but it is a 
major producer of natural gas. With 29 million people in 1996 (Gerner, 2000: 241), it has 
over 5 per cent of the total world supply and its gas fields are much more accessible than 
those of Siberia. The oil boom of 1973 was a windfall benefit, but it needs every dollar of 
additional revenue for its own development and industrialisation plans (Mansfield, 1992: 
461). Algeria, despite its financial and political difficulties has been a considerable market 
for telecommunications equipment. While European suppliers still dominate the market, US 
suppliers have seen their market share increase steadily since 1990 and they achieved a 15 
per cent share in 1992 (Market Opportunities in the Middle East, MEC, June 1994). Algeria 
has recently managed to maintain telecommunications growth similar to previous levels. 
The country still has an average tele-density for the Maghreb of around 4.5 per cent. 
Among potential communications developments is a proposed $2 billion investment by 
Daewoo Corporation of South Korea, currently being negotiated with the government 
(Weaver, April 1998: 20). 
Libya, the impoverished desert state of the 1950s, became one of the world's leading oil- 
producers. The country, which was shaped out of the desert a generation ago, with a 
population of around 5 million in 1996 (Gerner, 2000: 241), has now achieved remarkable 
success (Mansfield, 1992: 447-52). Telecommunications in Libya were greatly improved 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Radio relay and coaxial cable extended to numerous 
points and a domestic satellite system was constructed to serve areas not fully integrated 
into the ground-based networks. The number of telephone lines increased from 90,000 in 
1978 to 215,000 in 1985; an average of I telephone for every 100 citizens. By 1987 Libya 
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had a modem telecommunications system that provided high-quality service between the 
country's main population centres. All telecommunications activities were carried out by 
the General Post, Telephone, and Telegraph Organisation, a subsidiary of the Secretariat of 
Communications (Lenaghan, 1991). 
Iraq, with a population of 21 million (Gerner, 2000: 241), is a major oil exporting country 
in the Arab world. The increase of oil prices in the 1970s helped the country to foster its 
national economic development (Boyd, 1993: 119). Iraq also holds one of the largest 
sulphur reserves in the world and substantial deposits of phosphates (Elias, 2000). During 
its 8-year war with Iran (1980-88) and invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Iraq lost many of its 
opportunities to develop its telecommunications infrastructures. There is little information 
about the current communication development in Iraq. In 1988, Iraq had a good 
telecommunications network of radio communication stations, radio relay links, and coaxial 
cables. With approximately 972,000 television sets the system was connected to both the 
Atlantic Ocean and Indian Ocean systems of the International Telecommunications Satellite 
Organisation (INTELSAT), as well as to one Soviet INTERSPUTNIK satellite station. It 
also had coaxial cable and radio relays linking it to Jordan, Kuwait, Syria, and Turkey. Iraq 
had an estimated 632,000 telephones in 1988 (Mason, 1991). 
Jordan and Yemen are amongst the poorest nations in the region. Yet, per capita income 
in these countries along with more balanced oil economies of Bahrain, Egypt, Oman and 
Syria increased fivefold in the decade ended in 1983. Between 1973-1983, these countries 
invested more than $150 billion on the infrastructure sectors such as transport, 
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communication and electric power (Abed, 1988: 95). Jordan's population in 1996 was 
around 4 million (Gerner, 2000: 241). Its government-owned telecommunications 
organisation (TCC), receives its funding from the Ministry of Communications which has 
complete authority over all communications services. The government, in turn, is very 
dependent on external funding from organisations such as the World Bank. In its latest 
five-year plan (1992-1997) the Jordanian government invested $300 million in Jordan's 
telecommunications network. Specifically, the plan called for the construction of 20 main 
telephone exchanges and 100 local exchanges, providing services to over 180,000 new 
subscribers (Market Opportunities in the Middle East, MEC, June 1994). A number of U. S. 
companies have been involved in bids for a GSM cellular network in Jordan. Jordan has 
been among the first countries in the Middle East to participate in the wave of privatisation 
that has been sweeping through the region since 1995 (Jordan, MEC October 1998: 46). 
Yemen which was estimated have a population of 16 million in 1996 (Gerner, 2000: 241), 
has considerable foreign debt, estimated at around $9 billion. Moreover, the trend for 
export of oil has been under some pressure. However, it has been continuing to fulfil 
requirements in the telecommunications field. The Yemeni government, to upgrade its 
telecommunications infrastructure, specially the trunk exchanges and transmission network, 
secured a $50 million loan from The Japanese Overseas Economic Co-operation Fund. 
Yemen planned to digitise all trunk exchanges and the transmission network by 1996, and 
digitise the local network by 2003. However, political unrest between the North and South 
put these plans in doubt (Market Opportunities in the Middle East, MEC, June 1994). In 
February 1990, YTC, the national provider of national, local and long distance services, 
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entered to an agreement with Cable & Wireless to form a Joint venture company called 
TELE Yemen, to provide international links for Yemen by the end of the last century 
(Steel, MEC February 1998; 31). 
Although some useful minor oil discoveries have been made in the last 20 years, the Syrian 
telecommunication development has not been much dependent on oil. In 1991 the Syrian 
Telecommunications Establishment awarded a contract to Siemens for the expansion of the 
telephone network by 700,000 lines. There are some other tenders including: setting up a 
ground satellite receiving station using digital technology, construction of a fibre optic 
cable between Cyprus and Syria, and installing two cellular telephone systems. Due to 
foreign policy sanctions which have been in place since 1979, supplier relations between 
the U. S. and Syria in the telecommunications sector have been minimal (Market 
Opportunities in the Middle East, MEC, June 1994). The bulk of Syria's telecom equipment 
imports for its population of 9 million in 1996 (Gerner, 2000: 241), has come from 
European suppliers mainly from France, the UK and Germany (Steel, MEC, May 1998: 
28). 
In Lebanon which has a population of 4 million (est. in 1996) (Gerner 2000: 241), the 
Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (MPT) is attempting to rehabilitate and develop 
the telecommunications sector, which has been paralysed by years of civil war and a lack of 
investment. The Lebanese government has estimated the cost of urgent repairs to the 
telecommunications network at around $140 million, while longer term requirement for the 
modernisation of the network will cost about $600 million. The MPT has broken its 
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rehabilitation and development programme into three phases: exchanges, transmission, and 
networks (which includes a cellular network project) So far, Alcatel, Ericsson and Siemens 
have been awarded the majority of contracts for all three phases of the programme (Market 
Opportunities in the Middle East, MEC, June 1994). Demand for telecommunication 
products in Lebanon has been growing in recent years. European suppliers particularly 
Germany and France have been setting up their deliveries to the country (Steel, MEC 
March 1998: 28). 
Sudan with an estimated population of 36 million (Sudan, July 2001), is one of the non-oil 
producing countries in the region, and also amongst the poorest in terms of GNP and per 
capita income. In 1996, the Sudanese telecommunications organisation, MOBITEL became 
a member of the GSM MoU Association. In Sudan, Alacatel has supplied a GSM network 
to MOBITEL for 10,000 subscribers (Pre'vel & Ersfeld, MEC December 1997: 31). Lines 
are currently available in the Greater Khartoum area, with expansion work underway to 
extend coverage to Port Sudan and Wad Medani. The network, in commercial operation 
since January 1997, currently has some 5,000 GSM users (Pre'vel & Ersfeld, MEC 
December 1997: 31). 
Palestine, with a significant progress in recent years in its telecommunications sector, still 
faces a long road ahead. Two years after the private Company PALTEL, the Palestinian 
Telecommunications Organisation, has been in full operation, the tele-density in Palestinian 
National Authority (PNA) areas is nearing 5.7 phone lines for every 100 population 
(Bahour, March 1999: 24). 1999 has been a very busy year for the Palestinian 
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Telecommunications network. According to MEC, two mobile switching centres (MSCs) 
already constructed respectively in Ramallah and Gaza City, became operational in June 
1999. PATEL has signed international roaming agreement with more than 70 countries. A 
GSM cellular system is operational in Palestine and it is expected that during the next 10 
years there will be about 370,000 cellular users in the territory. PATEL has introduced a 
modern system for data communications. A tender was issued in 1997 for the provision of 
INTERNET services and was expected to be operational in the year 2000 (Halawani, MEC 
November 1999: 19,20). 
In North Africa, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt with estimated population of respectively 27 
million, 9 million, and 59 million in 1996 (Gerner, 2000: 241), unlike the two other oil 
exporting countries of Libya and Algeria, have been mainly dependent on foreign aid and 
finance. The Moroccan PTT currently enters the next phase of its $1.2 billion 
telecommunications development programme with the expectation of receiving a $60 
million loan from the African Development Bank for the programme (Market Opportunities 
in the Middle East, MEC, June 1994). The specific goal of the project is to increase 
telephone network capacity by 45 per cent and connect 332,000 new subscribers to the 
PSTN. Other projects include the construction of a national radio frequency control centre, 
the installation of fibre optic links, and the expansion of trunk and international networks 
for rural communities. In Tunisia, the Ministry of Communication has planned to 
restructure the country's telecommunications sector in a period from 1992 to 1996. The 
General Directorate of Telecommunications in Tunisia plans to spend $1 billion to finance 
a variety of projects to upgrade the infrastructure, including network management systems, 
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and a doubling of the number of telephones in service U. S. telecommunications companies 
have recently been involved in a competition for a $150 million contract to install a new 
centralised switching system (ibid. ). The development of the Egyptian telecommunication 
sector will be discussed in detail later in this chapter. 
The three Arab countries of Somalia, Mauritania and Djibouti have not been included in 
the above list mainly due to the lack of information about them. The role of the oil revenues 
in the process of economic transformation, and particularly the development of the 
telecommunication sector in the rest of the Arab countries, as can be seen, is however 
significant. As we shall see later in this chapter, while the Arab oil-rich countries such as 
Saudi Arabia have been the main targets of Western powers' politics, the geopolitical 
importance of some of oil-poor nations in the Arab world such as Egypt, has not excluded 
them from Western interest and influence. 
Privatisation in the Arab world 
A major outcome of globalisation of Western economic patterns has been the spread of 
privatisation norms in the developing countries. The Arab world, which contains extremes 
of both wealth and poverty, has however lagged behind the trend of privatisation. In 
pursuing their media enterprises, as advanced earlier, a tremendous trend of governmental 
investment has embraced the whole area including Algeria, Libya, Syria, Jordan, Morocco, 
Tunisia, Yemen and, particularly, the oil exporting countries of the GCC including Saudi 
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Oman. Meanwhile, events 
such as the passage of Morocco's telecommunications liberalisation law in June 1997 
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signal that the region is slowly, but unavoidably, beginning to respond to the changes 
occurring in global telecommunications markets (Mayer, MEC, September 1997: 11). 
Since the early 1980s, the process of globalisation has affected every corner of the world, 
and the Arab world is not an exception. The Arab PTTs and politicians are responding to 
the process differently. The region, by and large, has not made a firm commitment to 
privatisation of the basic service operations. Traditionally in the Arab world, with the 
exception of Lebanon, all terrestrial electronic media are government owned and controlled 
(Boyd 1993, Alterman 1998). In the telecommunications sector, the majority of countries in 
the region including Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, U. A. E., 
and Yemen have no concrete plans to end government control. While pressure from foreign 
governments and world bodies such as the WTO have succeeded in promoting the rhetoric 
of privatisation in the Arab world, there are few countries which are moving beyond mere 
rhetoric. Sudan, the Palestinian Authority, the U. A. E. and Bahrain already have a private- 
sector participation in their landline carriers. Jordan has been seeking a strategic investor to 
bring in capital and management experience, while Morocco and Egypt are experimenting 
with private value-added service licences, a process which may lead to future privatisation 
of the national carriers. The Oman government was preparing to consider privatisation 
policy in autumn 1997, beginning with the likely sale of the country's GSM network to a 
private operator (Mayer, 1997: 11-17). Saudi Arabia is currently to privatise some services 
which have been traditionally provided by the government. According to Saudi's Minister 
of PTT, in December 1997 the country decided to privatise its telecommunications sector 
within six months and transfer all services currently operated to a private company. The 
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private Saudi Telecommunications Company would have an initial capital of more than 10 
billion Riyals ($2.7 billion) (Saudi Privatising Post Offices, 1998). 
The Arab world overall is privileged in that if privatisation programmes were implemented, 
significant investment for telecommunications development could be raised largely from 
sources of capital within the region. This has already been proved by privatisation 
programmes in the GCC countries of UAE, Bahrain and Kuwait as well as the Palestinian 
self-rule authority. The success or setback of countries which are liberalising first, such as 
Jordan, Morocco, and Egypt will define the direction for the other governments to 
relinquish control over telecommunications operations (Mayer, 1997: 11-17). The prospects 
of privatisation in the Arab world in both telecommunications and broadcasting sectors will 
be discussed in chapter VIII. 
In short, relying on their own national oil revenues or external sources of finance, or both, 
the Arab states have shown their determination to establish and advance their 
telecommunications infrastructures. The process may be seen as a positive sign of hope; a 
progressive trend towards modernisation and industrialisation of the region; primary steps 
into a stable and well-off society in which Arab people through the new technology, could 
join into and enjoy the industrialised world's scientific and technical achievements. 
However, while virtually nobody disputes the potential possibility of realising these 
dreams, there are at least two important observations. Firstly, there is concern over the 
suitability and efficiency of these new technologies for the Arab nations, considering their 
peculiarities and traits. The question, as we shall see later in the case study of ARABSAT, 
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is not whether the modern technologies are good or bad in nature It is about the 
compatibility and the degree of their adequacy in the particular context of the Arab 
societies. This approach sounds theoretically correct and may be generalised to other areas 
too. For instance, nobody disputes the necessity of food, medicine or shelter. However, it 
may be asked what kind of food, how much medicine and which type of housing is 
appropriate for a specific community. 
The second observation, which constitutes the remaining part of this chapter, is concerned 
with the political implications of economic and commercial deals between Western 
countries and the Arab states . In 
dealing with Western countries, no matter how weak or 
strong their economic and financial positions, most of the Arab states have responded 
passively. Indeed, on many occasions they have dealt with Western companies and policies 
at the cost of their national or regional interests. In this context, the two leading Arab 
countries of Egypt in North Africa, and Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf stand out as 
striking examples. Egypt can be regarded as the representative of the non oil-rich Arab 
nations and Saudi Arabia as the most powerful economy in the Persian Gulf and the Middle 
East. 
The Case Study of Egypt 
With its 59 million people spread over approximately 40 percent of the country's 1 million 
sq. km, Egypt is easily the most populous of the Arab countries. About one quarter of the 
Arab nation is Egyptian by nationality (Mansfield, 1992; 935). Egypt enjoys essential 
political advantages in relation to the other Arab countries. It is the most ancient of nation- 
94 
states, with a natural sense of political community which most of the new artificially 
established states in the region have lacked (ibid. ). Egypt's relations with other Arab 
countries deteriorated following the 1979 peace treaty with Israel. The Arab League's 
headquarters was moved from Cairo to Tunisia and Egypt was no longer part of 
ARABSAT. For a decade, Egypt's popular television programmes and cinema were 
boycotted by most Arabs. In 1990, the situation was changed. The Gulf war, for all its 
unfortunate consequences, was generally beneficial for Egypt. The Arab League 
headquarters returned to Cairo and the former Egyptian Foreign Minister, Ismat Abdul 
Maguid became its new Secretary General (Mansfield 1992, Boyd 1993). 
Per capita income in Egypt climbed steadily from the inception of the Nasser era in 1952 
until the June 1967 War. It then rose rapidly from the outbreak of the oil boom in 1973 until 
oil revenues began to decline in the early 1980s. During the decade ended in 1983, the 
nominal GDP of Egypt grew by an average annual rate of nearly 29 per cent and the per 
capita income increased fivefold (Abed, 1988: 93,95, Cassandra, 1995: 46). By the mid 
1980s, however, Egypt was one of the most dependent and financially troubled economies 
of the Arab world. The country's total foreign debt, under $3 billion in 1973, had grown to 
16 billion by 1979. In 1982-83, the external debt was estimated at $20 billion. In the 
absence of government budget surpluses and adequate local savings, Egypt adopted a 
development strategy for which continuous flows of imported capital, commodities, and 
technology were indispensable. Most important, all the principal sources of income for the 
country, namely its oil revenues, remittances from workers abroad, Suez canal tolls, 
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tourism, cotton exports, as well as foreign aid, were closely linked to uncertain world 
economic conditions (Weinbaum, 1986: 21). 
Egypt's economic change and development in the last three decades cannot be adequately 
examined without taking into consideration its close relationship with the United States. 
Since the death of Nasser (1970), with only a short period of tendency towards the former 
Soviet Union, Egypt has played a vital part in the success of American politics in the Arab 
world. The role of Egypt's governments, particularly, in the process of peace between 
Arabs and Israelis has been crucial. Incapable of relying on their people and precious 
human and historical resources, the two last Egyptian governments established a strong 
political and economic dependency on the West and particularly the United States. Unlike 
the major Arab oil producing states in the Persian Gulf, however, the main determinant in 
Egypt's establishing the strategic relationship with the United States has been the country's 
economic and financial problems. In fact, the strategy has been pursued in order to find a 
way-out from the prevailing economic and political crisis in the country. 
All economic indications point to Egypt's strong reliance on the Western world for the 
capital, commodities, and technical services needed to sustain current levels of 
consumption for its citizens and realise promised economic expansion. While not seeking 
an end to financial assistance from the West, concerns are expressed about Egypt's 
economic dependence on outsiders. The major external patron of Egypt is the United States. 
As a result of the AID (U. S. Agency for International Development) programme, directly or 
indirectly, a number of U. S. management, accounting, and engineering firms are 
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represented in Cairo, along with American construction, telecommunications, and 
manufacturing companies. Some U. S. companies have responded to Egypt's efforts to 
attract foreign private investment. Petroleum exploration and production companies 
expanded a presence in Egypt from the mid-1960s. While, in 1974, there had been only six 
banks in the country, by 1983,75 foreign and Egyptian banks were in operation. Over 400 
companies in the United States are said to have benefited in the commodity aid programme 
for Egypt (Weinbaum, 1986: 28). Following the Persian Gulf War and in the accompanying 
stabilisation package agreed with the international Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1991, a huge 
amount of aid was allocated to Egypt. This aid reduced the 1990 foreign debt of $50 billion 
to $26 billion by 1994 (Cassandra, 1995: 48). 
Foreign financial assistance, particularly USAID's, facilitated the development of Egypt's 
telecommunication sector. The first Egyptian five-year plan for the development and 
expansion of the country's telecommunications network and services started in 1982. At 
the end of 1991, Egypt had 1.927 million exchange lines installed, with a total capacity of 
2.387 million. This equates to a line penetration of 3.52 per 100 of the population, which is 
close to the average of the Arab status. The Egyptian PTT, ARENTO, however, wanted to 
increase this to 12.3 per 100 of the population by the year 2000. A $42 million grant to 
finance telephone exchange expansion schemes in Cairo was agreed by USAID in 1992 
(Country Profile, MEC, September 1993: 35). Expecting an investment of nearly I billion 
dollars on the telecommunications sector during the 1990s, the Egyptian government 
entered its third Five Year Plan for the continued development of the telecommunications 
services in Greater Cairo in 1993. Now, Egypt is targeting network expansion at the rate of 
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1 million lines per year and is beginning to liberalise service provision. Egypt is currently 
working on attracting investment to build its Valley of the Pyramids project, an IT locale 
similar to Silicon Valley. Deliberations were underway between Intel late in 1997 and the 
Egyptian government to operate a hardware manufacturing plant (Digital Challenges, 
1998). In 1999, four US-based companies were among the bidders for a contract to build an 
outside plant as part of the latest Egyptian telecommunications expansion project. The 
project forms the second phase of a larger expansion plan being funded by the U. S. Agency 
for International Development (USAID). The plant is to support 400,000 additional lines in 
Cairo, Alexandria and Port Said. Bidders include Morrison Knudsen Corporation, Nastec, 
Bechtel, and ABB SUSA. K&M Engineering Corporation. A U. S. company is acting as a 
consultant for the project (Regional News, MEC, March 1999: 4). The U. S. also is recently 
co-operating with Egypt on implementation of Egypt's privatisation plans in the 
telecommunications and banking sectors, and with tax and customs reforms. In the context 
of the U. S. -Egypt Partnership for Economic Growth, President Mubarak and Vice President 
Gore met in March 2000. In the meeting, Al Gore noted that American investment has 
almost doubled over the past five years. To achieve its goal of attracting $5 billion in 
annual foreign direct investment, he urged Egypt to continue to make its economic reform 
efforts a high priority. They also noted especially USAID's new 10-year strategy, which 
links grants and programs to Egypt's own long-term goals. (Industry Group 91, March 
2000). Although some other European telecommunications firms such as Siemens, Alcatel, 
Biccotest have been present in Egypt's telecommunications programmes, it is often said 
that the telecommunications sector is becoming increasingly United States oriented. 
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In short, though often in a subtle rather than a direct manner, the U. S. aid to Egypt has been 
linked to its political objectives with the Arab-Israeli peace process (Weinbaum, 1986: 21). 
Preoccupied with the support of Israel in its cruel campaign against unarmed Palestinian 
Arabs and the increasing waves of Intifada throughout the occupied land, Cassandra (1995) 
argues: "the lens through which Washington views Egypt is designed to reveal what Egypt 
can contribute to the peace process, leaving in less clear focus purely national issues and 
challenges "(Cassandra, 1995: 62). The United States' $35 billion financial assistance to 
Egypt since 1975, has to be seen in this context. Yet, the impact of U. S. aid has been far 
from beneficial for Egypt's economy. Wilson (1993), among others, notes: 
Egypt's fundamental economic problems are not being addressed, and perhaps the Mubarak 
government will never be capable of addressing them.... A begging bowl approach is not an 
economic policy, and it is inappropriate for a country with such a rich economic history and 
proud traditions (Wilson, 1993: 44,45). 
The Case Study of Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia's economic and development programme is far more massive than those of 
other oil producing countries in the region. In February 1996, Salman Chaudhry of Star 
Distribution in Dubai, addressing manufacturers, distributors and programmers, said: "No 
matter which segment of industry you belong to, if you don't have a substantial presence in 
the Kingdom you're not playing in the major league in the Middle East" (Chaudhry, 
MEST, February 1996: 30). During the last three decades, thanks to the monumental oil 
incomes, the structural change and economic course of Saudi Arabia has been nothing less 
than a miracle. At the beginning of the 20th century, Saudi Arabia was among the poorest 
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and least developed nations of the world. The primary inflow of foreign exchange came 
from Muslim pilgrimages to Mecca. Other economic activities included nomadic grazing, 
some fishing along the coasts, and limited cultivation in the scattered oases. Oil changed 
the economy entirely and has accelerated economic growth and development. The rise in 
oil production combined with much higher payments for oil, resulted in huge increases in 
government oil revenues. They rose from $334 million in 1960 to $2.7 billion in 1972 to 
$33.5 billion in 1976, and to a record $102 billion in 1981. Thereafter, the world demand 
for petroleum began to fall, and by 1989 Saudi oil revenue had dropped to $24 billion. The 
crisis that began with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 boosted oil prices world-wide, 
raising Saudi Arabian oil revenue to almost $43.5 billion in 1991 (Kelly, et al., 1996). The 
thrust of development has been the establishment of a system of roads, ports, health, 
education and communication services. With the rapid development of a sophisticated 
infrastructure for communication all parts of the country are now linked by a highly 
advanced telecommunications and postal system integrated with global networks (ibid. ). 
Saudi Arabia, while it has never been ruled directly by a foreign power nor had a ruling 
hierarchy shaped or imposed from outside, is strongly under American influence (Butt, 
1997: 197). The United States through its transnational conglomerates has maintained and 
developed its interests, whether political, economic or military throughout the country. The 
example of warlike and remote sensing satellites for the expansion of military and security 
alliances by the United States in Saudi Arabia is a case in point. In less than half a decade 
(1978-1982), Mowlana (1990: 86) argues, billions of dollars worth of telecommunications 
and data gathering equipment were shipped to and installed in Persian Gulf countries, 
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particularly in Saudi Arabia. The total amount of the arms contracts between the United 
States and Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar 
including military satellite and hook-up systems, mobile ground radar, electronic warfare 
and intelligence, exceeded $47 billion during the period. The three countries of Kuwait, 
Bahrain and Saudi Arabia alone have established enough dependencies on the West that 
makes the information and communication infrastructure of this region at least 
technologically vulnerable to the existing policies of external powers, as well as to potential 
developments in the future. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia stands as the sixth most important 
overseas market for the United States and one of the few in the region where the balance of 
trade is in U. S. favour. Mowlana (1990) further argues: 
US-Saudi agreements on arms and military construction projects between 1978, on the eve 
of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, and approximately a half decade later, totalled $31 
billion.... In 1981, the largest single US arms deal with Saudi Arabia involved purchase of 
five Airborne Warning and Control System (A WACS) radar and communication surveillance 
planes for $8.5 billion which provide up-to-date information and guidance for the Saudis 
and the Americans about the military operations in the Iran-Iraq war (Mowlana, 1990: 86, 
87,88). 
This may suggest a similarity to pre revolutionary Iran. During the 1970s, along with 
American foreign policy, the Defence Department played a major role in protecting the 
`economy of Empire' in the region (Mattelart, 1979: 3,104). Mattelart (1979) in a part of 
his analysis, scrutinises the role of the Pentagon in Iran prior to the overthrown of the Shah 
in 1979. Military contracts between Iran and the United States in the Shah's time were 
incredible. In 1974 and 1975 alone, the Iranian government imported U. S. $6 billions 
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worth, which accounted for nearly 40% of total American arms exports. Consider that 
Germany, the foremost European importer of U. S. arms, stood 22 times lower, with a 
purchase of U. S. $273 million in 1975. In May 1975, the New York Times announced the 
installation of an intelligence base for Iranians making them capable of listening to all civil 
and military electronic communications in the (Persian) Gulf region. The $US 500,000 
project, called IBEX, at the time was one of several which were installed in "countries 
which are, so to speak, militarily occupied, which become laboratories for the discovery of 
the limits of strategies directed against the process of liberation" (Mattelart, 1979: 3,104, 
105). 
The time of the conclusion of the contracts, immediately after the oil boom of 1973 in Iran 
and a few years later in Saudi Arabia, and the American rapid shift of focus from one 
strategic ally, Iran, to another, Saudi Arabia, are worth mentioning. These economic and 
commercial relationships reflected a long and strong political, military and economic 
superiority for the U. S. over the Middle East. The trend may be more evidently traced in 
the process of development of two communications deals with Iran and Saudi Arabia 
respectively in the 1970s and 1990s. 
In 1975 the Iranian Government subscribed to a contract with GTE (General Telephone & 
Electronics) which was the largest that a private company could ever remember in the 
telecommunications industry. Six companies responded to a public invitation for a $US 
500 million contract which would add 2 million telephone lines and the associated 
exchange equipment to the Iranian communications system by 28 `h March 1978: the 
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German firm Siemens, the Japanese firm Nippon Electric, L. M. Ericsson, a Swedish 
company, the French subsidiaries of ITT, Compagnie Generale de Construction 
T'ele'phonique and Le Materiel Telephonique, and finally the German subsidiary of the 
same company, ITT Standard Elektrik Lorenz. France was widely expected to win the 
contract through the ITT subsidiaries company. The Shah of Iran himself had chosen a 
French technical consultant company to judge between the various proposals. In his trip to 
France he also had an interview with the French Head of State, which seemed to enhance 
the prospects of the French company. Yet, against all expectations, the expansion of the 
Iranian telecommunication system fell into the hands of GTE. Behind the scenes, 
Matterlart (1979) argues, there were two main reasons for this decision. Firstly, the 
American GTE was already in Iran, signing another contract with the Iranian Air force to 
supply a variety of communications apparatus. However, the annoyed French officials 
offered another reason which was certainly not without foundation: "that GTE exploited the 
recent communist gains in the French Elections by warning the Iranians they might wind 
up dealing with a nationalised manufacture by accepting the ITT subsidiaries' bid". The 
personal participation of the US ambassador, ex-chief of the CIA, Richards Helms, in the 
study of Iranian needs and his role in completion of the contract, as for another earth and air 
surveillance equipment contract, was decisive (Matterlart, 1979: 105,106). 
In order to provide a base of comparison, I have highlighted the Shah's economic and 
political policies towards the West, particularly the United States, in the 1970s, and those of 
Saudi Arabia in the 1990s. Unfortunately, the similarities are not negligible. Whether the 
similarity in pre-Revolutionary Iran and Saudi Arabia's foreign policies, and their similar 
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patterns of economic and commercial relationships with the West, will lead to similarity in 
political fate, is a valid question. The answer to this question may not seem difficult, but 
because social developments are very complex, one should rather wait for an exact response 
from the future. 
In 1996, the American AT&T Corporation won a $4 billion, seven-year agreement to build 
an advanced digital communications network in Saudi Arabia. AT&T beat several rivals for 
the deal, including Northern Telecom Ltd., Siemens and L. M. Ericsson Telephone Co. 
Through 2000 the deal could add annual sales of about $600 million to the company, which 
had revenue last year of $65 billion. The controversial agreement between Saudi Arabia 
and AT&T, according to Los Angeles Times (1994) would double Saudi Arabia's existing 
communications system capacity by the year 2000, creating 1.5 million digital lines as well 
as wireless systems. The agreement (TEP-6) is regarded as the world's largest single 
telecommunications contract outside the US. TEP-6 involves optical fibre and digital 
microwave transmission equipment and satellite earth stations. AT&T was also awarded the 
contract for a GSM system supporting up to 200,000 subscribers (Los Angeles Times, May 
10" 1994: p2A). The American Commerce Secretary, Ronald H. Brown, who had made two 
trips to Saudi Arabia in 1995, issued a statement saying the contract had "commanded top 
priority" at his department for the past eight months. A month before concluding the 
agreement, President Clinton had sent a letter to Saudi King Fahd urging that AT&T be 
chosen. Secretary of State Warren Christopher mentioned it in a visit to the King. In a 
statement, AT&T Chairman Robert E. Allen, while thanking Clinton, said: "We are 
104 
delighted that AT&T was selected to partner with the Saudis in their telecommunications 
expansion project" (Los Angeles Times, May 10`h 1994: p2A). 
Mattelart's account of Iran before the revolution offers a clear picture of the relations 
between Iran and the West, and is instructive for other Third World nations. Neither the 
Western political and technical support of Iran, nor the US and European sophisticated 
warfare equipment exported to this country, helped the Shah to survive. In fact, as 
Matterlart argues, 2,500 Maverick missiles, 80 Grumman fighter-bombers, 489 Bell 
helicopters of all types, six destroyers made by Litton at the cost of $US 110 million, more 
than 50 F-16s of General Dynamics from the US, accompanied with six French patrol-boats 
of the `Combatance' type, and several British anti-aircraft radar systems, purchased only 
during the two succeeding years of 1974 and 1975, did not turn away the surprising destiny 
of the most powerful American gendarmerie in the Middle East (Mattelart, 1979: 3,104, 
105). 
Having discussed the two reciprocal games of development in the Arab world, though 
unusual, and the extensive dependency of the Arab states on the great powers, we may now 
be able to come to an analytical conclusion. While summarising what has been already 
discussed in this chapter, the following section attempts to set the stage for my further 
arguments in the next two chapters on the development of the media in the Arab world 
(chapter IV), and the anatomy of ARAB SAT (chapter V). 
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Oil, Development and the West: A final analysis 
In the early 1980s, Brian Murphy (1983), in an analysis concerning the planning and 
implementation of developmental policies in the Third World, suggested that the policies 
adopted would not necessarily guarantee the national interests of most Third World 
countries. In fact, as he argued, the policies seemed a kind of reaction to or protection 
against their poor political position, rather than a pure economic or developmental strategy: 
There is a rather sophisticated level of double think approach amongst most Third World 
government officials. They know what is happening. They know their economies are tied 
hand and foot to Western economic interests. They also know that if they are seen to 
accept this state of affairs passively they will be held wholly responsible when their 
nations dissolve into riot and starvation (Murphy, 1983: 102). 
He further concluded that there were two things they could do. They could decide for an 
individual deal that might help them survive until the next election, the next coup, or the 
next sets of disasters. They could also unite with others to maintain some respect. Dealing 
with Western agencies and transnational corporations, in his view, at least they could forge 
a mechanism for saving face (ibid. ). 
In the Arab world, despite the great diversity in wealth, as mentioned earlier, the economy, 
by and large, is fuelled by oil, and the majority of Arab nations, except Jordan, Lebanon, 
Morocco and the Sudan which hold little or no crude oil production, enjoy oil revenues. 
Unlike most desperate nations of Africa and Latin America, the Arabs' privileged financial 
position, with very few exceptions, not only could protect them from poverty, debt, and 
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economic bankruptcy, but also provided an ideal opportunity for rapid economic 
development and structural transformation in the region. Unfortunately, however, the 
political dependency and the lack of sense of leadership among most of the regional states 
have been the main cause of their setback and, of course, a major theme of most critical 
analyses in the field. Findlay (1994) put the facts in this way: 
Unlike most developing countries, lack of capital has not been a major constraint on their 
choice of objectives or development path. The abundant availability of capital has not 
proved a sufficient condition for them to enjoy a smooth development course 
(Findlay, 1994: 100). 
Samir Amin (1990), while the Soviet Union was still in power, asserted that the Arabs' 
privileged condition did not lead to their political autonomy from the great powers: 
The Arab ruling classes and political leadership, unable to rely on themselves alone - or 
their peoples - must perforce seek the active intervention on their behalf of the Soviet Union 
or even of the imperialist forces (Amin, 1990: 147). 
Butt (1997) agrees that in the Arab world, the state owns the oil revenues and the ruler or 
ruling family practically owns the states. Although there are different forms in different 
states, the end result is the same. According to him, between 40 and 50 per cent of oil 
revenues in the Persian Gulf goes to the ruling families themselves and the rest may go to 
the state. "There are no detailed budgets, and no checks and balances on the spending. 
The ruling families not only cream off the oil revenues, ... they also take a commission on 
the big contracts with overseas firms" (Butt, 1997: 201). A great part of these personalised 
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petrodollars, Gresh & Vidal (1990) argue, are spent to further enrich small ruling classes 
and investments in the capital of Western companies. Only a small part is being devoted to 
development aid. "In ten years, from 1974 to 1984, capital arriving in this way in the 
developed countries had exceeded 350 billion dollars, $250 of which were destined for the 
USA alone" (Gresh & Vidal, 1990: 136). 
In Butt's (1997) judgement, millions of Arabs are not satisfied with their governments and 
Western powers alike. Arab governments have established educational institutions, 
commercial centres, communications facilities and entertainment programmes, but these 
have neither helped the Arabs to trust their governments, nor encouraged them to critically 
analyse the circumstances of their lives. A book on the region written by an Arab 
intellectual in the late 1980s opens with the following sentence "All is not well in the Arab 
world". Butt further argues: 
Accepting the bombast of their leaders, Arabs have not been able to alter their countries' 
destinies. Despite the apparently positive trends of globalisation, intellectuals in the 
Middle East point to severe limitations in the collective achievements of the Arab world 
this century, setting material gains made by oil-rich states against a sense of moral 
failure, inadequacy and defeat (Butt, 1997: 5,7). 
They also view the West as the main cause of their long-standing suffering and discomfort. 
Sceptical of the West, they are doubtful about the new world order which is being shaped 
by the United States or any other power. Ghazi Ghoseibi, before he became Saudi Arabia's 
ambassador to Britain in 1992, described the Arab misgivings about the new world order in 
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this way: "Those who are troubled by the international situation see it not as an `order' but 
as hegemony, not as `world' but American, and not `new' but rather as a return to the era 
of gun-boat diplomacy "(Butt, 1997: 11). The Arab-Western relationship, regardless of how 
much the Arab world has acquired by way of economic wealth, military might or academic 
and technological prowess, has been dominated by a strong feeling that "as a people they 
have never been anything other than pawns in the hands of the West" (ibid. : 9). They 
have, in Murphy's terms, failed to effectively unite in order to resist the processes of 
Western and US dominance sketched earlier. 
However unfortunate, it is a fact that the Arab rich-oil countries in the Middle East are still 
not prepared for the day the oil runs out. According to Amer Tamimi, head of the Kuwait 
Economic Society; "Politicians in the area are sort of relaxed and unmotivated to develop 
their economies" (Elias, 2000). Forty years ago, the Arab playwright Saad Faraj predicted 
that 2000 would be the year Kuwait's oil ran out, and that Kuwaitis wouldn't be prepared. 
The oil still exists. But, no matter how big that oil reserves are, it is not going to 
help them 
because they have exponential growth in their population and their infrastructure will be 
deteriorating (ibid. ). Additionally, Bacevich (1998) suggests, the oil-rich countries of the 
modern Middle East, "like Spain at the height of its empire ", have been "cursed by easy 
riches and led down the path of self-indulgence and laziness " (Bacevich, 1998). He further 
suggests; 
Lacking a skilled and ambitious workforce, mistrusting techniques that derive from the 
hated West, even the wealthy nations of the Arab world seem all but doomed to slide back 
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into poverty once the oil runs out or the developed world devises a cheap alternative 
energy source (Bacevich, 1998). 
In short, for most Arabs oil brought hope and then disappointment. Quoting Mahjoub 
Omar, an Egyptian political commentator, Butt (1997) says: "The Oil era like the struggle 
against Israel will be just a small phase in the broad sweep of history... oil is just a 
nonsense in history, in a hundred years it will all be gone" (Butt, 1997: 212). To illustrate 
his point, Omar likens the oil era to a visit to the Cairo International Fair in the Nasr district 
which was until comparatively recently open desert: 
First, you walk a lot to get there. Then you sit down and drink Saudi coffee. You have 
reached `yesterday'. Then you walk some more until you reach `today', with all the 
computers and machinery in the Fair. Then you carry on walking a bit until you find desert, 
the real desert of the Nasr district. And that is 'tomorrow'. When tomorrow comes there will 
be no more luxury construction schemes and no more surplus money to pay all the foreign 
workers. This will be a moment of reckoning - showing whether or not oil revenues have 
been invested wisely to enable the region to enjoy still the material benefits brought by the 
oil era (Butt, 1997: 212). 
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CHAPTER IV 
GLOBALISATION, MEDIA-CULTURAL IMPERIALISM, 
AND ISLAM 
Introduction 
At the threshold of the third millennium, the debate on the emergence of a single global 
culture and the preservation of domestic cultures is becoming increasingly heated. Despite 
those who argue that global domination no longer exists, my evidences state otherwise. 
Failing to fulfil its promises, globalisation has functioned as the principal agent of 
transnational corporations. While the economic, cultural and social disparities around the 
world still persist, the powerful forces of globalisation show no respect for national 
boundaries, local cultures, moral values, and religious beliefs. 
But not all view the process in this way. There are many who believe that the era of global, 
that is Western, domination is over, and invest much hope in the process of globalisation 
for overcoming the deepening economic and social disparities around the world. They also 
argue that the Third World cultures are flourishing amid this increasing trend of 
globalisation. This chapter aims to critically analyse the ideological discourses on 
globalisation in the three domains of economy, culture and the media. Pursuing the general 
line of this study, and in a global context, the ultimate aim of this chapter is to offer a 
clearer picture of the unequal power relations between the industrialised West and the rest 
of the world. A key aspect of my arguments in this context is the rising Islamic cultural and 
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political movements which since the early 1980s have acknowledged their presence on a 
global scale. 
Globalisation - An overview: 
Global Economy 
The economic success in some countries goes in parallel with growing socio-economic 
imbalances between and within the others. Alongside the flourishing economy of, for 
instance, some East Asian nations, one may think of impoverished people in most parts of 
Africa and Latin America where thousands upon thousands are suffering by the forces of 
global economic integration. This comment will be justified in the following discussion. 
The supporters of the IMF and the World Bank might describe today's world economy as 
an integrated and free-market system. Jeffrey Sachs (1994), a professor of economics at 
Harvard University and an adviser to many reforming governments in Latin America, 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, argues: 
They (IMF and the World Bank) have played an important part in bringing the global 
economy to this moment of great promise. Never before has the world had the opportunity to 
adopt an international system built on law, in which the weak and strong are treated 
equally, and where all have a chance to benefit from an open, market-based, global 
economy (A New Blueprint, 1994). 
In this view, the world has now become closer than ever before to the global, co-operative, 
free-market arrangements. Its economies are integrated not merely through trade in goods, 
but also through trade in services, finance and multinational production; and the central (if 
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not the only) task of the international economic institutions, is to reinforce this 
accomplishment. The proponents of the idea point to China and India, each with more than 
one billion population, and most of the 450m long-suffering citizens of Latin America, 
who "are pulling out of extreme poverty and enjoying economic growth and low inflation 
as their countries rejoin the world system after decades of statist development" (ibid. ). 
Marshall McLuhan's `global village' is already on the verge of happening. From an 
economic point of view, globalisation is a multi-dimensional process. David Dorbis (1997) 
argues for a world which is increasingly global in all aspects of trade, investment, 
manufacturing, marketing and technology: 
" Trade. Not since the Roman Empire have trade and travel moved so freely. EC'92, 
NAFTA and GATT are the new models for expanding markets. These agreements are 
models for other areas seeking borderless trade, such as APEC in the Pacific Rim and 
Mercosur in Latin America. Neither region is a unified entity by any means. But export 
among Asian nations is exploding as many of their economies continue to grow at 
double-digit rates. And by 2010, more US. exports in dollar value will go to Latin 
America than Europe and Japan combined. 
" Investment. The end of the Cold War has allowed capital to flow more freely across 
the continents, facilitating a global investment. Not only are Americans buying stock in 
US. companies, they're flocking to buy shares of companies around the world. That has 
led to a tripling in the trading volume of American Depository Receipts since the 
beginning of this decade. 
" Manufacturing. Trans-national companies like Coca-Cola and Heinz use worldwide 
distribution and economies of scale to become low-cost competitors. New Zealanders are 
selling ice cream to Russians in Siberia. Honda is America's leading automobile export to 
Japan. The world is turned upside down. 
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" Marketing. The advent of consumerism around the world has inspired a new global 
view of marketing. The strongest indicator of this is the rise of the global brand. From 
Disney to FedEx, there is a growing number of logos and products that are recognised 
and desired across the planet. One of the classic global marketing contests is the Cola 
wars. And the prime combatants -- Coke and Pepsi -- are battling each other on a number 
of fronts. 
" Technology. In many ways, technology is directly responsible for borders vanishing. 
Satellite/cable television has vastly expanded the number of television channels available 
around the world. Thanks to broadcasters like CNN and Sky Satellite Television, 
consumers can watch dozens of news, sports or syndicated programs from around the 
world (Dorbis, 1997). 
For some, globalisation implies the prospect of overcoming the economic and social 
inequalities across the world. Mike Featherstone (1990), in his `Global Culture' 
emphasises the "autonomy of the globalisalion process, which should be seen not as an 
outcome of inter-state processes ". He maintains that "the term globalisation is preferable 
to internationalisation, as it draws attention to the form within which the world becomes 
united". Significant to this movement are: 
an increase in the number of international agencies and institutions, the increasing global 
forms of communication, the acceptance of unified global time, the development of standard 
notions of citizenship, rights and conception of humankind (Featherstone, 1990: 5,6). 
Featherstone in focusing on the global tends to suggest that "a new level of 
conceptualisation is necessary", and `from the vantage point of the late twentieth century it 
seems that the era of revolution is now finally over" (ibid: 2,4). The new conceptualisation 
can be understood in what Schiller (1993a) interprets it as attempting to "dispose of the 
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centre periphery model of analysis and the very notion of intense social conflict... (T)his 
globalisation is defined to exclude domination, cultural control (soft or hard), and social 
revolution. The growth of the global institutions enumerated above is supposed to make 
these relationships and processes irrelevant, if not impossible " (Schiller, 1993 a: 106). 
However, the process of globalisation, at least in developing countries, is not avoiding 
social exclusion, regional disparities, deterioration of basic services and cultural and 
economic dominance. As far as the international system is concerned, a growing gap 
prevails in terms of power. The end of the Cold War raised questions about the legitimacy 
of the international system and the influence of transnational corporations. The main feature 
of the globalisation drive is comprehended by Schiller (1993a) in the study of the United 
Nations structure in the last 15 years and the apparent reversal of their prospects since the 
Persian Gulf War. In this respect, the most important international bodies associated with 
the United Nations such as the World Health Organisation (WHO), the Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO), and particularly, the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), all have had the same experience: 
Each of these organisations, as well as the United Nations itself, has been harshly attacked 
by the US government and the American media. Each has been financially disabled for 
pursuing goals unacceptable to powerfid American interests, i. e., the media, right wing anti- 
abortion and anti-environmental groups, and the military-industrial complex. In mid-1990, 
the United States owed $750 million to the UN overall, exclusive of unpaid dues to WHO and 
FAO. Such massive withholding of funds has crippled major health, agricultural, and 
educational programs world-wide. UNESCO has been a special target of Washington anger 
because it served as a forum - nothing more - to express the complaints of 125 nations 
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against the prevailing international information order. The United States withdraw from 
UNESCO in 1984 and has remained outside the organisation since (Schiller, 1993a: 106, 
107). 
Schiller also views the UN support for the US initiated embargo and then shattering of Iraq, 
the collapse of the former Soviet Union, termination of Russia's aid to Angola and Cuba, 
and Germany's unification and its adherence to NATO, as a turning point in the articulation 
of the new US strategy. Equally important to him is the paralysing weakness of the Third 
World and its economic dependency to the West, which has disabled it from expressing any 
serious opposition to current developments. By any criteria, these can not be considered as 
positive trends toward global equilibrium and social justice. Schiller concludes that the 
genuine sources of globalisation are not to be found in a newly achieved harmony of 
interests in the international arena, but to the contrary: 
the infrastructure of what is hopefully seen as the first scaffolding of universalism is supplied 
by the transnational corporate business order, actively engaged on all continents, in all 
forms of economic and cultural organisation, production, and distribution (ibid., 107). 
The arguments around the question will continue, as it has been for a long period the 
subject of a very wide range of denial and acceptance. However, the economic balance 
sheet of globalisation may embarrass the cheerful directors of the International Monetary 
Fund, (IMF), World Bank (WB) and World Trade Organisation (WTO). According to the 
1996 United Nations' Human Development Report, in the last 30 years the world has 
become more polarised, and the gulf between the poor and rich has widened. The report 
also shows: 
116 
" The poorest 20 percent of the world's people saw their share of global income decline 
from 2.3 percent to 1.4 percent in the past 30 years. 
" The assets of the world's 358 billionaires exceed the combined annual incomes of 
countries with 45 percent of the world's people. 
" During the last 30 years, the proportion of people with negative per-capita income 
growth tripled. 
" In the 1980s, the Socialist countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union did much 
better economically than all but a handful of countries. But after the return of capitalist 
exploitation, these countries "suffered steep declines in per capita income - which fell on 
average by a third from the peaks in the mid-1980s. 
" Economic decline or stagnation has affected 100 countries and the incomes of 1.6 billion 
people have been reduced. 
" In 70 of these countries average incomes are less than they were in 1980 - and in 43 
countries, less than they were in 1970. 
" In 1990-93 alone, average incomes fell by a fifth or more in 21 countries - mostly in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
" The world has become more economically polarised between countries and within 
countries. 
" The United States has one of the greatest income disparities, and the greatest number 
(141) of billionaires. From 1975 to 1990 the wealthiest 1% of the population increased its 
control of total assets from 20% to 36% while the bottom 60% experienced a decline in 
income. The richest 4% stole as much as the bottom 51% earned. The income ratio between 
the top 20% and bottom 20% is 9 to I (The UN Human Development Report-1996). 
What can one call this but the globalisation of poverty? Yet, the irony is that not only 
critics in developing countries, but as Sachs (1996) indicates, Western opinion leaders both 
in North America and Europe are hesitating just as this new system is emerging: 
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The vast majority of Americans take little heed of the new global system. The few who have 
heard of the World Trade Organisation view it with grumpy scepticism rather than seeing it 
for what it is -a fulfilment of American ideals pursued through 50 years of arduous effort (A 
New Blueprint, 1994). 
Beyond the world-wide trans-nationalisation of economy, trade and marketing, 
globalisation, however, has some other implications. A powerful cultural trend with 
Western, mostly American, imprint is sweeping all across the globe. The trend, as Schiller 
(1993a) argues, is at the service of the ideological and profit-making objectives of the world 
business system and global corporate economy. 
Global Culture 
Early in the twentieth century, Woodrow Wilson proclaimed that he was a "citizen of the 
world". In November 1996, David R. Dorbis, addressing the Public Relations Society of 
America National Conference (PRSA), ended his speech expressing the regret he felt for 
this unattained cosmopolitan vision, in this way: 
Unfortunately, the violent years that followed produced terrible divisions of nationality 
and ideology that made Wilson's cosmopolitan vision seem unattainable. But a new 
century brings with it the rebirth of Wilson's vision. At last, global citizenship is within 
our grasp... We are helping forge relationships of mutual understanding and self-interest 
among people and businesses throughout the world. And we are hastening the day when 
the last borders will fall (Dorbis, 1996). 
Yet, another world citizen of this extended village, Hamid Mowlana (1995), originally 
Iranian, now Professor of International Relations and director of the International 
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Communication Program at the American University, views globalisation as `dust another 
word for Western cultural dominance". He is not interested in helping the fall of remaining 
borders untouched by Western or American dominators. He wonders whether the American 
evangelist Billy Graham's preaching at one time to more than one billion people in 185 
countries - about one-fifth of the planet's population - through the electronic pulpit, 
illustrates the future of globalisation? Or, if the Hollywood Academy Awards ceremony, 
for years a symbol of the American cultural and entertainment crusade, was beamed around 
the world to another (perhaps overlapping) world-wide audience of a billion people, hosted 
by America's midnight storyteller David Letterman, is the future of globalisation (Mowlana, 
1995: 40). 
Featherstone (1990), in discussing 'global culture' points to trans-societal cultural 
processes "which sustain the exchange and f ow of goods, people, information, knowledge 
and images that give rise to communication processes which gain some autonomy on a 
global level". In his view, conceiving a global culture as "necessarily entailing a 
weakening of sovereignty of nation-states" is misleading. It is misleading also "to regard 
the emergence of third cultures as the embodiment of a logic which points to 
homogenisation" (Featherstone, 1990: 1). Rather, the process may lead to hybridisation of 
Western culture and even further, as Barker (1999) argues, eventually to the displacement 
of Western culture from its present peak. This approach underlines the impact of Non- 
western cultures on the West; the advent of vigorous Asian, African and Latin American 
cultures; and the influence of Islam, Hinduism and other world religions within the West 
(Barker, 1999: 42). 
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While it is true that there are elements from a wide variety of national cultures, which can 
be identified in the emerging world culture, the process is still significantly influenced by 
Western, mostly American, culture. American movies, soap operas, fashions and life styles 
are dominating screens, homes and shops throughout the world. As Schiller (1993b) states, 
it is unlikely that policies adopted by individual states can help them to successfully protect 
their societies. "Because of market imperatives, institutional infrastructures in country 
after country have been recast to facilitate the transmission of the American informational 
and cultural product" (Schiller, 1993b: 50 ). Questing for more and more profitability, he 
further suggests that human consciousness has been affected by the impact of media- 
cultural industries. While the ultimate effect of their cultural packages on the human senses 
is impossible to assess concretely, the existence of the effect cannot be ignored (ibid. ). 
Putting the question in a similar way, Mowlana (1995) also views globalisation as "the 
impending triumph of American culture: entertainment, fashion, and the American way of 
life, all combined in one package". To him globalisation is perhaps a nice new name used 
by transnational corporations "to hide their efforts to infect the entire world with the 
cultural virus of commercialism" (Mowlana, 1995: 40). Yet, just when the virus apparently 
has become widespread, Mowlana sees some emerging signs of hope. Thanks to the 
modern media technology, some people from various cultures, Western and Eastern, are 
revolting against the established Western cultural dominance. A very striking example of 
the new resistance against the overwhelming Western and American process has been 
illustrated in his `Communications Paradox' (1995) where he argues: 
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Two decades ago, another man in another culture, with new communications technologies 
and a totally different message in mind, not only revolutionised his country but also 
signalled the return of an old tradition. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the spiritual leader of 
Islamic Iran, then residing in suburban Paris, combined his access to networks of mosques 
and bazaars with that of electronic communication and cassette tapes in his successful long- 
distance overthrow of a secular, Western-oriented monarchy (Mowlana, 1995: 40). 
This positive approach not only views the Iranian revolution as a new emerging sign of 
hope but holds that the "vast third world regions soon will be the vanguard of a new 
revolutionary upsurge" (Amin, 1990). While still in exile, the late leader of the Islamic 
revolution used modern media technology successfully to contact his people and as Bernard 
Lewis (1994) suggests, the Islamic revolution "was probably the first revolution in modern 
history that was inaugurated by telephone, television and tape recorder" (Lewis, 1994: 
122). But there is a Persian proverb saying that `With one flower does not come the 
Spring'. It seems to be too early to suggest that the new technology has served the Third 
World nations to find their way out of the global predicament. On the contrary, the revival 
of new forms of imperialism can be traced in U. S. culture, replacing indigenous ones in the 
same way as the British Empire forced its ways on its colonies. The use and expansion of 
modern media systems in order to maintain and develop Western political, economic, 
cultural and military predominance in the Middle East during the U. S. -led war in the 
Persian Gulf "is only the most recent instance of imperialism (Schiller, 1993a: 103). 
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Global media 
Decades ago, the British historian, Arnold Toynbee had predicted that in the twentieth 
century, for the first time, it is possible for mankind to contemplate the welfare of the entire 
race. This optimism was mainly based upon the emerging modern technology and in 
particular, innovations in advanced communications. Now, the world is defined by the 
extent of communications. As we celebrate the dawn of the third millennium, the impact of 
media technology is apparent in almost all aspects of our daily lives. Marshal McLuhan's 
`global village' concept has proved correct. Yet, Toynbee's prophecy is doubted. 
Since the 1980s, a small number of transnational companies have been controlling a vast 
proportion of the world's media. The emergence of global media empires has been 
shattering the myths of national sovereignty, independent culture and free exchange of 
information among equals. Some 15 years ago, Peter Lewis (1986) suggested that these old 
mythologies were "wheeled out to justify the latest moves in the power struggle to rule the 
airwaves ". This struggle for power has not, however, been an equal one. The resources at 
the disposal of some communication giants outweighed the gross national product of many 
countries (Lewis, 1986: 9). The players in the field were not `journalists and poets" but 
giant transnational media conglomerates which in Schiller's (1983: x) view, were "playing 
for multibillion-dollar stakes ". And, as he further argued, our `global village' could not be 
identified only by TV shows, movies and news, but more importantly, by economic 
networks utilising transoceanic cables, satellites, interpersonal connections, and interactive 
computers. This facilitated an historically unprecedented international corporate economic 
order. In these circumstances, Schiller speculated that, any chance of gaining a new global 
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information order independent from the dominant transnational economic system would be 
nearly ruled out (Schiller, 1983: x). 
The more recent deployment of the major global media powers, however, are much more 
threatening than the concerns of Lewis and Schiller in the 1980s. Herman and Mc Chesney 
(1997) in their `The Global Media, the New Missionaries of Global Capitalism', profile the 
ten firms in the dominant tier of the global media oligopoly. The five largest media firms in 
the world in terms of sales - Time Warner, Disney, Bertelsmann, 
Viacom, and News 
Corporation - are also the most fully integrated global media giants. News Corporation, 
Time Warner, Disney, and Viacom have huge film and television production facilities and 
are in intense competition for success in the booming global commercial market. Lacking 
such studios, Bertelsmann and TCI compete in different markets and manners, though both 
are moving toward more direct competition - and collaboration - in the global television 
market. Four other firms- Polygram, Seagram, Sony, and General Electric - rank lower in 
the first tier. Any of these firms could potentially vault to the very top of the global media 
market if they established that as a goal, and successfully engineered the mergers and 
acquisitions necessary to bring it about (Herman and Mc Chesney, 1997: 70). 
Time-Warner with 1997 sales approaching $25 billion was the largest media organisation in 
history, controlling an unprecedented number of periodicals, books, films and television - in 
all stages of creation, production and dissemination. It was established in 1989 through the 
merger of Time Incorporated and Warner Communications Incorporated. Time Warner is a 
major force in virtually every medium and on every continent. In 1996 approximately two- 
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thirds of Time Warner's income came from the United States, but that figure was expected 
to drop to three-fifths by 2000 and eventually to less than one half (ibid. 77,78). Following 
close behind are companies controlled by Disney, Viacom, Bertelsmann and Murdoch's 
News Corporation. Although only two of these companies are wholly American-controlled, 
all are inspired and informed by American values and American products (Shawcross, 1992 
: 5,8). Disney, with 1997 sales of nearly $24 billion, is the closest challenger to Time 
Warner for the status of being the world's largest media firm. Disney now generates 31 
percent of its income from broadcasting, 23 percent from theme parks, and the balance from 
"creative content", meaning films, publishing and merchandising. Disney's stated goal is to 
expand its non-U. S. share of revenues from 23 percent in 1995 to 50 percent by 2000 
(Herman and Mc Chesney, 1997: 81). Viacom had a 1997 income exceeding $13 billion, 
and only 20 percent of that came from outside of the United States. Viacom generates 33 
percent of its income from its film studios, 33 percent from its music, video rentals and 
theme parks, 18 percent from broadcasting and 14 percent from publishing (ibid., 84,85). 
Bertelsmann is the only European-based corporation in the first tier of media giants. It is 
the third largest media group in the world with sales of approximately $15 billion in 1996. 
The Bertelsmann empire was built on global networks of book and music clubs. In 1994 its 
income was distributed among Germany (36 percent), the rest of Europe (32 percent), 
United States (24 percent), and the rest of the world (8 percent) [ibid., 87]. 
To illustrate the power of dominant firms in the global media market, News Corporation is 
a striking example. Although fifth in ranking with approximately $10 billion in 1996 sales, 
it provides the prototype for the twenty-first century global media corporation in many 
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respects, and is the best case study for understanding global media corporation behaviour. 
Rupert Murdoch and his family hold some 30 percent of News Corporation, though the firm 
is often solely identified by the head of the group, Murdoch. Its objective is basically to 
conquer the media world by controlling every form of programming including news, sports, 
films and children's programmes and beaming them through satellite or TV stations to 
homes in the United States, Europe, Asia and South America. Viacom CEO Sumner 
Redstone, Disney CEO Michael Eisner, and Time Warner CEO Gerald Levin have each 
commented that Murdoch is the one media executive they most respect and fear while 
Levin "in a more sinister fashion "'... likens him to "Adolph Hitler" (Herman and 
McChesney, 1997: 71). Following the creation of News Corporation in his native 
Australia, Murdoch was first attracted by the British market in 1969, and less than two 
decades later in the 1980s he became the most influential media mogul in the US market. 
The more significant media holdings by News Corporation are as follows: 
" Some 132 newspapers (primarily in Australia, Britain, and the United States), making it 
one of the three largest newspaper groups in the world; 
" Twentieth Century Fox, a major fibn, television, and video production centre, which has a 
library of over 2,000 fibn to exploit; 
" The US. Fox broadcasting network, 
" Twenty-two U. S. television stations, the largest US station group, covering over 40 
percent of U. S. TV owners; 
" Twenty-five magazines, most notably TV Guide; 
" Book publishing interests, including Har per Collins; 
"A 50 percent stake (with TCI's Liberty Media) in several U. S and global cable nettivorks 
including fX, )XM, Fox Sports Net, 
" Fox News Channel, 
" Asian Star Television, satellite service and television channels; 
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" Controlling interest (40 percent) in British Sky Broadcasting (BSkyB) (1996 sales: $1.6 
billion); 
" BSkyB has 40 percent stake in UK's Granada Sky Television satellite channel group; 
"A 49.9 percent stake in Germany's Vox channel; 
"A 30 percent stake in Sky Latin America digital satellite service; 
"A 40 percent stake in U. S. Sky Television, a digital satellite joint venture with Echostar 
and Concert; 
"A 50 percent stake in Japan Sky Broadcasting digital satellite service; 
" Australian Foxtel cable channel; 
"A 49.9 percent stake in India's Zee TV, 
" The Spanish-language El Canal Fox in Latin America; 
" UK Sky radio; 
"A 15 percent stake in the Australian Seven networks; 
" India Sky Broadcasting digital satellite service; 
"A 50 percent stake in channel V Asian music video channel; 
"A 45 percent stake in Hong Kong-based Phoenix Satellite Television Company (Herman 
and McChesney, 1997: 71,72). 
News Corporation is operating in nine different media on six continents and its plan for 
global expansion looks to the areas where growth is expected to be greater for commercial 
media namely continental Europe, Asia and Latin America. In the developing world, News 
Corporation has two digital satellite systems: Sky Latin America and India Sky 
Broadcasting. The former is a joint venture held equally (30 percent each) with the two 
leading Latin American media firms, Globo of Brazil and Teleisia of Mexico. TCI has the 
remaining 10 percent. The latter -ISkyB- draws from News Corporation's experience with 
the analogue Asia Star Television, which it purchased in 1993 (Herman and Mc Chesney, 
1997: 73). 
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News Corporation, Viacom, Bertelsmann, Disney and Time Warner, and some other 
vertically integrated media firms which are mostly based in the United States, are 
dominating the global media market. Such transnational media conglomerates, with a 
combination of satellite, cable, video and direct access to home, can easily attract the 
audiences on which national broadcasting depend. In this context, and given the growing 
media competition amongst the Western countries, a new level of analysis is required. In 
fact, the new global media infrastructures have established new international power 
relations, which are somehow unprecedented. In this-new deployment of power, not only 
the Third World, the Middle East and Arab nations, but most of the European countries 
which until perhaps 50 years ago were far ahead of the United States in the media 
competition, and until recently were running head to head with it, are now facing threat and 
difficulty. With the collapse of communism, the assertive and powerful presence of the 
United States, as the main actor on the international scene, has pushed almost all of the rest 
of the world into a passive position, no matter how powerful they are. As far as the arising 
challenge within the industrialised world is concerned, neither European Germany nor 
Asian Japan have really been able to take a considerable part in the new international 
communications order. The amount of information flowing across the world from the 
United States in the 1970s was nothing to what is now being exported. 
1 Fortune's 1990 list of the global 500 (the 500 biggest industrial corporations in the world) revealed that the US leads all 
countries, with 167 companies on the list. That is more than Japan, West Germany, and Canada combined... Americans 
are No. I in 14 of the 25 industries on the global 500. Still, according to the publication, impressive as these figures are, 
US dominance is slowly giving way. In 1980,23 US companies made the top 50, compared with only 5 Japanese. Now 
there are 17 American and 10 Japanese (The Global 500, p 265, quoted from Schiller's `Not Yet the Post-Imperialist Era' 
1993, p104). 
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A key motive compelling the Arab/Muslim states to get closer to Europe and establish 
firmer relationship and co-operation with the European Union member states after the cold 
war, is perhaps such an understanding of the present global order. In this assessment, 
though they are not completely off the mark, they need to be aware of the historical 
common roots and interests of the great powers on both sides of the Atlantic, and their 
consensus over preserving and expanding their strategic interests in the Middle East and 
Muslim world. 
NWICO: A renewal of old concerns 
The establishment of a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) has 
been for a long time a major concern for the Third World and non-Allied nations. Even the 
E. U. members, once powerful and unassailable entities in almost equal association with the 
U. S., have been driven into feeling vulnerable. It is argued that the questions of adjustment 
to the communications revolution have been particularly problematic for the West 
European states (Dyson and Humphreys, 1990). In response to these developments the 
West European nations have tried to set up protectionist barriers to deter the import of 
American cultural products and services. Confirming the level of economic threat 
emanating from outsiders, mostly Americans, Charles Husband (1992) argues that "an 
urgent sense of the imminent threat to `European' culture has been a powerful theme within 
the European Community's deliberations on communication policies" (Husband, 1992: 
21). 
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During the 1960s and 1970s, a group of Third World countries made efforts to create a New 
World Information and Communication Order (NWICO). The United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) was an important forum for this campaign. 
The principal aim of the initiative was to challenge the Western, mainly American, 
domination of world news, information and cultural flows. They complained that the 
powerful West, utilising its domination of world media resources, wanted to impose its 
cultural norms, political perceptions and economic interests on the rest of the world. This 
reflected the unfair advantage of controlling most of the output of radio, television, cinema, 
press and news agencies by Western powers. Third World nations were seeking for a more 
balanced flow of news values that could be more sensitive to the needs of Third World 
countries; their economic development, political stability and cultural integrity (Schiller 
1993b, El-Affendi 1993). 
These voices of protest were fiercely attacked by the United States and its few Western 
allies. UNESCO was at the heart of this attack; being accused of being nothing more than a 
forum to serve 125 nations in expressing their complaints against the prevailing 
international information order. The United States withheld the funds owed to the 
Organisation to cripple its cultural and educational programmes and later in 1984 withdrew 
from UNESCO, followed by the United Kingdom. They wanted to force these countries to 
accept the Western global information policy (Schiller, 1993a: 106,107). 
Today, these same key issues from a strong capitalist framework, in Husband's (1992) 
view, "are at the core of the European Community's concerns regarding the technical and 
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economic pre-eminence of the USA, and Japan, and the consequent threat of cultural 
colonisation by alien values. " However, as he argues: 
The irony lies in the fact that so strong was the U. S. opposition to the NWICO Movement 
that in 1985 it withdrew f "om UNESCO, followed a year later by the United Kingdom. The 
Third World and non-aligned Movement opposition to media-led cultural imperialism was 
regarded as a threat to the free f ow of information and the operation of market forces. Now, 
the NWICO argument has been refurbished in European terms and has occupied an 
unembarrassed, if contradictory, place within the debates around the Television Without 
Frontiers Directive (Husband, 1992: 22). 
Among E. U. member states, particularly regarding the media industries, France's 
standpoint is remarkable. In 1967, the French politician and writer, Jean-Jacques Servan 
Schreiber warned that the American corporations were dominating the European economy 
and if this trend was continued Europe would fall permanently behind in this race. He 
called for national policies to encourage European companies to become big enough to 
compete with Americans. Schreiber also told Europeans they were losing out on the 
development and control of computer-communications, which he believed would be the 
`engine of history' after the year 2000. In this respect, he proposed a co-operative 
framework within which Europeans could unite to take on the American threat. What he 
was suggesting reshaped the patriotic notion of French destiny (Murphy, 1983: 64). The 
continuous hostility of the French government to American TV progranunes and movies is 
also summed up in former Culture Minister Jacques Lang's expressed fear of `wall-to-wall 
Dallas' and European attempts within the GATT (General Agreement on Tariff and Trade) 
to sanction a protectionist wall against American audio-visual products (Barker 1999: 1). 
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Muslims observe the new developments curiously and to some extent positively. The 
widening gap between the United States and Europe, while weakening the conventional 
alliance between the two, may lessen the Muslims' long-standing distance from Europe. 
Further, the new concerns among E. U. members may help provide an appropriate ground 
to enhance the level of mutual understanding and co-operation with Muslim nations in 
media and cultural spheres. By and large, it appears that concern over the US hegemony of 
the global media now more than ever before is taken seriously, at least in academic forums 
both in the West and the Middle East. However, as a top priority for Muslim nations the 
area is one of the most widely debated in Arab/Islamic media literature. 
Media threat and the Islamic world: signs of resistance 
Considering the media as a threat is not just a Muslim thought. Earlier, Marshal McLuhan 
(1964) in his influential `Understanding Media', with the appropriate sub-title `The 
extensions of man', had sounded a warning regarding the new technology and its influence: 
The threat of Stalin or Hitler is external. The electric technology is within the gates, and we 
are numb, deaf, blind and mute about its encounter with the Gutenberg technology, on and 
through which the American way of life was formed. It is, however, no time to suggest 
strategies when the threat has not even been acknowledged to exist (McLuhan, 1964: 17,18). 
After nearly three decades, Akbar S. Ahmed, a Pakistan-born scholar based in the UK, in 
his `Postmodernism and Islam' (1992) echoes McLuhan's concern over the content of 
television programming, when he suggests: "Pictures on television can be as devastating 
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to a country as a fleet of gunships blockading it or a shower of missiles falling on it" 
(Ahmed, 1992: 2). 
Today, all across the Muslim world, the power and influence of the Western media and its 
impact on almost every aspect of Muslims' lives is clearly perceived. For most 
intellectuals and religious leaders in the Middle East, the arrival of satellites and the 
Internet have considerably renewed the charges of cultural imperialism. In confrontation 
with the continual influx of transnational broadcasting signals, Muslims believe they may 
not be able to preserve and promote the values important to them. They denounce many 
Western, mainly American, satellite programmes as pornographic and corrupting. The 
images of Western lifestyles are very seductive for Muslim youth and teenagers. Most 
Middle Eastern countries are now having problems with the propagation of perceived 
sexual perversions such as homosexuality, lesbianism; and of paedophilia and the depiction 
of violence via the Internet. They see Michael Jackson and Madonna "the world-wide 
prophets of the American dream- or their successors, as a great danger for the new young 
Muslim generation" (Theodoulou, 1994: 10). Of course, there are also protests in the West 
against these kinds of programmes. 
At the 10`h General Assembly of the Organisation of Asia-Pacific News Agencies (OANA) 
held in August 1997 in Tehran, the Iranian Vice-President Hassan Habibi, inaugurating the 
conference, stated that the Western countries utilise the information network as a means of 
imposing their cultural, economic and political outlook on the world. He claimed that these 
countries, aiming to resurrect their colonial past, impose their culture and civilisation on 
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other nations, most of them the possessors of ancient cultures and civilisations. This 
cultural invasion, more dangerous than any military attack, has to be resisted by true, noble 
and universally acknowledged cultures, religions and beliefs (Habibi, 1997: 10). 
As a protection policy, Middle Eastern authorities during the last few years started 
enforcing a ban on satellite dishes. At the forefront of the campaign, the Islamic activists in 
Iran decided to tear down all satellite dishes after the parliament passed a law banning their 
import and distribution in 1995. In Tehran's parliamentary debate, Binyon (1995) reports, 
Nafiseh Fayaz Bakhsh, a woman deputy, said: "I have heard some barber shops and beauty 
salons say that our customers, especially young ones, ask us for the make-up, hair cut or 
dress style of last night's programme on satellite television. When a 15-year old or 18- 
year-old sees attractive programmes by satellite... will they be willing to (watch) listen to 
our programmes? " (Binyon, 1995: 8). Michael Theodolou, the reporter for the Times in 
Tehran, in another analysis (19 May 1994) states that in Tehran the targets drawing most 
fire are Western soap operas such as `Neighbours'. Islamic hard-liners, he says, are 
determined to resist Western political and cultural influences, which they believe are 
distracting Iranian youth from the purer parts of Ayatollah Khomeini's revolution 
(Theodoulou, 1994: 10). Not only in Iran but in some other Middle Eastern countries such 
as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Egypt, using satellite antennae is illegal. Despite the official 
enforcing of a ban on satellite dishes by governments, in practice there is no effective 
restriction on watching transnational television across the region. 
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In the Persian Gulf a growing number of Muslims surf the Internet. The widespread access 
to the Internet further increases concerns about the availability of pornographic, 
blasphemous and seditious material. Already, the Internet is available in Bahrain, via 
Batelco's Inet service; in Kuwait through Gulfnet; in the U. E. A. via the Emirates Internet 
service; while Qatar and Oman have both been planning to go on-line in recent years. 
According to Middle East Communication (MEC), May 1996, demand for the service has 
recently doubled, and is set to rise by 1000 percent. In 1996, Kuwait's Ministry of 
Communications (MoC) announced plans to enhance its Gulfnet service by launching a 
new Internet service, and also to reduce tariff on the services. Salman Al-Roumi, a 
Kuwaiti official talking to the Arab Times, said that service providers will need to ensure 
that no pornography or `politically subversive' material is available in the country. The 
MoC intends to impose certain conditions on the new Internet suppliers so that the 
government can block access to certain sites. As subscriber numbers increase, even in 
Kuwait, which has no legislation to control the Internet, the parliament may consider 
introducing such laws. Internet users in Bahrain, Kuwait and U. A. E. range from students to 
businessmen. Reflecting governmental concerns regarding the new technology, the 
U. A. E. 's police force recently held a seminar on how to challenge the spread of indecent 
material, which at present is openly available to U. A. E. Internet users. Saudi Arabia has 
limited Internet access to universities, such as King Saud University and King Abdulaziz 
City for Science and Technology, and to hospitals, for tele-medicinal applications. Yet, 
many Saudis get around these restrictions by using long distance service (Gulf Internet 
Growth Curbed by Censorship, MEC, May 1996: 3). In June 1996, Middle East 
Communications announced that Saudi Arabia's Internet pilot project, based in the King 
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Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology (KACST), had been suspended after concerns 
about the availability of seditious and political information. The Saudi authorities had 
already banned the use of encrypted facsimile machines within the kingdom (Waller, MEC, 
June 1996: 5). 
Mardini (1996) in an article provided by Global Information Network, distributor of Inter 
Press Service, suggests that the Arab states in the Persian Gulf region intend to shield 
citizens from pornography and safeguard national security on its stretch of the global 
information highway. Security officials from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain, all members of the regional Gulf Co-operation 
Council (GCC) met in 1996 to discuss the threat from cyberspace to their religious 
societies. Dr. Mansour Al-Awar from the Dubai Police suggested that the Internet is a 
danger to the high moral values, traditional practices and religious beliefs of the Arabs. 
Conducting studies, The Dubai Police Research and Study Centre attributes many of the 
problems of young people in the region to the influence of foreign culture. Dr. Mohammed 
Murad Abdullah said e-mail has spawned new forms of sexual and other harassment. An 
important factor, which helps the spread of immoral ideas among children, in his view, is 
the lack of censorship applicable to books, publications and movies (Mardini, 1996). 
National security is also an extremely sensitive issue in the Persian Gulf. Dubai's Chief of 
Police, Major-General Dhahi Khalfan Tamim, accused Israel of trying to infiltrate the Arab 
states through the Internet by setting up websites targeted at Middle Eastern subscribers. 
Internet users in the region can chat with Israelis and exchange important information, he 
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said. While arguing for the urgent need to regulate the Internet, he acknowledged that it is 
impossible to fully police cyberspace. "(Though) putting air-tight restrictions on access to 
the Internet is impossible, we (Dubai) did not lose hope, especially since we came to know 
that Singapore has successfully done it. In the world of computer programming, we believe 
nothing is beyond reach ", the Major General said (Mardini, 1996). 
A mass demonstration organised by leaders of Pakistan's Islamic Parties in 1996 against 
the cultural policies of then Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, further evidences the existence 
of religious concerns in the sub-continent. Senator Qazi Hussain Ahmed, leader of the 
Jamaat-i-Islami said "Today we are demonstrating outside. Time may come when we will 
move to destroy the source of this vulgarity" (Rally Against PTV, MEST, April 1996: 7). 
Following the event, a bomb exploded without any casualties in the Islamabad offices of 
Pakistan's state-run TV broadcaster, PTV, with nobody claiming responsibility (PTV gets 
bombed, MEBS, May 1996). These concerns sweeping all through the Islamic world could 
be summarised in Ahmed's (1992) suggestion that: 
Nothing in history has threatened Muslims like Western media: neither gunpowder in the 
Middle Ages, which Muslims like Babar used with skill on the fields of Panipat thus winning 
India for his Mughal dynasty, nor trains and the telephone, which helped colonise them in 
the last century, nor even planes which they mastered for their national airlines earlier this 
century. The Western media are ever present and ubiquitous; never resting and never 
allowing respite. They probe and attack ceaselessly, showing no mercy for weakness or 
frailty (Ahmed, 1992: 223). 
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Islam versus the Western paradigm 
In order to understand the Islamic challenges against the Western paradigm one needs to 
perceive first the role and influence of Islam in the contemporary Muslim world, as well as 
having a clear idea about the two widely held and fundamental theories of secularisation and 
modernisation in social science. 
The secularisation thesis holds that in industrial and industrialising societies the influence of 
religion is diminishing. The theory is explained in very different ways: "the scientific basis 
of the new technology undermines faith; or the erosion of social units deprives religion of 
its organisational base; or doctrinally centralised, unitarian, rationalised religion 
eventually cuts its own throat" (Gellner, 1994: xi). Gellner, however, confidently affirms 
that "the secularisation thesis does not apply to Islam ". As a progressive faith, the power 
of Islam over the minds and hearts of believers during the last century "by some criteria has 
probably increased". More importantly, as he argues: 
this hold is not limited to some restricted zones of social life: it is not backward or socially 
underprivileged strata which are specially prone to the preservation of faith, or rustics, or 
women, or those linked to traditional regimes. The retention of a religious orientation 
marks the populations of socially radical countries as much as traditionalist ones. 
Christianity has its Bible bell. Islam is a Our'an bell (Gellner, 1994: xi). 
Secularism is the lifeblood of contemporary Western culture and civilisation. But there are 
convincing evidences that a tide of religious movements spreading world-wide by the late 
1970s and early 1980s, are challenging the Western paradigm. Prominent in this is a 
massive Islamic cultural movement, which is being formed in reaction to Western culture. 
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The movement claims to represent a cultural break with the outlook and motivations of 
modern secularism, which in Kepel's view: 
it blames for all the ills of Third World societies, from social inequality to despotism, and 
from endemic under-employment to widespread corruption. Many of its members are highly 
qualified, especially in science, and they aim to detach the most advanced technology - 
which they intend to master - from the values of secularisation which they reject, in order to 
promote an ethic which submits reason to God (Kepe1,1994: 8). 
Modernisation theory holds the idea that societies have developed from agricultural to 
industrial, from traditional to modem. In this process the notion of industrialisation is 
central to our understanding of global social changes. A particular, though dominant, 
version of the model maintains that the development of Western societies represents a 
universal evolutionary model of human history; that the domination of Western civilisation 
is influencing other civilisations in the other parts of the world. The main driving force of 
modernisation is therefore the influence of the West; and the increasing internationalisation 
of Western economic and cultural life has imposed the specific history of Western 
civilisation on other nations as "the history of human civilisation in general" (Smart 1992: 
11). Considering the Western civilisation as the winner of ideological as well as cultural 
struggles, Frances Fukuyama (1992) confidently affirms this glorious victory to be "the 
end of history, the ultimate triumph of Western economic and political liberalism. the end 
point of mankind's ideological evolution... and the final form of human government" 
(Fukuyama, 1992: xi). 
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It is, however, argued that the Islamic renaissance stands as one of the most formidable 
obstacles to the victory of Western civilisation. A renewal of "revitalised fundamentalism - 
though evident in all the world's major religions, whether Islam, Christianity, Judaism, 
Shinto ism, or Confucianism - nowhere is more apparent than in modern Islam" (Kepel, 
1994: 8). Everywhere around the world, from Malaysia to Pakistan, from the newly 
independent countries of Central Asia right into the heart of Europe in London and Paris, 
the rising Islamic movements have come to centre stage: 
Though the resurgence of political Islam may have startled many Western observers 
accustomed to think of Third World religions as a picturesque survival, it was only the most 
visible part of a vast subterranean movement to re-Islamise daily life and customs and 
reorganise individual existence according to the injunctions of the sacred books (Kepel, 
1994: 8). 
The renewal of Islamic faith and its resistance to secular values and domination of Western 
culture led the American theorist, Samuel Huntington, to go even further, suggesting that 
our future civilisation will be dominated by conflict between Islam and the West. In his 
controversial `Clash of Civilisations', Huntington (1993) advances the idea that the 
"interaction between Islam and the West is seen as a clash of civilisations" and that this 
conflict "is unlikely to decline ": 
The West's "next confrontation", observes M J. Akbar, an Indian Muslim author, "is 
definitely going to come from the Muslim world. It is in the sweep of the Islamic nations 
from the Maghreb to Pakistan that the struggle for ci new world order will begin. " Bernard 
Lewis comes to a similar conclusion: "We are facing a mood and a movement far 
transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them. This is 
no less than a clash of civilisations - the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of 
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an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the world- 
wide expansion of both" (Huntington, 1993: 31,32). 
Huntington's bloody borders are frightening the world. "The crescent-shaped Islamic 
block, from the bulge of Africa to central Asia, has bloody borders" (Ibid.: 34). Hossein 
Nasr, Iranian professor in philosophy (1997) in his `Futurology of human history' a Persian 
article published in the Iranian newspaper, 'Ettela'at, International', concerning 
Huntington's clash of civilisations, argues that this is not only a scientific theory about the 
future of the world, but, in its turn, is policy making. He argues that awareness about it is 
very important. What makes Huntington's theory even more threatening, in his view, is not 
only the possibility of the clash between these civilisations but the presumed inevitability 
of the conflict. Furthermore, in Nasr's view it is not by accident that Huntington in 
formulating the foundation of his theory chooses the Islamic civilisation as an example 
(Nasr, 1997: 9). 
A clear sign of this hostile approach can be seen in Worsthorne (1991), who calls for the 
use of force against Saddam, expressing the idea that the destruction of Islamic civilisation 
is "an essential condition of justice ": "Not only must Iraq be defeated, but it must be 
conquered as well. An ugly, evil spirit is abroad in the Third World and it cannot be 
condoned, only crushed, as Carthage was crushed by the Romans" (Ali, 1995: 22). 
Earlier, Anthony Harrigan (1990), president of the U. S. Industrial Educational Foundation, 
had suggested that, had the Byzantine Empire taken care of Islam earlier, there would be no 
threat to Western power. The Persian Gulf war (Kuwaiti crisis) in his view is a reminder to 
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Americans that threats often emerge from the most unexpected directions and causes. "The 
Byzantine Empire had no reason to expect that a new, militant religion, representing a 
military threat, would arise in the Arabian desert... Whether a country survives, however, 
depends very much on its ability to respond to threats in a quick and effective manner" 
(ibid., 21-22). 
Leon T. Hadar (1993) in his article `What green peril? ' - green being the colour of Islam - 
published in the American Journal of Foreign Affairs- contests this antagonistic approach. 
He argues that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there have been provoking voices 
warning U. S. policy makers that they must be prepared for a new global threat - radical 
Islam. Since the emergence of the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran the image of a world- 
wide threat from militant Islam, like the perception of danger from Soviet Communism, 
which helped to define U. S. foreign policy for more than four decades, has been 
dominating the Western media and policy. In this approach, all the changes and instability 
in the post-Cold War Middle East and its consequences across the world are described as 
part of a grand scheme perpetrated by an international Islamic conspiracy. In this very 
attractive plot, Tehran is the headquarters of the ideological subversion motivating a global 
intifada stretching from North Africa throughout the Near East and the Persian Gulf to 
Central Asia, aiming to control the oil-rich Gulf, destroy Israel and threaten areas as vast as 
the Horn of Africa, Southern Europe, the Balkans and the Indian sub-continent (Hadar, 
1993: 28,29). 
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This Islamic threat to the West, even if it exists, is only potential. The Islamic world, 
however, is right now faced with a very objective and real danger. The rise of the Islamic 
movements can be seen as defending their own values, and to some extent, represent 
reactions to Western (mainly American) hostility. Far from being a unified power 
threatening the Western civilisation, Hadar (1993) argues, Islam is, in fact, "currently on 
the defensive against militant anti-Muslim fundamentalists ". Challenging the very 
assumption that there is a war between Western and Islamic civilisations, Hadar further 
points to the former Yugoslavia, where the Muslim population of Bosnia and Kosovo, 
though westernised and secular, was threatened with extinction by Serbian nationalists 
strongly connected to the Eastern Orthodox Church. In Central Asia, he argues, a bloody 
campaign against both westernised and Islamic opposition groups, is led by the old 
communist guard, with support from Russian nationalists, sending a wave of Muslim 
refugees from Tajikistan into Afghanistan. The Bharatiya Janata Party, an anti-Muslim 
Hindu nationalist group, and the even more militant Shiv Sena have gained power in India. 
Since 1967, the Jewish fundamentalist settlement movement, Gush Emmunim, in the West 
Bank has been spearheading the Greater Israel drive with the aim of suppressing the 
Palestinian nationalist movement, which includes many secular Muslims and Christians. 
And racist and neo-Nazi groups in France and Germany are trying to violently remove 
large Muslim immigrant populations (Hadar 1993: 31). In the case of the Islamic 
revolution in Iran, Shawcross (1992) argues that by the end of 1970s, "US cultural 
imperialism had stirred great resentment and contributed to the rise of Shi'a 
fundamentalism in the Middle East" (Shawcross, 1992: 7,8). Nonetheless, given the long- 
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standing background of hostility and conflict no one can really dispute the very existence 
of a mutual fear. 
In sum, during the last two decades, in response to the globalisation of Western culture, 
many Muslim countries with large populations have experienced strong currents of 
religious enthusiasm. Indonesian writer, Imam Prasodjo in his article `Islam and Western 
Civilisation'(1995), arguing that the interaction of `Islamic and Western influence is 
undoubtedly the cause of some cultural turbulence ", identifies three patterns of behaviour 
within Muslim societies and individuals: "A radical opposition to Western cultural 
influence; a complete surrender to Western values; or a selective adaptation to modern 
conditions while maintaining the fundamental principles of Islam" (Prasodjo, 1995). The 
new movements, however, are less politically and more psychologically motivated. In 
response to the question; "what accounts for this religious resurgence"?, he views 
psychological uncertainty as a major cause of religious revivals and quoting from Western 
sociologist Bellah (1970), holds that contact with the secular Western world has created an 
identity crisis within each individual Muslim: 
The questions `Who am I, What are my roots, and Who an I going to be? ' have ignited a 
search for Islamic identities and values. Undoubtedly, the impact of political, cultural and 
intellectual freedom gained after Independence also provides non-trivial contribution. The 
rigorous intensity of the search for Islamic values has become evident (Prasodjo, 1995). 
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Conclusion 
The operation of global media systems, with their double-edged capacity to promote a 
hegemonic Western culture and to facilitate an increasing cultural diversity through 
hybridisation and cultural closure (audience fragmentation, ethnic esentialism), is a key 
aspect of the contest of Arab states. But, so too is the growth of Islamic self-conscious 
assertion in response to Islamophobia. The interaction of these two processes is a central 
dynamic shaping the world I am seeking to map. It is important to note that Islam in its 
recent quest to address the Muslims' contemporary problems, has been mainly conceived 
and represented as a revolutionary force with a destructive capacity to challenge the 
modern world, and ultimately, a threat to the Western culture and civilisation. More 
realistically, one may argue, Muslims like other groupings, concerned about the 
preservation of what matter to them are developing their own familiar methods of protest 
and protection. Portraying these attempts as hostility to the West is not a true reflection of 
the reality. I would like to end this chapter by quoting Dale F. Eickleman's (2000) where 
he rightly suggests: 
Today, Buzzwords such as fundamentalism' and catchy phrases such as Samuel 
Huntington's `West verses the rest', or Daniel Lerner's 'Mecca or mechanisation', are of 
little use in understanding this transformation. Indeed, they obscure or even distort the 
immense spiritual and intellectual ferment that is taking place among the world's nearly I 
billion Muslims, reducing it to a fanatical rejection of everything modern, liberal, or 
progressive (Eickelman, 2000: 16). 
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CHAPTER V 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARAB MEDIA 
Introduction 
The last two chapters laid the foundation of arguments. In chapter III, in an overview of the 
Arab countries, while underlining the two case studies of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, I argued 
that structural change and development, including the development of the 
telecommunications sector, is mainly driven by the affluence of oil revenues, and the 
influence of the external powers in the region, rather than by effective indigenous 
determination and strategy. Chapter IV principally presented an outline of the theoretical 
debates on, and practical challenges between, the two other important players in the field, 
namely globalisation and Islam. Within such a framework, this chapter aims to critically 
analyse the development of the Arab media during the last two-three decades. For a full 
assessment of the process, however, one may need to look a few centuries further back. 
Starting with the study of the first communications facilities, established by the Western 
powers in the 15`h century, this chapter, therefore, takes up the emergence of the printed 
media in the nineteenth century, and the advent of radio and television stations, respectively 
in the 1920s and 1950s throughout the region. Through a chronological study of the Arab 
media since 1950, while identifying three key stages in the course of media development, 
the second part of the analysis underlines some major characteristics of each period. The 
importance of the development of transnational and co-operative media run by the Arabs 
will be defined, and placed in relation to the national and terrestrial channels. Drawing 
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upon unique interviews with three key international media experts, the chapter will end by 
addressing some important policy issues in the process of the development of the Arab 
media. 
Modern media in the Arab world: A background 
The advent of modem media in the Arab world coincides with the presence of the Western 
powers in the Middle East. It dates back to the 15th century, when the first 
communications facilities were established by the Portuguese, the Dutch, the British and 
then the Americans to facilitate their colonial aims. The region's geopolitical position 
attracted foreign powers, British in particular, to extend their traditional 
telecommunications lines such as telegraph. The establishment of telegraphic system and 
navigation lines in the 1860s enabled the British to access economic and military news of 
international and regional interests from the Persian Gulf area and other parts of the empire. 
By the end of 1864, the first telegraph line had been constructed in some of the Persian Gulf 
countries. Baron Julius de Reuter, a British banker and the founder of Reuters News 
Agency in 1851, organised several companies and obtained an extensive concession from 
the regional rulers (Mowlana, 1990: 92,93). 
Printed media emerged in the Arab world in the eighteenth century. The first periodical 
publications were introduced to the region during Napoleon Bonaparte's occupation of 
Egypt in 1799. In the late 1820s, Egypt's ruler, Muhammad Ali, established al-Wagai' al- 
Misriyya (Egyptian Events) as the first journal in the Muslim world. Some years later other 
publications, either sponsored by the states or depending on private initiative, emerged 
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across the Arab world. As most of these papers were socially progressive and with secular 
orientation, mainly run by Syrian and Lebanese Christians and Muslim reformists, they 
were occasionally accused by traditional Muslims of "being part of a sinister plot to 
destabilise the Muslim world and infect it with the germs of Western corruption" (El- 
Affendi, 1993: 167). 
During the second half of the nineteenth century, two types of publications were emerging 
in the region. The press which was led mainly by the Western-trained and educated elite, 
who were promoting European ideas of secularism and modern nationalism, and that which 
was pioneered by such individuals as Seyyed Jamal al Din Asadabadi (1838-1897), who 
was campaigning for a unified Islamic community throughout the Islamic lands. Using his 
oratorical skills, combined with his influential journal al-Urvalul Vosgha (Indissoluble 
Link), Jamal-al-Din had profound impact in politically mobilising the people in such 
countries as Iran, Egypt, India, and Turkey against the European powers. He was one of the 
most outspoken and dramatic figures of the Middle East and Islamic world, whose efforts 
resulted in altering the power base of the press. Journalism became the weapon of men and 
women in revolution instead of those in power. By the turn of the century, the limited 
channel of press media was transformed to a genuine information medium of enormous 
impact, with the state, political parties, and upper strata of society playing an important role 
(Kamalipour & Mowlana, 1994: xvi, xvii). 
The emergence of radio in the Arab world was in the mid-1920s. Algeria was the first 
country to have a radio station (1925) followed by Egypt (1926), and Morocco (1928). The 
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Arab nations continued to introduce radio through the 1930s and the 1940s until the 1970s 
when Oman acquired radio for the first time. In the early days of its introduction, radio in 
the Arab world was regarded as both conservative and elementary until the 1950s and the 
1960s, when it became a political and psychological tool. The transistor revolution 
coincided with political movements in vast areas such as North Africa, Egypt, Algeria and 
Iraq that overthrew ruling royal families or were successful in gaining independence from 
colonial powers. The `Voice of the Arabs' under President Nasser of Egypt played a key 
role in familiarising the Arab people with the power of radio (Boyd 1993: x, Kurdistani 
1988: 128). The use of radio during the war for Algerian independence has been underlined 
by Frantz Fanon, a fearless critic of colonialism and a key figure in Algeria's struggle for 
independence. In his `Dying Colonialism' Fanon writes: "Listening to the Voice of Fighting 
Algeria was motivated not just by eagerness to hear the news, but more particularly by the 
inner need to be at one with the Nation in its struggle " (Alessandrini, 1999: 94). With few 
competing forms of information and entertainment, radio listening was, and in some places 
still is, a major leisure activity. The Persian Gulf countries of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, 
and the United Arab Emirates were initially slow to develop radio receivers and 
consequently vulnerable to radio propaganda from countries such as Syria, Iraq, and Egypt 
which had political interests in deposing the Persian Gulf ruling families (Boyd, 1993: 4,5). 
The advent of radio in the Arab world was followed by the establishment of the first 
national television stations in the 1950s. Morocco, Algeria, Iraq and Lebanon established 
their own television stations, respectively between 1954-1956. They were followed by 
Egypt (1960), Syria (1960), Kuwait (1961), Sudan (1962), Democratic Yemen (1964) and 
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Saudi Arabia (1965). Tunisia introduced a television service in 1966 and was followed by 
Jordan in 1967, which was the year of the Arab-Israeli War, Libya in 1968, Qatar (1970), 
Bahrain (1973), (Oman (1974), and Yemen (1975). In the United Arab Emirates, Abu 
Dhabi was the first to develop a television system in 1969, with Dubai following in 1972. 
The only countries in which television was not used by a large number of people were 
Yemen and the Sudan as these two countries were less developed economically (Amin, 
1996: 103). 
Some characteristics of the Arab broadcasting systems have been underlined by media 
critics. Amin (1996) classified the Arab television systems into two general categories: 1) a 
propaganda/mobilisation model, including Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Libya, 
Yemen and the Sudan. In these countries there is an absolute governmental control over the 
broadcasting systems. 2) The rest of the Arab world (with the exception of Morocco and 
Lebanon), who exercise less governmental control over the media. The first group used 
television, like radio in its early years of emergence, as an instrument of propaganda, while 
in the second group the aim was to reach the widest locations and communicate to 
populations with a high level of illiteracy (Amin, 1996: 103,106). Broadcasting systems, 
especially television, were used by some Arab leaders, such as Gamal Abdel Nasser and 
Anwar Sadat, as a means of social and economic change, which could bypass the print 
media that were primarily responsive to the literate elite who could afford publications and 
read them. Iraqi president Saddam Hussein used radio and television to perpetuate his 
carefully orchestrated personality cult throughout the 1980s (Boyd, 1993: 4). 
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The Arab broadcasting systems have also been characterised as subordinated to the neo- 
colonial influence of the great powers. Access to national television systems, Mohammadi 
(1998) argues, was the beginning of the establishment of Western electronic empires in the 
Arab/Islamic world. He assesses the creation of national television systems in each 
individual country as the result of the colonial powers' desire to extend their zone of 
influence. The integration of different sections of colonial zones into the Western market 
had both economic and cultural implications. The Western hegemony, by destroying "the 
very fabric of social systems which were extremely functional in traditional economies" 
created dependent societies with new patterns of consumption. The new socio-economic 
system showed no respect for other nations' traditional life styles, cultures and values. 
"Globalisation was not possible unless the culture became open to mass consumption-the 
foremost instrumental means for the globalisation of culture ". Mohammadi divides the 
Islamic world into three categories: modern, mixed and traditional. Yet, since "none of the 
Islamic countries have been at ease in accepting the rules of Western consumer society", 
his classifications do indicate the degree of flexibility of each individual Muslim country 
towards the penetration of electronic empires (Mohammadi, 1998: 3,4). 
The two approaches above are actually two sides of one coin. The first approach (Amin, 
Boyd) underlines the internal social, political and propagandist characteristics of the Arab 
broadcasting systems. The second approach (Mohammadi) highlights the influence of the 
external powers in the formation and development of the Arab radio and television 
infrastructures. Together, these two may present a fuller picture of the development of the 
Arab broadcasting systems in the last half a century. One can easily trace signs of the 
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presence of both approaches in the Arab media literature. Given its principal aims and 
direction, the present research places primary emphasis on Western influences on Arab 
media. The challenge of modernity as a Western project and the question of how 
Arab/Muslim nations have responded to the phenomena, will be discussed in this context. 
Media and Modernisation 
With the accomplishment of the last radio and television stations in the early 1970s, the 
Arab nations were proud of having established the foundation of their modern societies. 
Broadcasting systems, while used as important political tools for the Arab states, were also 
seen as status symbols of modernisation (Turkistani, 1988: 129). In chapter IV, the theory 
of modernisation in general was briefly discussed. As far as the advent of modern media 
technology is concerned, the theory holds that the media, along with urbanisation, 
education, and other social forces, are resources which stimulate progressive economic, 
social, and cultural transformation. Daniel Lerner (1962) in a pioneer survey, which had 
began in the fall of 1950 and continued into 1951, studied six Middle Eastern countries. He 
began his field-work in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, then went on to Egypt, Syria and 
Iran. His idea of modernisation came to pinpoint the passing of tradition as a critical phase. 
To define the system of modernity, Lerner (1962) proposed that: 
Modern media systems have flourished only in societies that are modern by other tests. That 
is, the media spread psychic mobility most efficiently among peoples who have achieved in 
some measure the antecedent conditions of geographic and social mobility. The converse of 
this proposition is also true: no modern society functions efficiently without a developed 
system of mass media (Lerner, 1958: 54,55). 
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Basing his theory of modernisation on four fundamental elements of `urbanisation', 
`literacy', `political participation' and `media participation' Lerner proclaimed that "rising 
media participation tends to raise participation in all sectors of the social system ". In 
particular, what he was calling the Western model of modernisation was perceived by him 
to be operational on a global scale. Moreover, since this meant that other important changes 
must regularly accompany the development of media systems, there was some point in his 
frequent references to a world communication revolution. In this respect, despite his 
attempts to be more moderate in proposing: "a communication system is both index and 
agent of change in a total social systems ", he emphasised that 'just as there is no perfect 
media system so there is no perfectly urban, literate, electoral society" (Lerner, 1958: 56). 
Even in contemporary UK and US, Husband (2001) states, less than half the working class 
exercise their vote despite the proliferation of the media. 
The fundamental assumptions of this model were challenged by Third World political 
economists, on the basis of its "technological determinism and the omission of particularly 
any interest in the power relations that shape the terms of economic and social exchange 
between First and Third World nations" (Mosco, 1996: 20). As noted in chapter IV, the 
influence of the industrialised West has been the driving force of modernisation, and the 
hegemony of Western civilisation has had an inevitable impact on other parts of the world. 
The first waves of globalisation, economic, military and cultural, were part of the dynamic 
spread of western modernity. Since these institutions originated in Europe, and spread 
outward from this base, Barker (1999) suggests modernity is a Western project, and that 
early stages of globalisation involved Western questioning of alternative cultures. The 
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expansion of European power, military and economic, also involved the imposition of its 
cultural forms, as mercantile expansion gave way to a phase of more direct rule. Colonial 
control sustained military dominance, cultural ascendancy and the origins of economic 
dependency, as occupied lands were turned into both a protected market for selected 
commodities from the imperial power, and a provider of raw materials (Barker, 1999: 39). 
Since the early twentieth century a series of anti-imperial struggles and independence 
movements, which culminated in the Arab nationalistic movements of 1950s, defied 
Western imperial power. Nationalism, both in the pan-Arab sense and the new perception 
of individual nation-states, Khalil argues, has been a powerful force in the Arab world 
(Khalil, 1983: 16). What today is well perceived and practised as Islamic resurgence, in 
those days was configured as Arab patriotism. The Arab nations, to create their own media 
outlets, primarily referred to their Arabness as a source of power, prestige and identity. 
After the rise of the Islamic revolution in Iran (1979), these movements had mainly faded in 
favour of a new wave of religious-cultural media campaigns. Challenging the prevailing 
position of the Western media, the new campaigners want to develop their own media and 
restore their cultural and religious identity, which has been defamed or ignored by the 
global media networks. 
As a key analytic tool, and on the basis of the data reviewed in previous chapters, in the 
section which follows, I divide the last 50 years into three periods, which guides this 
account of the chronological development of the Arab media. The prime focus of the 
chapter from now on is transnational and co-operative media run by the Arabs. In this 
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respect there are a few points worth mentioning. First, as sketched in chapter III, the wealth 
generated by oil has greatly influenced the Arab media structure and policy since mid 
1970s. Second, ARABSAT is the only Arab media configuration which has experienced all 
three periods. And, third, due to the elastic nature of the periods, which overlap each other, 
it was decided that the term `wave' could better explain the situation, rather than any other 
alternative. 
A chronological study of the Arab media (1950-2000) ' 
In a chronological study of the Arab media, three different stages can be identified. Starting 
from 1950, the first wave (1950-1970) with a particular emphasis on Arabic culture and 
identity, is characterised by the highest level of media collaboration among the Arab 
nations, and the lowest level of media usage, which may be explained by the negligible 
sources of income prior to the oil boom of 1973. The role of Egypt in the media 
development of this period is quite remarkable. The Arab media, inspired by national and 
pan-Arab movements, heralded by Nasser of Egypt, tended to be anti-Western, pro-socialist 
and somewhat non-religious. By the fall of the Nasserist era (1970) and the rise of 
globalisation (1980), the first wave had lost its momentum in favour of the new powerful 
Western-secular media flow. The second wave (1970-onward), witnessed a tremendous 
' In the following pages of this chapter, my argument draws upon interviews with three distinguished scholars 
of the media in the Middle East and elsewhere. Douglas Boyd is professor in the Department of 
Communication and School of Journalism and Telecommunications College of Communications and 
Information Studies, University of Kentucky. Hamid Mowlana is professor of International Relations and 
Director of International Communications Programs, School of International Service, The American 
University. Chris Forrester is a well-known broadcast journalist, with columns regularly published in 
Middle East-related magazines and newspapers. He is also author of `Digital television broadcastingödrivers 
for growth and pattern of uptake' published in June 1998 by Phillips Business Information. 
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surge of media expansion and huge investment on the industry by the Arab states, 
particularly the wealthy countries of GCC in the Persian Gulf. Within this period, Saudi 
Arabia has become dominant over the Arab media and this continues to the present time. 
The third wave (1980-onward) inspired by the Islamic revolution of Iran (1979), grew 
greatly in the early 1990s. The main character of this period is an Islamic quest for media 
involvement, which encompasses a wide spectrum of radical and conservative tendencies, 
from militant groups in Lebanon to the Royal Family in Saudi Arabia. Although we have 
underlined the main features of each period, as mentioned above, this chronology does 
involve some overlapping. 
The first wave: media collaboration and Arab identity (1950-1970) 
The Arab media during the 1950s and 1960s were characterised by Arab nationalism and 
pan-Arab thought. The Egyptian president (1956-1970), and the key player in the Arab 
world's politics after the Second World War, Gamal Abdel Nasser, was, in Kandil's word, 
"the master of media masters" (Kandil 1988: 67). He envisioned the role of the modern 
media and cleverly manipulated radio and television while he was in power (Amin 1996: 
110). Egypt, with its al-Saws al-Arab (the Voice of Arabs), was "the most sophisticated 
media arsenal" in the Arab world, calling for "a united Arab nation from the (Persian) 
Gulf to the (Atlantic) Ocean " (Kandil, 1988: 67). 
A number of Arab co-operational frameworks and institutions were established in this era. 
The first Arab media collaboration began in the early 1950s. After the Second World War, 
the Arab League (1945) emerged to realise the unification of the Arab world, while 
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considering the sentiments of each individual Arab state towards its national sovereignty. 
These dual aspirations, as Amin (1996) suggests, have been reflected in television 
programme exchange since then (Amin, 1996: 106,107). The first Arab League mass 
media co-operation was established in 1951, followed by the Permanent Committee for 
Arab Media (PCAM) in 1960, which led to the Council of Arab Information Ministers 
(CAIM) as a forum with the highest Arab League media authority. It was in 1969 that the 
Arab State Broadcasting Union (ASBU), the League's. specialised agency, was inaugurated, 
with the aim of co-ordination of radio and television as well as personnel training. The Arab 
Network for Television News Exchange (ANTNE) was one of the activities of the ASBU, 
to advance the news services in the member countries through news exchanges (Turkistani, 
1988: 20,21). The idea of establishing ARABSAT was conceived at about this time. The 
Arab world, though participating in INTELSAT since 1967, decided to connect through 
their own space communication system, in order to exchange their cultural and educational 
television programmes (Al-Saadon 1990, Hudson 1990, Boyd 1993, Amin 1996). 
Following the war between Egypt and Israel (1967), the Arab states under the leadership of 
the Arab League planned for their own regional satellite system (Hudson, 1990). Since then 
the Arab Ministers of Information and Culture have been working together to establish the 
principles of their first organisational framework, `The Arab Satellite Communications 
Organisation' (ASCO). Nine years later, ASCO was established and set the stage for the 
foundation of the first Arab regional spacecraft, ARABSAT (ARABSAT Overview, 1998). 
As can be seen, the primary stages of preparation and planning of both ASCO (1976) and 
ARABSAT (1985) were conducted in the late 1960s. 
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Amin (1996) argues that in establishing the Administration for Information and Publication 
(AIP) in 1951, the Arab League aimed to "promote the Arab perspective internationally" 
(Amin, 1996: 106). Similarly, the quest to create the Arab Satellite Broadcasting Union 
(ASBU) and the Arab Satellite Communications Organisation (ASCO), has been attributed 
to the prevailing nationalistic and Pan-Arab movements in this period (Al-Saadon, 1990: 
36). With the same ambition, ARABSAT was also created to place `Arabic culture and 
society' in plain view (Warwick, January, 1993: 8). The role of ARABSAT in relation to 
Arab nationalism has continued to be underlined in later years. In AIESCO's (1987) study 
of Arab media has come this: "The most important criterion of ARABSAT success must be 
whether it would accomplish its nationalistic objectives, which the media (co-operation) 
ranks as one of the main objectives" (Al-Saadon, 1990: 158). The major driving force 
behind the Arab media policy and practice was, therefore, Arab nationalistic sentiments. 
Al-Saadon, however, points to a paradox in the timing of the ARABSAT project. The idea 
took form in the 1960s when Arab nationalism was dominating the Arab world and 
liberation movements were very active. The project was inaugurated almost two decades 
later, when Arab ambitions and nationalism were at their lowest level. The successful 
implementation of ARABSAT, and broadly speaking, the formation of any co-operative 
effort amongst Arabs, in his judgement, was realised despite individual Arab states' 
distinctive stances toward Arab nationalism (Al-Saadon, 1990: 36). 
Egypt was the centre of Arab nationalism, and Cairo the axis of the Arab media movement 
in this era. The first period can also be known as the golden years of Egyptian cinema, 
which flourished during the 1950s and 1960s (Whittington, 1995). Egypt's long history of 
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film production, which was started in the early 1920s, contributed significantly to the 
development of television in Egypt as well as the other Arab countries. In fact, the Egyptian 
cinema with its feature-length movies, for over half a century was dominating the Arab 
world. The penetration of the Egyptian cinema and television in this period demonstrates 
the success of terrestrial media in transcending regional borders (Amin, 1996: 109). As 
well as television, which as the ultimate symbol of modernisation fascinated them, in the 
early 1960s, the Egyptian political `Voice of the Arabs' on radio was popular in the Middle 
East, and various programmes on the Egyptian station were attractive to Saudi Arabian 
students, and what was broadcast was taken as the truth (Boyd, 1993: xii, xiii). 
In the contemporary Arab world, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, because of their geopolitical 
significance and their close relationship with the Western powers, have played a leading 
part. Since Nasser's era, there has been a tense rivalry over the leadership of the Arab world 
between Egypt, and Saudi Arabia - which holds a strong religious and economic position 
in 
the Arab League, due to its guardianship of the Islamic heartland and its huge oil incomes. 
These two countries, for different reasons, have had a great deal of influence over the 
electronic media in the Middle East (Boyd, 1993). By the fall of the Nasserist era (1970), 
and the oil boom (1973) which brought about a radical economic transformation in the Arab 
world (Sharabi, 1988: 2), Saudi Arabia had replaced Egypt, and the `Arab media capital' 
was transferred from Cairo to Riyadh. 
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The second wave: Saudi Arabia's dominance over media 
While the 1960s and 1970s witnessed the lowest level of usage in media technology in the 
Arab world, since the 1980s Arab media investment has undergone a tremendous increase 
(Middle East Broadcasting and Satellite, January 95). The rise of globalisation (1980) and 
its impact on the region, reinforced by the availability of the oil revenues, prompted the 
individual public and private sectors, particularly those in the Persian Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula, to hasten their pace. At the forefront of the campaign, Saudi Arabia invested a 
large amount of its exogenous revenues mainly out of oil incomes, on modern media. The 
Saudis' huge investment in the telecommunications sector within the country and across the 
region was discussed in the previous chapter. The most prestigious electronic and printed 
media in relation to the Arab/Islamic World, operating from outside the Middle East, are 
also controlled by Saudi Arabia. The Saudi-owned newspaper, Asharq al- Awsat (The 
Middle East) and al-Hayal (Life), another leading Arab newspaper both based in London, 
have a predominant position in the Arab media arena (Shadid, 1995). While Asharq al- 
Awsat and al-Hayat - based in London and distributed among 
Arab language readers world- 
wide- continue to flourish, their success came at a price. They have accepted full control by 
the Saudi royal family. The former was a Saudi venture from the outset, while the latter, as 
El-Affendi (1993) suggests: 
flirted briefly with independence during its first year, before first accepting part-ownership 
from a prominent member of the Saudi royal family and- soon after the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait in 1990 -full ownership by the Saudis (EI-Affendi, 1993: 174). 
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Not only the printed media but electronic ones such as the Pan-Arab satellite television 
channels and networks, including the Middle East Broadcasting Centre (MBC), Arab Radio 
and Television (ART) and Orbit are all controlled by Saudi investors (Shadid, 1995). In the 
Persian Gulf region, three Saudis have led the quest for the Middle East's satellite viewers: 
Sheikh Walid Al Ibrahim, Sheikh Saleh Kamel, billionaire owner of the Islamic banking 
group Dallah Al-Baraka; and Emir Khalid Ibn Abdallah Ibn Abdel Rahman, who is head of 
the Mawarid Group, one of the kingdom's largest conglomerates (Ozanne, 1994: 6). 
The Middle East Broadcasting Centre (MBC) was the first privately owned Arabic- 
language satellite station, which was launched in September 1991 to provide a 
communications channel linking Arabs who live, work or visit in Europe, with their 
homelands and cultures. MBC is broadcasting across Europe and North Africa through 
EUTELSAT-II and across the Middle East through ARABSAT. It is a news-led service, 
which also offers family entertainment and a wide range of life-style and informational 
programmes. MBC is pushed by the Saudi regime to spread its views throughout the region 
(Amin, 1996). MBC is controlled by Shaykh Walid Ibrahim, a young Saudi investor and a 
brother-in-law of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia. Walid's personal wealth is estimated around 
Million, which also include his holdings in Untied Press International (Alterman, 1998). 
Some industry observers, however, suggest that the company is now in trouble in terms of 
programming and management. For one thing, MBC is perceived to be the personal project 
of King Fahd who, it is said, calls the station and asks them to "show one programme or 
another as his mood dictates". MBC's programming is also conceived as unexciting 
compared with its transnational TV competitors. Furthermore, regular changes, top-down 
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decision making and secrecy appears to identify the MBC's management style. The 
aforementioned Saleh Kamel, the prominent Saudi banker and a former investor in the 
company, sold his 37.5 percent stake in MBC for a reported $60 million in 1994 (Alterman, 
1998: 21,29). Before 1994, by investing in World Space Corporation (WSC) in 
Washington DC, Kamel and Ibrahim got permission to launch a satellite transmitting to the 
Middle East and Africa. The centre aspires to become an Arab version of the major 
American networks. It was the first media company to open a correspondent office in 
Jerusalem. MBC began with an initial capital of US$300 million and a $US60 million 
annual budget (Amin, 1996: 114,115). 
Arab Radio & Television (ART) was inaugurated in, early 1994 when its founder Saleh 
Kamel sold his stake in MBC. ART is a subscription-based satellite television station which 
aimed to be the first Arabic network providing family members of different age groups and 
interests with specialised channels. Prince Al-walid bin Talal, another Saudi billionaire, is 
the second biggest shareholder in ART (Alterman, 1998: 29). Starting with four specialised 
channels, namely; Variety, Sports, Children's, and Movies, according to its Chairman, 
Sheikh Saleh Kamel, the network earned immediate success and was considered a pioneer 
in Arab media. It launched a popular Music channel in July 1994, and ART Shopping in 
January 1996. Ambitious planning was not limited to providing this service to Arabs in 
their native lands, but to all Arabs in Europe (June 1995) and in America (March 1996). 
ART was perhaps a pioneer in creating a dialogue with audiences, through several 
interactive programmes and talk shows. These programmes have been possible since ART 
now claims eleven production houses in the Arab world, four others in Europe and one in 
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the United States of America (Kamel, 1996). Unlike its competitors, ART seeks to be an 
entertainment channel rather than majoring on news. In an interview in 1995 Saleh claimed 
that his main ambitions in launching ART has been challenging Western satellite 
programming. "There is a Western media campaign to undermine our Arab culture and 
traditions.... I do not allow anything on ART that I wouldn't want my children to watch" 
(Alterman, 1998: 29). Since there is a limited amount of Arab programming, with 
difficulty in obtaining exclusive rights, a major problem for ART is providing programmes 
which could distinguish it from other Arab transnational TV channels. Investing heavily in 
the Egyptian Media Production City being erected outside Cairo, ART's officials are 
hoping to be able to fill their considerable air-time in the future. The station, Alterman 
(1998) argues, "is perceived as the `most Arab" of the broadcasters that provide a 
`bouquet' of channels to subscribers" (Alterman, 1998: 30). 
Another satellite television station, Orbit, headed by Prince Khaled bin Abdel Raliman Al 
Saud, the head of the Mawarid Group, a multi-billion dollar Saudi business conglomerate, 
began its services in May 1994. Orbit is a pay satellite television channel on ARABSAT, 
with a high decoder price of $US 10,000. It consists of 16 television channels and 4 radio 
networks including Egyptian Television Channels I and 2, an all-news network channel, 
Cable News Network International (CNNI), the Hollywood Channel, the Discovety 
Channel, American Plus C-Span, Music Now, Orbit News which contains news 
programmes from ABC, NBC, CBS (Amin, 1996: 117). With such a wide range of Western 
programming on Orbit, Alterman (1998) views the channel as "perhaps the most explicitly 
Western of Arab channels ". Orbit faced some tensions when its BBC Arabic service aired 
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some programmes such as coverage of the London-based Saudi dissident Muhammad Al- 
Mas'ari, and a report on the Panorama show about capital punishment in the Kingdom. 
Alexander Zilo, its American CEO called the show "a sneering and racist attack on Islamic 
law and culture" when he decided to end the BBC agreement. There is doubt that Orbit 
wants to play a leading regional role: rather it may represent the victory of the profit motive 
in regional programming. For those concerned with profits, Orbit perhaps wants to prove 
that broadcasters in the Middle East, like those in the US or Europe, must rely on 
suscribers' revenues rather than distributing their programmes without charge (Alterman, 
1998: 27,28,29). 
This exciting scene has also been witnessing the emergence of some ambitious Saudi media 
figures, who are seeking world-wide fame and prestige. Alwaleed bin Tala bin Abdul Aziz 
al Saud (a Saudi prince now the second shareholder of News Corporation after the global 
media mogul Rupert Murdoch) is investing largely in the media industry. Scott Macleod 
wrote in The Times, January 1997, while stock markets were falling and brokers were 
selling desperately, "deep in the desert night of Saudi Arabia, a reclusive investor, attired 
in a plain white robe and the red-checked head-dress of a Bedouin, is buying". With a 
personal wealth exceeding $12 billion, Alwaleed's share-purchasing order of US$ 1.2 
billion contract in 1996, according to Macleod, "was undoubtedly one of the largest ever 
placed by an individual investor ". Concentrating on media technology, entertainment and 
news, he views media as "the future". Along with holding 5% of News Corporation, he 
owns some 5% of Web-browser maker Netscape Communications and a chunk of chip and 
cell-phone maker Motorola. Alwaleed had already invested in Citi, Apple Computer and 
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Disneyland Paris: however, this time he wishes to have a more active part in management. 
By investing in high-tech media-related outfits, Macleod (1997) argues, the prince 
seemingly aims to become a "king of communications in the Middle East or, in due course, 
an emperor like Murdoch" (Macleod, 1997). 
Saudi's invisible control over some other Arab transnational media networks such as Arab 
News Network (ANN) has also been a persistent rumour in recent years. Begun in 1997, the 
Arab News Network is the most recent comer on the regional satellite broadcasting scene. 
The station is operated by the nephew of the late Syrian president Hafiz Al-Asad, Sawmer 
Al-Asad who hopes to establish a channel akin to CNN. The Arab news channel aims to 
address the Arab's "social, economic and political ills" and "to tell the Arab people that 
their voices will be heard", the Financial Times wrote in 1998, quoting from Asad 
(Alterman, 1998: 25). According to sources close to Sawmer Asad, Alterman (1998) further 
suggests, ANN gains financial support from either Rifaa't Asad (Hafiz Asad's brother) or 
Saudi Crown prince Abdullah (ibid., 26). 
Along with these Saudi-backed or controlled media, there are some other major Arab 
satellite stations run by other Arab states or private sectors. The emergence of the Qatari 
station, Al-Jazeera, is one of the most important events in the Arab transnational 
broadcasting arena. Al-Jazeera, a relatively new entry to the regional scene (November 
1996), is an all-news channel with an unprecedented way of news presentation and dialogue 
for the Middle East. Al-Jazeera intentionally aims to be provocative in presenting issues 
that matter to Arab viewers such as religion and politics, relations with Israel, regional 
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unity, and others. What is broadcast on the channel has been labelled "another kind of 
pornography ", and has been the target of similar assault from many different states, 
particularly the conservative Saudi Arabia. Faisal al-Qasim, the host of one of its most 
controversial programmes, `al-Ittijah al-Mu'akas' (The Opposite Direction) received his 
PhD from Hull University in the UK and worked for the BBC's radio and television Arabic 
services from 1988 to 1996. In an interview with an Arabic magazine in 1998, he said: 
"Not twenty percent of the freedom of expression available to me on the Jazeera channel 
was available to me on the BBC" (Alterman, 1998: 23). With its controversial talks on 
issues ranging from woman's role in society, polygamy, Palestinian refugees, sanctions on 
Iraq, democracy and human rights in the Arab world, Eickelman (2000) calls it "a new 
phenomenon " in Arab-language broadcasting (Eickelman, 2000: 18). 
The Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBC) is another Arab venture aiming to provide 
music and variety and, as Alterman (1998) suggests "a bit of scandal in the search for 
audience ". Comparing Al-Jazeera and LBC, he describes the Lebanese channel in this way: 
"If Al-Jazeera indicates that news can be entertainment, LBC indicates that entertainment 
can be news" (Alterman, 1998: 24). Alongside with its own news and entertainment, LBC 
rebroadcasts CNN International and ABC news daily, and shows Hollywood films. LBC's 
programmes are sexually provocative and this has made it commercially profitable and a 
market leader. According to media observers and industry officials' LBC is perhaps "the 
only station in the region to turn any sort ofprofit" (Alterman, 1998: 25). 
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These Arab TV stations, competing with each other, and with other global media channels 
outpouring in the Arab world, are greatly concerned about their economic viability. Even 
those stations which are directed or supported by the Saudi billionaires are, or will be, 
facing trouble if they can not prove their financial and commercial adequacy. They have 
two potential sources for income: advertising revenue and subscription fees. Advertising 
revenue structure is less developed in the Middle East and Arab countries compared with 
other developing regions such as Southeast Asia and Latin America. Yet, 70 percent of the 
currently $90 million regional advertising revenues, is split between MBC, LBC and Future 
TV. With regard to subscription fees, as noted earlier, Orbit was the pioneer in launching 
pay television in the region. It has been followed by ART and recently LBC which is 
planning a premium pay channel in addition to its free-to-air offerings (Altermanl998: 18). 
The advent of new regional stations, such as Al-Jazeera and those Egyptian controlled 
channels provided by NILESAT, or Lebanese channels, such as LBC and Future TV 
(privately owned by Lebanese prime Minister Rafiq Hariri), along with the previously 
mentioned Saudi satellite television stations, may imply a form of media pluralisation and 
competition in the second period. The new channels, though resulting in the decline of 
Saudi influence, can still be seen as the further expansion of Western conceptions of media. 
Whether private or public, and despite their differences in ambition, management and 
country of origin, these media attempts have one thing in common: they are Westernised 
and arguably secular. Although the owners and directors of these media enterprises may 
not readily agree with this assessment, there is no inherent distinction between their 
initiatives and those of their Western rivals in practice. There is also no serious attempt or 
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willingness by them to show that these transnational media channels are consistent with 
Islamic teaching and law (Shari'a). In this respect, one can hardly distinguish between the 
politically motivated channel, Al-Jazeera and the entertainment ones such as LBC. 
The third wave of the media (1980-onward), arising from the middle of the second wave, is 
distinguished from the other two, not only because of its stand in contesting the dominant 
media, but more importantly because of its claim to be motivated by Divine rather than 
secular considerations. Those making this claim include the `state media', such as the 
Saudis and Iranians; the `political media', whether in exile such as the aforementioned Al- 
Mas'ari media criticism of the Saudi regime or Hezbollah's media campaign against Israel. 
Others such as the `cultural media' of most of Malaysian and Indonesian output, are also 
distinctly paving the same path. 
The third wave: the rise of Muslim-type media 
The world of Islam, as discussed earlier, is undergoing significant changes as a result of 
modem technology. Modern media are having a great impact on every aspect of life in 
Muslim societies. Muslims have found by experience that the technology, extensively 
exploited by the Western powers to maintain their dominance and control over them, may 
now be used to promote their own culture and values, and even possibly to reverse the 
process of Western influence. Islam is discussed in an effort to find some solution for the 
problems facing the modern world. In response to the globalisation of Western culture, we 
can see a corresponding `Islamisation'. New terms -'Islamic Art', `Islamic Economy', 
`Islamic State', `Islamic Banking', `Islamic Management System', `Islamic Knowledge', 
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and `Islamic Media' - for example, have become common in public discourse among 
Muslims (Prasodjo, 1995). 
The interaction of modem Islam and modem media, one supporting the other, has been 
appropriately viewed by some scholars from a Third world origin. Mowlana (2000) points 
to the religious resurgence and Islamic movements as most influential in shaping media in 
the Middle East over the last ten years. Mowlana (2000) identifies three trends of media 
developments in the Middle East. 1) a growing voice of independent media that did not 
exist a decade ago. They are critical of domestic policies and sceptical of foreign media 
domination. 2) A second trend seeks to establish a somewhat Western-oriented media 
strategy, a hybrid of both civic and democratic trends such as is currently underway in 
Eastern Europe. The emergence of the Qatari news channel, Al-Jazeera, discussed in the 
study of the second wave of my chronology, is the most striking example of this media 
trend. 3) The third collective media strategy is the Islamic one, and is clearly seen both in 
government and private owned media systems in revolutionary Iran (Mowlana, 2000: 
Interview). 
Mowlana (1995) also describes the role of modem media in the formation of the new 
Islamic wave as crucial. He argues that modern media not only facilitate the world-wide 
selling of McDonald's products, but also allow a Third World leader to communicate with 
his people far away from home. Underlining the integration of modern media into the old 
social networks, as already discussed in chapter IV, he points to the key part this twinning 
played in the removal of the last royal dynasty in Iran (Mowlana, 1995: 40). 
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The developments of the 1980s, while opening up a new chapter in media development, 
provoked new anxieties too. Liberalisation of the media and the prevailing influence of 
Western secularism through satellite televisions in the Middle East and Arab world led to a 
new campaign, this time overwhelmingly Islamic, against the predominant position of the 
Western media. Dissatisfied with the status of being passive recipients of a dominating one- 
way flow of information from transnational media, Muslims attempted to develop their own 
Islamic version of media. A sense of necessity to respond, on the one hand, and to defend 
their identity, on the other, has provoked most of the Muslim countries to establish their 
own voice in the global arena. Tackling issues such as stereotypes of backwardness, 
fundamentalism and terrorism, which are usually attributed to Muslims and Islamic culture, 
is one of the principal motives behind the process. In line with their long-standing struggle 
against Israel, a major item currently on the Muslim agenda is the creation of an `Islamic 
common market' and `an Islamic satellite television network' (Kharrazi, 1997). 
Muslims also consider the content of the dominant media as cultural imperialism: an 
unannounced invasion against them from the West and, particularly, the United States of 
America. It is a threat because, as entire communities, they may not be able to preserve and 
promote the values important to them. The fundamental bases of Islamic identity, moral 
values and religious beliefs are perceived to be under attack by Western movies, videos, 
selected news and currently the seductive computer games and the INTERNET's indecent 
images. The concern is mainly associated with the. effects of Direct To Home (DTH) 
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foreign satellite television services beaming into the Arab/Islamic world. From North 
Africa to the Persian Gulf, the Middle Eastern countries are worried about the uncontrolled 
spillage from Europe, Israel, and even the Turkish secularly oriented satellite TV (Al- 
Umran, 1996). 
Not only through the content of media programming, but by controlling media 
infrastructure as a source of independence and prestige, the new campaigners are seeking to 
prove their Islamic identity. In the Spring of 1990, Cairo hosted a seminar with the 
attendance of heads of television stations from all around the Arab world, media specialists 
and policy makers to discuss the imminent threat of Direct To Home satellites (DTH) and 
its impact on the region. Seven years later, at the opening session of the Organisation of 
Islamic Conference (OIC) in Dakar, the critical question for the Egyptian's Minister of 
Information Safwat El-Sherif, was the infrastructure of the Islamic media in space and the 
image of Islam, which he asserted "certain people were trying to defame intentionally or by 
ignorance ". He argued that the Islamic nations should cope with new changes and learn 
how to face challenges through co-ordination among each other (El-Sherif, 1997). In the 
inaugural session of the OIC's ministers of telecommunications, held in Tehran in 1996, the 
former Iranian President, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, also called for a joint Islamic satellite 
system for Muslim countries (Hashemi Rafsanjani, 1989-1997). Since the victory of the 
Islamic Revolution in Iran, Iranian officials on many occasions, particularly in regional 
summits and media gatherings, have underlined the importance of establishing an Islamic 
media framework and mechanism. Mowlana (2000) in his identification of the new Islamic 
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media movement (noted earlier) notes the Iranian national media policy, as well as the 
country's official call and quest for establishing a collective Islamic media strategy in the 
entire Muslim world (Mowlana, 2000: Interview). 
Earlier in the 1970s and 1980s, Muslims had experienced a rather unsuccessful press media 
campaign. Publications such as South, Inquiry and Arabia emerged in London in this period 
to offer an alternative voice to Western media institutions. The monthly magazine, Arabia, 
The Islamic World Review, was, perhaps, the most ambitious printed media launched by 
Muslims. The rationale behind the initiative and its parent company, the Islamic Press 
Agency (IPA), in El-Affendi's (1993) judgement, was challenging the perceived Western 
hegemony and bias in the international media. The initiative was different from the TINA 
(International Islamic News Agency) which had been launched in 1979 by the Organisation 
of the Islamic Conference (OIC) with a particular Islamic vision based on dialogue with the 
West. The two attempts, however, ended in failure. The former closed in 1987, because of 
managerial and financial difficulties and the latter, though it continues, 
is hobbled by the 
need to appease 45 member-governments. Following Arabia, two other publications, South 
and Inquiry, with a similar orientation appeared. South, an attempt to support a broad 
Third World perspective, financed by the now discredited Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International (BCCI), and Inquiry, a pro-Iranian radical publication holding a radical 
Islamic line, both folded by the end of the 1980s. The failure of these two projects was due 
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to low distribution, negligible advertising revenue, weak markets as well as political 
reasons' (El-Affendi, 1993: 173,174). 
The new wave of media enterprises developed an optimistic atmosphere different, to a large 
extent, from the Muslim media environment before and during the 1980s. Referring to the 
outcome of the first International Islamic News Agency (IINA), and the covenant for 
Muslim Media Professionals endorsed by the first International Conference of Muslim 
Journalists held in Jakarta, Indonesia in 1988, Siddiqi (1998) assessed the efforts as a 
failure. The reasons given were: 1) lack of support by Muslim governments; 2) lack of 
interest by Muslim journalists and 3) lack of support from Muslim scholars as well as 
Muslim society in general (Siddiqi, 1998: 9). But, media perception and attitude among 
Muslims has changed considerably since the early 1990s. Now, one may argue for new 
awareness and enthusiasm amongst Muslim governments, who have invested enormously 
in modern media, and there is an eager involvement by Muslim journalists and scholars in 
the study of the latest media developments in their homelands and abroad. The following 
are just a few examples of the new Islamic media developments. 
There are attempts to utilise the media for more unification of different branches of Islam, 
as well as achieving more common interpretations of Islamic events amongst Muslims. On 
Monday, November 23,1998, Arabia On Line reported the launch of the first Islamic 
2 While some have claimed that the IPA was located in London to facilitate dialogue with the West, the real 
political reason was that no Muslim capital would accept an independent and free news organisation. The 
economic failure is thus a symptom of a deeper malaise affecting the Umma. For further information see El- 
Affendi's `Eclipse of Reason' (1993). 
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satellite, which was discussed during the meetings of the unified Hegri Calendar committee 
in Saudi Arabia. The project is a great step towards consensus over the starting and ending 
dates of Ramadan, the holy month of fasting for Muslims, the setting of which has always 
been a big concern in the Islamic World. The satellite is expected to solve the problems 
facing the unification of Hegri (Lunar) Calendar for the beginning of Hegri months and 
feasts which depend on the moon's reappearance (Arabia On Line, 1998a). Another 
development is a new television channel, IQRA' (A Quranic word meaning read), which 
started its transmission in October 1998 via ARABSAT. IQRA', a Saudi initiative, now is 
an open forum for all Islamic schools of thought, with special attention to the issues of 
family, women and children. To internationalise the Arabic language, bolster the sense of 
belonging to one Islamic culture and protect it against pillaging, and also to highlight the 
contribution of Arab and Islamic civilisation to human knowledge, have been announced as 
the principal targets of the new channel (Propagating the True Spirit of Islam, 1998). In 
early 1998, an agreement was also signed to spread Arab and Islamic culture through 
programmes, studies, and research by the Arab League Education, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation (ALESCO) and Sharjah Satellite Television, according to Gulf News 
(ALESCO Spreads Arab Culture, 1998). Along with various Arab satellite televisions, there 
have been six television and radio channels, running on EUTELSAT, and launched by the 
Islamic Republic of Iran since 1998. The channels' target audiences are Iranians residing 
abroad and those who speak Farsi as well as other Arab, Turk, Kurd, French, Bosnian and 
English audiences across Europe, the Middle East, North America and Canada. The main 
purpose of the initiative is the propagation of Islamic culture, values and civilisation, and 
the protection of the Islamic and Iranian cultural heritage. Iran has recently announced its 
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new plan to launch its first national satellite system, ZOHREH, which has been under 
discussion since the Shah's time (Tabeshian, 2000). Another Islamic TV station is called 
Muslim Television Ahmadyyah (MTA) whose signals can be received in most parts of 
Africa, Asia and Europe. It is said that all its programmes are in accordance with Islamic 
education with no pornography, superstition and gambling in its programmes (Mujeeb, 
2000). 
In addition to the transnational television channels, there is an increasing wave of 
participation and eagerness among Muslim activists and governments in surfing the 
INTERNET and constructing Islamic web sites. A robust Middle Eastern presence can 
already be felt on the INTERNET. Middle East-oriented news-groups have existed for 
more than half a decade, encouraging discussions on subjects as broad as Middle Eastern 
politics and as narrow as Algerian music. Middle Eastern chat rooms can also be found. 
Newspapers from throughout the region have begun maintaining a presence on the Web, 
often posting the contents of their newspapers free of charge. Even radio and television 
stations have taken to the Web, and in the last few years an increasing number have begun 
web-casting their programming (Alterman, 2000: 21). 
Many Muslims residing abroad are using the Net to link with their home countries. The 
Muslim Students Association, an American collegiate organisation, maintains an 
impressive news website that has links to sites throughout the Muslim world 
(msanews. mynet. net/Launchpad/index. html). Explicitly religious organisations have taken 
to the web as well. One recently launched site, Islam Online (www. islam-online. net), offers 
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net-surfers the ability to solicit a custom -tailored religious decree, or fatwa, in Arabic or 
English. Political opposition groups have also taken a web page (www. hizbollah. org), as 
does the Saudi opposition group, the Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia 
(www. miraserve. com) (Alterman, 2000: 21,22). 
Even Hezbollah, the Shi'ite Muslim organisation based in southern Lebanon, has used the 
INTERNET, satellite television and battlefield video cameras to transmit a guerrilla's-eye 
view of events (Minneapolis Star Tribune (2000). The use of the INTERNET among the 
highly conservative Muslim clerical establishment in the Iranian holy city of Qom is 
reported by the BBC correspondent, Jim Muir (2000). In recent years, not only do the 
Iranian younger generation surf the INTERNET effectively, but the great ayatollahs are also 
using the technology to communicate with their flocks at home and abroad. They have 
realised the potential of the new technology and captured the fact that, for example, the 
computer can bring enormous advantages to the kind of scholarly work they're engaged in. 
Now religious materials such as Islamic jurisprudence, history, tradition and law is being 
processed and saved on the computer instead of being restricted by traditional forms of 
access. As Muir (2000) suggests, there are reformists and conservatives, progressives and 
hard-liners with a wide spectrum of ideas on politics and religion, but when it comes to 
exploiting the new technology, there seems to be no distinction between them. "Computers 
are very much part of the accepted landscape in Iran" (Edward, 2000). 
As far as the use of modern media is concerned the entire Islamic world has undergone 
fundamental changes. The phenomenal achievements of the South East Asian Muslim 
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countries of Malaysia and Indonesia in both areas of software and hardware technology and 
their use of satellite TV stations for religious and educational purposes, hardly need 
mentioning. In sum, in aiming for more unification of the Islamic world, promoting Islamic 
and national culture and values and challenging the dominance of secular media, Muslims 
are seeking for an Islamic version of media with all its contents within the boundaries of 
Islamic teachings and from which not only Muslims can benefit but non-Muslims can also 
understand Islam (Mujeeb, 2000). 
Arab media: A paradoxical pattern of development 
Whatever the orientation, Islamic or otherwise, the huge investment on modern media 
technology by the Arabs appears to be suffering from an inadequate clarity in terms of 
policy/strategy. Douglas Boyd (1999) in a symposium organised by the London-based 
International Centre Against Censorship (ICAO) held in March 1999, observed the process 
of development of the media in the Arab world as "a reaction to the Western media 
practices rather than a pre planned policy" (Talaat, 1999). Also, in response to my recent 
question to him `Is there actually any collective media strategy in the Middle East and Arab 
world? ', Boyd (2000) said: "there is almost no specific media policy in the Middle East, 
except for an obvious Islamic orientation and what the Ministry of Information wants" 
(Boyd, 2000: Interview). 
There are few evidences, if any at all, to support the existence of effective media insights 
and policies during the first period. Since 1950, as noted earlier, some media organisations 
such as the Arab League's mass media co-operation (1951), the Permanent Committee for 
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Arab Media (PCAM) (1960), the Council of Arab Information Ministers (CAIM), Arab 
State Broadcasting Union (ASBU) (1969) and the Arab Satellite Communications 
Organisation (ASCO) established in 1976, have been important players in developing 
media policy in the Middle East. I asked Boyd (2000) if any of these organisations have 
played a significant part? He answered in this way: 
These organisations in large measure have been completely ineffective in forming media 
policy. In the Arab world the media since the 1950s, especially since Nasser came to power, 
has been whatever the government of the day wanted, via the Ministry of Information (ibid. ). 
Referring to more recent developments particularly since the early 1980s, Mowlana (2000) 
argues for a growing wave of awareness in the Middle East, both on the part of government 
officials and non-governmental organisations, of the critical role of media and 
communication technologies in relation to their political, economic and cultural 
developments. Yet he (2000) proposes that the term `collective media policy' cannot be 
adequately used in the region since the media policies in the Middle East region vary from 
one country to another. In the Middle East some countries, such as Iran, U. A. E., Egypt and 
Turkey have a more clear view on the development of their media infrastructure. In Iran 
currently there is much clearer direction toward broadcasting policy than towards the press. 
In Turkey, the process of privatisation of telecommunications and broadcasting is 
underway, and in U. A. E. and Egypt their current communication policies are influenced by, 
first, their linkages culturally and economically to the US, and second, the presence of U. S. 
military operations in the Persian Gulf area (Mowlana, 2000: Interview). 
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Concerning politics and religion and the ways in which these factors may shape the 
development of media in the Middle East, Mowlana, not only in response to my recent 
research questions but, throughout his extensive works on the Arab/Muslim media, tends to 
give priority to the religious resurgence and Islamic movements in shaping media in the 
Middle East particularly during the last ten years (Mowlana, 1993,1995,1997,2000, 
Interview). Responding to the same question Boyd (2000) also suggests: "In the Arab 
world, Islam shapes almost all aspects of the media, , although admittedly more so 
in the 
more conservative states" (Boyd, 2000: Interview). 
The trend is, however, controversial and paradoxical. Within the region, the more religious 
the country, the more paradoxical the pattern of media development. Saudi Arabia, for 
example, is the most conservative country in the Arab world, but with a double standard for 
media at home and abroad. While much Western-oriented media running from outside the 
Middle East, as mentioned earlier, are under Saudi control, the country's national television 
channel in Arabic is an extremely conservative one in terms of religion and morals (Amin, 
1996: 117). Catering to Saudi tastes and Islamic sensitivities, Smith (1998) argues, is the 
main priority for the Ministry of Information. To give an example, in 1998, an agreement 
was signed between AGI (MBCs parent company) and the Saudi Ministry of Information to 
build a TV platform through MMDS to serve up the "ethical and cultural sensitivities" of 
Saudi viewers. Overall, the active presence of Saudi Arabia on the international TV scene - 
London, California, and Hong Kong - compared with its situation at home, may be 
considered as a paradox. Yet, it remains to be seen whether these policies will be 
compatible with the desire of privately-owned Saudi media companies to expand their 
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operations internationally (Smith, 1998). It is also interesting to note that there are no 
theatres or public cinemas in the country. Few newspapers or periodicals are published and 
none independent of the government. Ironically, the use of the INTERNET in the country in 
recent years shows a remarkable increase (Kelly, J. B. et al., 1996). 
Additionally, the development of satellite technology and transnational television, the 
presumed protection apparatus and alternative cultural forms of resistance against the 
Western media flows, is also controversial. Television channels run either on Arab satellite 
systems such as ARABSAT and NILESAT, or other regional or global satellites such as 
EUTELSAT and INTELSAT, have caused major concern within specific national 
communities. Drawing viewers away from terrestrial. channels, nevertheless their success 
and competence to develop independent versions of programming to counter the Western 
political and cultural influx is clearly in doubt. There are considerations in terms of both 
technology and content. Firstly, the new satellite systems, initially perceived as a protective 
shield against the propagation of global cultural and political forms, have now played a 
reversed role. As we shall see later in the case study of ARABSAT, the system ironically 
placed the Middle East in the gateway of global flows. Thanks to satellite dishes now being 
easily available, people now have access to various unauthorised channels accidentally or 
intentionally (Warwick 1993, Mohammadi 1998). Secondly, it appears that the Arab media 
policy-makers have not succeeded in clarifying their cultural priorities, objectives and 
principles, distinguished from those of Western values and principles. As Turkistani (1988) 
notes: "The Arab media lack identity even when they produce programmes in Arabic... 
Media format and style is, at best, an imitation of western programming" (Turkistani, 
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1988: 20,21). In this context, Siddiqi (1998) points to a dilemma in the development of 
Islamic-type media. The ethical principles governing the contemporary media are based 
upon Western philosophies and ideologies. The conventional motivation behind the 
Western media, mass media in particular, is sales value, which is governed by market 
mechanisms. Many Muslim media, he suggests, "have not been able to demonstrate that 
what they practice is inherently different from the secular media" (Siddiqi, 1998: 9). 
Indeed, in some cases there is no distinction at all. Most of the Arab satellite TV channels 
such as MBC, ART, Orbit and Future TV, as discussed earlier in this chapter and will be 
elaborated in chapter VII, are not reflecting a genuine Arabic or Islamic culture and identity 
but simply imitating the Western pattern of programming. A striking example of this 
paradoxical pattern of Muslim media expansion and programming may be seen in a joint 
venture between billionaire pop star Michael Jackson and the aforementioned Prince 
Alwaleed Bin Talal Bin Abdulaziz, the fabulously wealthy Saudi investor. The venture, 
reported by The Independent in March 1996, was dedicated to 'family values' and 
'wholesome entertainment'. Prince Alwaleed, the 39 year-old nephew of the King of Saudi 
Arabia, describes himself as an orthodox Muslim (Horsman, and Jonna, 1996). The irony 
lies in the fact that "Michael Jackson and Madonna - the world-wide prophets of the 
American dream- or their successors" are viewed by most Muslims as a "great danger for 
the new young Muslim generation" (Theodoulou, 1994). 
As far as the development of satellite technology in the region is concerned, and contrary to 
the Arabs' intentions, the process, Mowlana (2000) argues, has in fact opened the door for 
more Western influence in the region. The trend is unavoidable unless national and regional 
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programming is upgraded to meet the needs of the people and new rules and regulations are 
established that would compete with the realities of modem technologies as well as regional 
and national interests (Mowlana, 2000: Interview). Forrester (2000) believes that it 
undoubtedly opened the door: but not necessarily for more Western influence in the region. 
He assesses the process as an opportunity which has allowed countries like Egypt (Media 
Production City), UAE (Dubai and Abu Dhabi), Lebanon (Beirut generally) to compete 
directly with Western programme producers, creating exciting, interesting and even 
compelling programmes from these emerging centres. Without satellite television this could 
never have happened (Forrester, 2000: Interview). Boyd (2000) however thinks that it has 
opened the door for more Middle Eastern influence. Without satellite technology, he 
argues, there would be no Orbit, MBC, Future TV, ART, and the rest of the Arab 
broadcasters that transmit via satellite (Boyd, 2000: Interview). 
A key question facing Arab media policy makers is the allocation of their limited financial 
resources to create new national and regional satellite systems in the region. In the Middle 
East, taking into consideration Turkey's national satellite, TURKSAT, Egypt's national 
satellite, NILESAT, and the regional satellite system of ARABSAT, there are now three 
satellite systems operating, while the newly scheduled United Arab Emirate's THURYA 
will be operational very soon. One may add to these, the new attempt by Iran to put its first 
national satellite, ZOHREH, into orbit. The satellite has the capacity to beam 12 channels, 
seven of which are designed for providing audio-video coverage and five others for 
telecommunication purposes. It is also said that Iran . 
has two more satellite projects. One 
called `MESBAH', with an initial capital of 10 million U. S. dollars, which will be 
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operational in the next three years, while the other is a multi-purpose satellite to be built in 
co-operation with China, Thailand, South Korea, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia and 
Mongolia (Tabeshian, 2000). Chris Forrester (2000) taking the example of the two Arab 
satellite systems, ARABSAT (1985) and NILESAT (1997) respectively regional and 
national, described the Middle East in terms of media policy as "confused": 
It is confusing that ARABSA T and NILESA T compete for the same customers, and indeed, 
carry many of the exact same channels. Factor in the various proposals for new national 
satellites, and you have the perfect mix for further confusion and duplication of precious 
resources (Forrester, 2000: Interview). 
What will be the consequences of different Middle East states launching their own 
satellites? I put the question to Forrester. In his judgement, launching further independent 
satellites in the region will further confuse the public. It is much better to place greater 
resources behind ARABSAT and NILESAT, two organisations clearly able to grow their 
businesses as well as provide the technical backup needed to satisfy their clients (Forrester, 
2000: interview). Boyd (2000) believes that few states will seek to establish their own 
satellites. They will prefer to use ARABSAT and NILESAT because it is cheaper and 
satellite technology has a short shelf life. ARABSAT 2A, the first satellite of the second 
generation of ARABSAT, is, for example, out of date (Boyd, 2000: Interview). Mowlana 
(2000) argues, launching a national satellite, if not a major scheme economically, involves a 
great deal of technological know-how. Only co-operation and understanding between the 
countries in the region, to minimise the cost and maximise the outcome, will be the proper 
policy. Yet, he expresses concern about the "non-Arab prevailing media policies in the 
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region, as well as their incompetence in the articulation of a coherent model of satellite 
broadcasting" (Mowlana, 2000: Interview). 
Conclusion 
The modem media in the Arab world, since their early years of development have been 
intertwined with Western political and economic interests in the region. In assessing the 
process during the last 50 years, one may hardly find supporting signs of clear insight and 
long-term anticipation. During the first 20 years of Arab media development from 1950 to 
1970, the role of oil in the Arab economy and, therefore, in the development of the media 
was negligible. In contrast, the rise of nationalistic movements played an important part in 
shaping the first Arab regional media collaborations in this period. The political economy 
of the Arab media since the mid 1970s and early 1980s, is dominated by three significant 
facts: the oil boom of 1973, the process of globalisation, and the rise of Islamic movements 
in the early 1980s. Most Arab countries, particularly the oil rich states of the GCC with 
Saudi Arabia at the forefront, have invested largely on modem media technology. The 
Arab media policy-makers, however, have not been able to devise comprehensive media 
policies to guide their media practice and direction. The development of satellite 
broadcasting in the region, for instance, has seriously, overlapped in terms of programmes 
and target audiences. Furthermore, there seems to be no consensus over the competence 
and capacity of the Arab media, satellite included, to resist the influx of global media into 
the region. The success of the recent Islamic-type media to offer an alternative to the 
previously inadequate media practices and policies in the region, given its paradoxical 
nature, is still in doubt. Despite the vast investment on their media infrastructures, the 
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success of Muslim media in protecting, restoring and propagating the Arabic/Islamic 
culture and identity in their homeland and throughout the world is not a matter of 
agreement. 
Having reviewed the background, trends of development, the most important features of the 
Arab media and, lastly, the concerns over the lack of clarity and competence in 
development of the media policies, this chapter has set the stage for a critical analysis of the 
development of satellite technology in the Arab world, particularly, the Arab satellite 
system ARABSAT, which will be discussed in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER VI 
AN ANATOMY OF ARABSAT 
A POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH 
Introduction 
This chapter begins with illustrating the background and current status of satellite 
technology in the Middle East and Arab world. The process of media co-operation among 
Arab nations, and the development of the Arab Satellite Communications Organisation 
(ASCO) by 22 Arab countries constitutes the next part of the chapter. There will be an 
attempt to clarify the main reasons for the establishment of ARABSAT, given the 
availability of the same services from INTELSAT at a lower cost. ARABSAT, it will be 
argued, emerged as a breakthrough with some important implications, more important 
among them, the change of Arabs' attitudes towards new technologies, setting up a 
framework for their collective co-operation, and acting as a source of pride, unity and 
prestige for people of the region. ARABSAT, however, has arguably several pros and cons. 
In this respect, the performance of the system since the early years of its establishment, has 
been questioned by some media critics. They have suggested that ARABSAT has been 
financially in crisis, politically impotent and culturally a failure. The major theme of this 
study, and therefore, the study of ARABSAT, is media policy in the Arab world. The 
chapter is mainly concerned with the political, economic and cultural implications of 
ARABSAT in terms of policy through a political economy approach. There are some other 
important issues which will be discussed within this general framework. 
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Satellites in the Middle East 
By the end of the 1980s, developing countries in terms of satellite use were classified in 
three main categories: leasing capacity from INTELSAT, providing a national satellite 
system or using regional satellites (Hudson, 1990: 263). 
The advent of satellite communications in the Arab Middle East, was began by INTELSAT 
launching a satellite to cover the area stretching from North Africa to the Persian Gulf in 
1966 (Gibbens, 1994: 92). INTELSAT started its domestic service at the instigation of 
Algeria in 1967. Since then, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Sudan, Libya, and Oman have all 
leased INTELSAT capacity (Hudson, 1990: 187). For many years, INTELSAT was the 
sole service provider in the Middle East. The Eastern European satellite, INTERSPUTNIK 
(the International System and Organisation of Space Communication), was established in 
July 1972 and offered services not only to countries with strong ties to the former Soviet 
Union, but also to nations outside that relationship. Among the Arab countries, Libya, 
Algeria, Syria and Iraq in one way or another dealt with INTERSPUTNIK in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s (Downing, 1985: 28). Later, the system extended its television coverage to 
other Arab countries in the Middle East. There were some overlap of membership and 
facilities usage between INTELSAT and INTERSPUTNIK (Collins, 1992: 28,39). With 14 
members and a only 0.3 percent of the traffic volume carried by INTELSAT, 
INTERSPUTNIK played a very minor role in the international satellite arena (Martinez, 
1985: 2,3). 
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Although both developed and developing countries benefited from INTELSAT, the 
exclusive use of INTELSAT by the former was still 72 per cent of the total (Hudson, 1990: 
263). Critics of INTELSAT pointed out that the formation of the system by the United 
States and other developed countries was exclusively to meet their needs in the 1960s and 
1970s, and were not necessarily corresponding to the Third World's requirements in the 
1980s and beyond. Additionally they argued that the' INTELSAT technical standards and 
network architecture was suitable for intercontinental telecommunications, not for thin 
route rural and low volume applications. Thus, due to the relatively high fixed earth station 
costs for low volume LDC users, equitable access comes at a higher price per circuit 
(Martinez, 1985: 8). 
Responding to this and in recognition of the large market and user demands in LDCs and 
particularly to the challenges posed by competing satellite systems, such as ARABSAT, 
EUTELSAT and private North Atlantic systems led by the Orion system's proposal, 
INTELSAT started to change its technological and economic perspective. INTELSAT 
learnt that if it was to survive as an dynamic organisation it must provide a vast market for 
inexpensive satellite telecommunications systems in LDCs, by using high power satellites. 
In late 1983, INTELSAT launched its offensive against the competing systems vying to cut 
vital pieces from its market. In December of the same year, INTELSAT introduced its 
VISTA service which would meet the low-volume telecommunications needs of many 
developing countries and international organisations' located at the remote development 
sites. In September 1984, INTELSAT was able to disseminate data anywhere within the 
global arena. Despite all this, declining costs encouraged third world nations to establish 
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their own satellite systems, many of them competing directly with INTELSAT (Martinez, 
1985: 8). 
With great hopes for the contribution satellite could make to educational, social and 
developmental programmes, the 1970s and 1980s witnessed a tendency towards satellite 
self sufficiency. This optimism was mainly based on the fact that satellite was easily 
accessible in rural areas and remarkably cost effective (Turkistani, 1988: 69). In the 
developing world Indonesia was the first country to procure a national satellite system 
(PALAPA-A). Other developing countries with their own national satellite systems 
included: India, which has been operating the INSAT system since 1983; Brazil which 
initiated the BRAZILSAT system in 1985; Mexico, which had launched the MORELOS 
system in 1985; and China with its own experimental satellite system. Argentina, 
Colombia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Thailand and some others were also considering their own 
national satellite systems (Hudson, 1990). There was no national satellite system in the 
Middle East and Arab world until the early 1990s when TURKSAT emerged (Verlini, 
2000: 18). 
Since the early 1970s, when the first domestic geostationary satellite system was launched 
by Canada, the number of regional satellites systems steadily grew. The two most important 
regional satellites, according to Martinez (1985), have been ARABSAT in the Middle East 
and EUTELSAT in Europe (Martinez, 1985: 9). In 1983, the second generation of the 
PALAPA (PALAPA-B) was launched (Hudson, 1990: 184,185). 
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-Satellites today 
In year 2000. according to Verlini (2000), there are nearly 60 geostationary satellite 
s}stems, national, regional and global, serving the Middle East deployed between 25 
degrees West and 70 degrees East longitude. These satellites can be divided in three 
categories: 
i 
I 
I 
ý 
" Satellites based and operating in the Middle East including ARABSAT, NILESAT and 
'R IRKSAT, etc. 
Satellites based in Europe or Asia covering the Middle East such as SES/ASTRA, 
FUTFI. SAT. INSAT, etc. 
" International satellites covering the region such as INTELSAT, New Skies, 
1'ANA fSAVl', WorldSpace. etc (Verlini, 2000: 18). 
ARABSAT and NILESAT. respectively regional and national, belong to the Arab Middle 
Eastern countries, while TURKSAT, a national satellite system, has been launched by the 
Turkish government. These three satellite systems are dominating the scene in the Middle 
East. : \RAl3SAT was inaugurated in February 1985 by 22 Arab states all members of the 
Arab league. The next generations of ARABSAT including ARABSAT-2A (July 1996), 
ARABBSA'I'-211 (November 1996) were lifted into Geostationary Orbit subsequently. After 
the launch and operation of two generations of satellite, ARABSAT designed its third 
generation in response to overwhelming demand. ARABSAT (3A) dedicated for TV 
broadcast in the Ku-hand, has an extended coverage incorporating countries throughout the 
Middle East and North Africa and most European countries (Dubai World Trade Centre, 
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1999). The commissioning of ARABSAT (3B) is currently under discussion (Verlini, 
2000: 1 9,19). 
Turkey launched an international tender for its first national satellite system in 1989. 
11IRKSAT was the first national satellite system in the Middle East. TURKSAT, currently 
operates two satellites in orbit, TURKSAT-1B (August 1994) and TURKSAT-1C (July 
1996)- while the first communication satellite.. TUTKSAT-IA was lost during launch 
operations (Verlini. 2000: 18.19). NILESAT is another Arab satellite system launched by 
the Fgvvptian government. In the Arab world. Egypt was the first country which placed its 
()N%-n national satellite system, NILESAT-101, into orbit in 1998. The second generation of 
NILESAT, namely NILESAT-102, is to be manufactured by the UK-French group Matra 
Marconi Space (NMIMS). Besides. TIIURAYA, a newly scheduled regional mobile satellite 
system, was also expected to he launched in May 2000 and operate commercially by 
September 2000. The United Arab Emirates' ETISALAT US$ 1.3 billion, THURAYA, is 
to extend mobile coverage and services to users from the Indian subcontinent, 
Central Asia, 
the Middle Fast and Eastern Europe (Waller, 1997b: 3). Regional satellites in the Middle 
East are tither Mobile Satellite Services (MSS), which provide satellite-based mobile 
telephony or Broadcasting Satellite Services (BSS) and Fixed Satellite Services (FSS) 
(Verlini, 2000). 
Throughout the region viewers are now able to enjoy more than 80 digital Free-to-Air 
Channels with an additional 100 available through ARABSAT 2 and 3, NILESAT and 
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ASIASAT in addition to the established giants Orbit. Star Select. Gulf DTH and Sara vision 
(Ihihai World Trade Centre. 1999). 
Arab Satellite Communication Organisation (ASCO) 
As noted in chapter V. after the Second World War, the Arab League (1945) emerged to 
realise the unification of the Arab world (Amin. 1996). The first Arab League mass media 
co-olviration was established in 1951. followed by the Permanent Committee for Arab 
Media (P('AMi) in 1960 which led to the Council of Arab Information Ministers (CAIN) as 
a forum . vith the highest Arab League media authority. It was in 1969 that the Arab State 
Broadcasting Union (ASBtº) -the League's specialised agency- was 
inaugurated with the 
aim of co-ordinating radio and television as well as personnel training (ibid. ). INTELSAT 
(The International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium) started its domestic service at 
the instigation of iýigcria in 1967. Since then, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Sudan, Libya, and 
(hnan leased IN I11. SA C capacity (Hudson, 1990,187). The Arab countries, though 
participating in iN 1'IE. I. SAT. desired to connect through their own space communication 
system to exchange their cultural and educational television programmes (Al-Saadon 1990, 
1ludson 1990. Boyd 1991. Amin 1996). 
fl c idea of ARAI3SAF was conceived in 1967 during a Ministry of Information meeting 
that was held in Tunisia (A1-Suadon, 1990: 141). The national broadcasters of the Arab 
States Broadcasting Union (ASI5U) were seeking for an Arab owned, controlled and 
operated international satellite broadcasting system to provide information. 
data, and 
ente tainment services from the perspective of Arabic culture and society (Warwick. 1993: 
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8). Following the war between Egypt and Israel in 1967, the Arab states under the 
leadership of the Arab league planned for their own regional satellite system (Hudson, 
1990: 187). At the beginning, the Arab Telecommunication Union (ATU) was hesitant in 
accepting the idea of ARABSAT. This continued until 1974, when the ATU formed a joint 
committee with ASBU. The joint committee recommended the establishment of an 
independent entity to transfer the project from merely an idea to a practical plan. In April 
1976 the organisational framework of ARABSAT namely the Arab Satellite 
Communications Organisation (ASCO) was established. The actual implementation of 
ARABSAT was a result of the increased foreign exchange revenues after the Arab oil 
embargo in 1973. The rise in oil prices consequently introduced Arab oil-producing 
countries to truly big business on an international. Thus, ARABSAT was founded by the 
Arab League to provide, in the first place, satellite broadcasting for 21 member countries 
level (Al-Saadon, 1990: 142). 
The main objectives of ARABSAT were: (I) The establishment of reliable communications 
links between the Arab States; (2) communications networks in rural areas, especially for 
programmes concerning education, information, and culture; (3) programme exchanges. 
Additionally, the Arab Satellite Communication Organisation (ASCO) aimed at the transfer 
of technology in the field of space technology and was bent on the promotion of space 
communications industries in the Arab World and on the conduct of studies and research in 
space technology (Martinez, 1985: 9). 
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The organisational structure of ARABSAT consists of a General Assembly, a Board of 
Directors and an Executive Body. The General Assembly includes the ministers of the 
Arab national PTTs (Post, Telephone and Telegraph administration) 'which meet annually. 
The Board of Directors with representatives of nine member states are nominated annually 
as follows: 
- The five main shareholders 
- Two members with the highest utilisation shares 
- Two members elected by the General Assembly 
The Board is responsible to secure, invest and maintain the space sector and to implement 
the policies approved by the General Assembly. The executive body is headed by the 
Director General, who is the senior executive and legal representative of the organisation 
(Abu-Argoub 1988, Amin 1996). 
The initial capital of ARABSAT paid by the 21 member states plus the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation (PLO) was about US$163 million (Figure 1). The members hold varying 
proportions of the organisation capital which can be classified in three categories. The first 
group consists of the oil exporting countries. The countries in this group including Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Oman with small 
size population (only 10% of the Arab world) are the main shareholders of ARABSAT. 
1 One of the many national bodies responsible for providing communications services in a particular country. 
Traditionally, PTTs had monopolies in their respective countries. This monopoly was first broken in the 
USA, with the UK joining somewhat later. Currently the markets are being deregulated in Europe as well as 
other parts of the world. 
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(Figure) 
Participation of the ARABSAT Member States in Paid Capital 
The paid capital of ARABSAT is about US $163 million. 
Member Country 
% Participation in 
Paid Capital 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
36.66% 
The State of Kuwait 
14.59% 
The Arab Jamahiriya of Libya 
11.28% 
The State of Qatar 
4.66% 
The United Arab Emirates 
4.05% 
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 
3.83% 
The Republic of Lebanon 
2.45% 
The State of Bahrain 
2.08% 
The Arab Republic of Syria 
1.9% 
The Republic of Iraq 
The Democratic & Popular Republic of Algeria 
1'72% 
1.65% 
The Republic of Yemen 
1.59% 
The Arab Republic of Egypt 
1.23% 
The Sultanate of Oman 
0.74% 
The Republic of Tunisia 
0.61% 
The Kingdom of Morocco 
0.27% 
The Republic of Sudan 
The Islamic Republic of Mauritania 
0.27% 
The State of Palestine 
0.25% 
The Democratic Republic of Somalia 
0.24% 
The Republic of Djibouti 
0.12% 
Source Internet: http: //www. arabsat. corn/about us/mcmbcr. htinl 
MK Alavi 10.10.2001 
With the exception of Libya which is located in North Africa, the other six countries all are 
based in the Persian Gulf region. Saudi Arabia, the largest investor in ARABSAT with 
36.66%, is followed by Kuwait (14.59%), Libya (11.28%) and Qatar (9.81%) which stands 
in the forth place. The United Arab Emirates, now perhaps the second biggest investor on 
media communications after Saudi Arabia, holds only (4.66%) of ARABSAT share/capital 
while Bahrain and Oman enjoy respectively (2.45%) and (1.23%). The other two oil 
producing countries of Iraq and Algeria which hold respectively 1.90% and 1.72% of 
ARABSAT share/capital are also classified in this group (ARABSAT Capital, 1998). 
The second group with a remarkable position in the ARABSAT capital hierarchy includes 
the non-oil exporting but the semi-industrial Arab countries with the majority of the Arab 
population (more than 51%). In this group Jordan, Lebanon and Syria respectively hold 
(4.05%), (3.83%) and (2.08%) shares of ARABSAT. Surprisingly, Egypt with the largest 
population and, historically, the most prestigious media position in the Arab world, holds 
only (1.59%) prior to Tunisia (0.74%) and Morocco (0.61%), the other countries in this 
group (ARABSAT Capital, 1998). 
The least advanced and the least industrialised countries with no oil revenue (except 
Yemen) and the smallest proportion of shares in the ARABSAT initial capital are 
Mauritania (0.27%), the Sudan (0.27%), Somalia (0.24%) and Djibouti (0.12%). PLO has 
also been holding 0.25% of ARABSAT shares. The Republic of Yemen, holding some oil 
reserves, in this group is an exception. Despite its poor economic condition, Yemen with 
1.65% of the shares in ARABSAT, occupies a relatively high position before Oman and 
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Egypt respectively in the first and second groups. As can be seen, with few exceptions, 
there is a direct relation between the oil revenues in each member state and their initial 
investment on ARABSAT (ARABSAT Capital, 1998). 
ARABSAT: a breakthrough 
A remarkable point in the political economy of ARABSAT, is the ultimate success of Arab 
countries in establishing their own satellite system. Since 1969, with no single Middle 
Eastern country using satellite, the usage of INTELSAT was considered a dramatic change 
in the region (Al-Saadon, 1990). The establishment of ARABSAT, however, emerged as a 
breakthrough in the Middle East and Arab world. In 1985, at the threshold of inauguration 
of the system, Martinez defined ARABSAT as a "groundbreaking co-operative venture 
among Arab countries" (Martinez, 1985: 10). As a regional satellite system, ARABSAT 
not only provides telecommunications and direct broadcasting television to the countries in 
its covering area, but more importantly equips these countries with "high technology and 
reduces their perceived dependency on INTELSAT's provision of domestic and regional 
services ". Moreover, he maintains, ARAB SAT is "a very high prestige project for Arab 
countries, officially marking their entry into the Space Age " (ibid. ). 
The implications of the development are multifaceted. Perhaps the first and the most 
important one is their change of attitudes towards the notion of new technologies. Indeed, 
the development of ARABSAT put an end to the long-standing discourses around the 
unsuitability of the technology for the third world, due to its alleged costly and 
sophisticated nature and the fear of facing new technical or cultural difficulties. The 
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question of whether developing countries could afford to establish their own satellite 
system, effectively, changed to whether they could afford to ignore it. Economically, for 
instance, they came to the ultimate conclusion that the cost of the technology was 
secondary to their urgent need for enhancing their developmental plans and goals. It could 
provide them with proper communication links which would cover their geographically 
dispersed peoples, reduce transport costs and reach a wide variety of audiences. After all 
the satellite technology, compared with terrestrial and microwave links, was considered as 
easier, cheaper and more reliable (Abu-Argoub, 1988: 43,44). Furthermore, while there 
were people who said the developing countries should spend their money on other things, 
as Kierstead & Kierstead (1985) regarding satellite broadcasting in Asia-Pacific basin 
argue, the easy access of people to video, convinced the satellite planners that it was better 
to let them have "information rather than misinformation or fantasy" (Kierstead & 
Kierstead, 985: 226). 
Another aspect of the development was the emergence, of a spirit of collective co-operation 
among these historically disunited nations. Indeed, such an extensive co-operation amongst 
the developing nations was unprecedented. The only regional satellite system in the 
developing world comparable with ARABSAT is the aforementioned Southeast Asian 
PALAPA-B with smaller constituency in terms of the member countries. PALAPA-B links 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines. On a global level, Martinez 
(1985) compares ARABSAT with EUTELSAT, though maintaining different objectives for 
the two regional satellites systems. The European Telecommunications Satellite 
Organisation (EUTELSAT) pursued technical and economic targets in serving as a vehicle 
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for pooling European technological and financial resources in the expansion of European 
research and development. The ARABSAT system, in contrast, "clearly reflects the 
political motivations behind regional and national satellite networks" (Martinez, 1985: 9). 
In other words, the advent of ARABSAT, by itself, was a metaphor for the Arab/Muslim 
nations overcoming a long history of disparity and disintegration. 
Al-Saadon (1990) refers to the historical roots of the formation of Arab modem 
independent states. The fall of the Abbasid empire in 1258 and the occupation of Baghdad, 
the capital of the Arab/Islamic state by the Mongolians, the transfer of the Arab/Islamic 
central authority to the outsider Ottoman Empire and the change of the trade routes which 
led to the isolation of the Arab world from the rest of the developed world (1517-1918), 
appear to be central to the question. The subordination of the Arab world to the Ottoman 
empire and the rise of the Western powers and their new hegemonic contact with the Arab 
world are seen as defining factors involved in the formation of Arab polity in the 19''' 
century (Al-Saadon, 1990). After nearly 1000 years of continuing clashes between the 
Islamic world and the West, the latter took the control of the Islamic world with the 
imposition of its capitalist system and the introduction of the nation-state concept which 
was alien to Arab political culture (Amin 1978, Al-Saadon 1990). The notion of nation- 
state was forged by the colonial powers which led to the rise of new individual nationalism 
and the introduction of a centralised system of administration in the Middle East. This 
process of separatism, with no clear definition of state and its relation to the whole (one 
Arab nation), according to Al-Saadon (1990), provoked each individual Arab country to 
pursue its own interest while taking up the rhetorical public discourse of pan-Arabic or pan- 
197 
Islamism (Al-Saadon, 1990: 32). The establishment of the Arab State Broadcasting Union 
(ASBU), the Arab Satellite Communication Organisation (ASCO) and the final success of 
the Arab League in launching ARABSAT, therefore, may be considered as serious steps 
taken towards co-operation and moderate progress in Arab media development (Turkistani, 
1988: 127). 
ARABSAT also emerged as a source of pride and prestige amongst Arabs and Muslims. 
The spacecraft presented a `giant leap forward' for the whole region in all aspects: 
economic, social, political, cultural and developmental (Abu-Argoub, 1988: 45). Abu- 
Argoub (1988) argues for an overwhelming consensus among the entrepreneurs, through all 
Arab states authorities, over the support of the system. Dr. Alawi Darvish, the Saudi 
Minister of Post, after the complementation of the first phase of the system, ARABSAT- 
Al, called it a success story in every respect: "Not only because twenty-two Arab countries 
agreed on the project of this magnitude, but also because it is a successful example of how 
modern technology can be transferred to the Arab world" (Abu-Argoub, 1988: 45). For 
Arabs, ARABSAT was a long-standing dream which came into reality. The launch of 
ARABSAT was conceived by the Middle Easterners as indicating their joining the West in 
the revolution of communication and information technology (ibid. ) The Iraqi Minister of 
Information, Latif Nasif, addressing a UNESCO delegation described the initiative as a 
"national strategic project which realises the national ambitions of the Arab people" 
(ibid., 45). It could also provide them with the opportunity of participation in international 
communications instead of being passive recipients of global dominant media (Al-Saadon, 
1990: 10). 
198 
In 1982, the ARABSAT's director General, Ali Al-Mashat, in a satellite communication 
conference held in San Diego, California said: 
No doubt, the realisation of the ARABSAT system and the attainment of its proclaimed 
objectives shall serve the economic and technical independence of the Arab region, 
augment the sense of national prestige, play an important role in the organisation of 
economic and social structures by strengthening the linguistic and cultural homogeneity, 
by facilitating decentralisation of industry, by slowing the migration of population to 
urban centres, by maximising the use of available centralised facilities and expertise, 
etc., and lead, finally, to the realisation of the Arab aspirations in prosperity and unity 
[eºnphasis added] (Martinez, 1985: 10). 
The last point in regarding ARABSAT as a success is concerned with the US campaign 
against the ARAB SAT development. In the construction of ARABSAT, the contract was 
granted to French Aeospatiale, now Alcatel Space, as the prime contractor, and Ford 
Aerospace and Communications Corporation from the US, as the sub-contractor. From the 
first days of ARABSAT's inception in May 1981, to the time of its launch by NASA in 
June 1985, the USA administration tried to block the project. There were at least two main 
reasons for this. First, the United States was not happy with the contract as it was the first 
time that a non-US company had been selected as a prime contractor. Secondly, the US 
government was concerned about the future use of ARABSAT for military application 
against Israel. Abu-Argoub (1988) in an extensive account of the development, describes 
how ARABSAT officials attempted to convince the Americans that ARABSAT was a 
merely commercial spacecraft with no military purpose against the US allies or even a 
symbol of recognition of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) which held a 0.25% 
share of ARABSAT. The US Senate opposed the sale of equipment to the ARABSAT 
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Organisation which recognised the PLO as an entity or separate government. The deal, 
Americans believed, did not comply with their long-run interests in the Middle East as it 
was a semi-recognition of the PLO, which did not recognise the existence of Israel. 
Alexander Haig, then the Secretary of State, addressing the Senate Foreign Relation 
Committee said: "In light of your concern we are withdrawing the proposal until we can 
study the issue further and discuss it with the committee" (Abu-Argoub, 1988: 116). 
Lobbying efforts against ARABSAT continued in the Senate on the basis that some hostile 
countries such as Libya, Syria, the PLO and South Yemen were the members of the 
organisation. The political row delayed the project. ARABSAT-Al which was initially 
scheduled to be launched by the Ariane Rocket Company in December 1983 started its 
delivery in February 1985. ARABSAT-B 1 was launched by NASA with delay in June 
1985. The State Department and administrative officials, using a lobbying group and 
private briefing, eventually reassured the Senate that the ARABSAT project will not imply 
a change in relationship with US/Israeli hostile elements. Ford Company representatives, 
also present in the briefings, emphasised the jobs to be created by the project and the danger 
of losing business to European companies. The final approval was given by the Senate to 
the sale in February 1982. The State Department approved the deal because most of the 
ARABSAT members were US allies and also US$79 million for the sale of parts and 
US$11.6 million for the launching fee of ARABSAT by NASA were involved (Abu- 
Argoub, 1988: 131). It is important to note that the ARABSAT organisation 
"diplomatically divided its launch business between NASA and the Ariane Rocket Company 
in order to strengthen the Arab world's relationship with France and to promote the Arab 
world's co-operation with the United States" (ibid. ). 
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In sum, the creation of ARABSAT, by itself, can be, or in fact has been, considered as a 
source of success, unity, prestige and pride for the people of the Arab countries and the 
whole Middle East. Regarded as a breakthrough in the Middle East, ARABSAT, however, 
has arguably had several pros and cons. Since the early years of its establishment, media 
critics have questioned the performance of the system. They have suggested that 
ARABSAT has been financially in crisis, politically impotent and culturally a failure. The 
questions have primarily been concerned with the financial and economic aspects of the 
system. They have also challenged the ultimate success of ARABSAT in its cultural and 
political ambitions, namely media co-operation and exchange programming within the 
Arab/Islamic word as well as resisting the global wave of liberalisation. In this context, 
there are several questions which need to be addressed. Why did ARAB SAT emerge? 
What have been the main motives/aims, political, economic and cultural, behind the 
establishment of the system? What have been the major obstacles facing ARABSAT? Has 
ARABSAT succeeded in achieving its proposed regional and global objectives? And as the 
following section will investigate, how realistically was the system designed and 
implemented to meet its targets and the real media demands in the region? These questions 
will be examined in the framework of media policy in the Arab world. 
ARABSAT: An ambitious project 
ARABSAT though the first Arab venture into space was an ambitious project. It was an 
attempt to provide general and specialised telecommunications services for the entire Arab 
world. ARABSAT also aimed to "help design and implement earth stations, both 
financially and technically; carry out research studies in the field of space 
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communications; and promote aerospace industries in the region. There was no realistic 
thought given to the scale of both basic and the potential services of ARABSAT" 
(Turkistani, 1988: 74). 
The system's first generation started with three satellites. In 1985 the Arab League's 
original satellites, ARABSAT-IA (February) and 113 (June) were installed in orbit and 
operated until 1990. These were ultimately replaced in 1992, the same year that the Arab 
League opened bidding for the construction of a more powerful, second-generation satellite 
to avoid future interruption in transmissions. The third one was on the ground for a long 
time as a reserve. Each satellite had a capacity of 26 transponders, 8,000 telephone circuits, 
7 television channels, and 1 large channel for community television (Turkistani, 1988: 75). 
The basic system intended to serve telephone, telegraph, telex, television and radio 
broadcasting, remote monitoring, teleconferencing, and electronic mail needs. While the 
potential services include educational broadcasting, emergency communication, 
telemedicine, simultaneous newspaper printing, and data exchange. The actual use of 
ARABSAT, however, was disappointing. By the end of the 1980s, most of the mentioned 
services were not used with no clear plan to use them in the near future. Out of 8,000 
telephone circuits less than 200 were applied for (Turkistani, 1988: 76). While, application 
for INTELSAT circuits by Arab users exceeded 3,000 just for 1987, ARABSAT-1A was 
using only 1.25 of its 26 transponders and ARABSAT-2A was using only 2.4 % of its 
capacity for a few telephone circuits and television exchanges. One can add to these 
problems the lack of professionals, training shortages, and technology transfer policies 
(ibid). 
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Financially, ARABSAT has been regarded as "under-utilised" and "debt-ridden", with the 
use of only 40% of its total capacity. That is, out of 9,000 available circuits in 1986, only 
1,300 were being used (Hudson 1990: 188, Negrine 1997: 60). Amin (1996) also suggests 
that ARABSAT was significantly under-subscribed until the 1990s (Amin 1996: 108). 
Despite the primary optimism about ARABSAT and its potential use and capacity it 
continued to be under-utilised (Abu-Argoub 1988: 60). In order to cover its proposed area 
including the vast countries of Saudi Arabia, Oman, the Sudan, and Algeria, ARABSAT 
had to be cost effective. The system needed to gain an annual income of at least 14% of its 
expenses ($134 million) for launch and maintenance. of the system for seven years. To 
compete with INTELSAT charges ($17.50 per minute for communication transmission), 
ARABSAT had to work 10 hours a day on each one of six transponders. This meant 
working for a total of at least 60 hours a day. Otherwise the system was not economically 
efficient. In 1986 the daily use of Arab television exchange was 32 minutes of uplink and 
115 minutes of downlink transmission: in total less than three hours a day (Kuridstani, 
1988: 76). 
At the time, efforts to regulate the system and open it up for commercial use did not 
materialise. A request by Arab Space Television Incorporated, a private company, to rent 
six transponders for their commercial use was ignored by Arab Ministers of Information. It 
was believed that any commercialisation of the system was not likely to succeed. The 
pessimism was based on the governmental restrictions and control of broadcasting in 
particular, and the lack of an economic and technical system to absorb broadcasting from 
satellites. It was suggested that unless certain quick and serious solutions were introduced 
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to improve ARABSAT financially and professionally, there was doubt that the system 
would survive. If the system was not used for various telecommunication services on a 
large scale, the television exchange of news and programmes would certainly be in danger 
(Turkistani, 1988,77). 
The increasing use of VCRs in the Middle East has also been regarded as another problem 
for ARABSAT. Despite the investment on regional satellite, according to Hudson (1990), 
the Middle East paradoxically showed the highest VCR penetration and lowest satellite use. 
VCRs were owned by over 80 percent of television households in Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia, and by over 70 percent in Oman and the United Arab Emirates. A Saudi official, 
for instance, had referred to his country as the first videotape society. VCRs enabled Arabs 
to see foreign programmes which were not permitted to be shown on television because of 
their perceived harmful cultural influence. Arab television, however, was less dependent on 
US and European content than that of other regions because of the availability of popular 
regional content, for example from Egypt, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi 
Arabia. At the time, about 40 percent of the programmes in the Arab world were imported, 
with about one third of the content from other Arab states, one third from the United States, 
and the remainder from various sources (Hudson, 1990: 188,189). 
Another reason for the ARABSAT financial deficiency was considered the lack of earth 
stations for picking up the signals and the absence of a high level of penetration of basic 
telephone services. Only the six countries of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Jordan, Oman, 
Tunisia, and Kuwait possessed earth stations. The rest of ARABSAT shareholders have 
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been slow not only to construct earth stations, but also to make the contributions they had 
pledged to ARABSAT, which was financed primarily by Saudi Arabia (Hudson 1990, 
Boyd 1993). 
Boyd (1993), regarded ARABSAT as a financial burden to Arab nations requiring them to 
pay hard currency to Western companies. The main rationale behind the establishment of 
ARABSAT, in his view, was "Arab world satellite self-sufficiency" (Boyd, 1993: 9). 
Indeed, the tremendous increase of oil prices provided an economic capacity for the Persian 
Gulf states to decide to establish their own regional satellite system. The financial situation 
in other Arab states, however, were different. Thus, the non-oil exporting countries were 
under financial pressure as they could not afford to construct down and up- linking facilities 
to use ARABSAT. Some Arab countries preferred to hold on to their INTELSAT leases 
rather than switch to ARABSAT. One reason was likely to be the fact that ARABSAT 
charges were higher than those of INTELSAT(Abu-Argoub 1988: 60, Boyd 1993: 9). 
This very fact as well as the other mentioned technical and financial problems, may raise 
the important question of what really provoked the Arab nations to persist in the creation of 
their own satellite system in 1985? The following section seeks to respond to the critical 
question of what have been the main motives/objectives, political, economic and cultural, 
behind the establishment of ARABSAT? This will set the stage for further discussion 
about the success/failure of ARABSAT in its proposed missions. 
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Why did ARABSAT emerge? 
As discussed earlier, ARABSAT was established to provide a reliable communications 
links between the Arab States and within the rural areas for the exchange of educational, 
information, and cultural programmes. The system also aimed at the transfer and 
promotion of the space technology and the conduct of research in the field. Additionally, it 
was believed that ARABSAT could provide an opportunity for the reciprocal flow of 
information within the Arab world and on a global scale (Martinez 1985, Turkistani 1988, 
Al-Saadon 1990, Hudson 1990, Boyd 1993, Amin 1996). 
Martinez (1985) argued that ARABSAT was "implemented for other than solely technical 
or economic reasons ". Comparing ARABSAT and EUTELSAT, he proposed different 
objectives for the two regional satellites systems. EUTELSAT pursued technical and 
economic targets in serving as a vehicle for pooling European technological and financial 
resources in the expansion of European research and development. ARABSAT, in contrast, 
"clearly reflects the political motivations behind regional and national satellite networks" 
(Martinez, 1985: 9). 
Al-Saadon (1990) characterised the system by its mainly political and cultural implications. 
It is a media co-operation effort on a regional level as well as a medium for news and 
television programme exchange within the region and across the world. The system could 
pose a "potential alternative to the existing one -way flow of information" (Al-Saadon, 
1990: 18). Similarly, Turkistani (1988), identified ARABSAT mainly as a political 
decision which could serve as a vehicle for information exchange between the Arab states 
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and the rest of the world. He also noted that since the ASCO was under the Arab 
telecommunications ministers auspices they soon took the control of ARABSAT as a 
political tool (Turkistani, 1988: 73,74). 
ARABSAT emerged following the 1967 war between Egypt and Israel, and as a result of 
the Arab loss of communication installations. The establishment of the system may, 
therefore, be seen as a reaction to the deterioration of the international image of the Arabs 
(Turkistani 1988, Hudson 1990). One of the main stated goals of ARABSAT was to unite 
the Arab people in different countries through the exchange of programming. Although, as 
Abu-Argoub (1988) argued, it was very unlikely that ARABSAT policy-makers were to 
allow an unrestricted use of the community television channel. It was "merely an ambition 
or a banner used by the Arab regimes to control the people" (Abu-Argoub, 1988: 170). 
It is also important to note that since the establishment of the Arab League in 1946, 
ARABSAT has been the most significant joint venture successfully implemented by the 
Arab League members. Motivated by various political interests, several governmental 
organisations on both national and regional levels have been involved in the planning of 
ARABSAT. Among them, the Arab State Broadcasting Union (ASBU), the Arab 
Telecommunications Union (ATU), the Arab League Educational, Cultural, Scientific 
Organisation (ALEASCO) and the Arab Bureau of Education for the Gulf States (Abu- 
Argoub, 1988: 61). Thus, the system was planned, manufactured, launched, and established 
by political considerations rather than communication considerations. In this respect, due 
to the gap between ARABSAT's different users such as broadcasters, educators and the 
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political leaders those political considerations were unlikely to be translated into 
communication ones (ibid., 170). 
There are also three main issues highlighted exclusively concerned with the relationship 
between ARABSAT and INTELSAT. Firstly, the Arab states were not satisfied with the 
INTELSAT tariff rates. Although it was generally believed that INTELSAT's service cost 
was reasonable, some Arabs users could not afford it. The average cost for the first minute 
of occasional transmission was between $850 and $900, with an additional charge of $40 
per minute. Compared with the rate applied to American television organisations it was 
double, while 60-70% higher than European rates. There were some countries that 
negotiated the tariff rates and gained some reductions such as New Zealand, Singapore and 
Thailand, and some others like Brunei and Sri Lanka that enjoyed low rates from the 
inception (Turkistani, 1988: 72). 
Secondly, though INTELSAT was more accessible to all parts of the world, it was believed 
that the West sustained its predominant position over the system. The developing nations, 
Arab included, regarded themselves as receivers of transmissions from the US and Europe. 
Europe was dominant in terms of both the number of transmission and hours transmitted. 
This was due mainly to the Erouvision exchange through which broadcasters in Europe 
gained access to news, sports, and other programmes. The European dominance replaced 
North America, the previous hub of satellite television traffic [Turkistani 1988,70, quoting 
from Hulten & Hulten (1985)]. 
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The third reason, was concern over the powerful position of INTELSAT. The Arab nations 
believed that they had no power in influencing the policies and the administration of 
INTELSAT. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, among others, expressed their dissatisfaction about 
reservation problems. "Cancellations occur and reservation priorities are not confirmed. 
In addition, there is the difficulty of finding suitable times for programme exchanges " 
(Turkistani, 1988: 72,73). 
In sum, while the political motivations behind ARABSAT were clearly strong, the initiative 
was essentially driven by its cultural aims with almost negligible implications in terms of 
economy. In fact, with the exception of the concern over the INTELSAT tariff rates, the 
other reasons for the establishment of ARABSAT hold no strong economic and financial 
indications. This fact as well as the other technical and financial problems discussed 
earlier, may imply the failure of ARABSAT policy-makers to address the economic 
viability of the system from the outset. One may conclude that at the time of the creation of 
ARABSAT, there was no clear economic or financial policy or even economic motive 
behind the initiative. At most, the financial and economic objectives of the system were 
considered as secondary. One must remember that the increase of oil prices in one decade 
starting from 1973 to 1983 had a great impact on the development of ARABSAT. I will 
later take up these issues from another perspective in this chapter. Yet, in pursuing the 
political, economic and cultural implications of ARABSAT in terms of policy, the 
following section looks at the main obstacles facing media co-operation through 
ARABSAT. 
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Media co-operation through ARABSAT: Major obstacles 
In chapter III of this research, mapping the political, economic and cultural ecology of the 
Arab media, the original roots of disparities among the Arab nations were discussed in 
detail. The differences have been reflected in the use of ARABSAT for the exchange of 
television programming. In Arab media literature, political and economic differences across 
the Arab world, notably more than cultural, have been highlighted as major obstacles for 
media co-operation through ARABSAT (Khalil 1983, Kandil 1988, Abu-Argoub 1988, 
Turkistani 1988, Al-Saadon 1990, Amin 1996, Mohammadi 1998). 
In this view, the programmes are highly politically oriented and, therefore, difficult to be 
exchanged smoothly among the other Arab nations. While, the entertainment programmes 
are less ideologically motivated, in the case of information programmes which carry the 
political messages of a national party or a government, the importing countries exercise 
more restrictive criteria (Al-Saadon, 1990: 14). A major concern for Arab media policy- 
makers, therefore, has been to create programmes that transcend political barriers or the 
geographical division of 22 Arab countries. Perhaps the only solution, though nearly 
impossible, for media exchange is to avoid touching on political issues in television 
programmes which are sent out via ARABSAT (Abu- Argoub, 1988: 96). 
Hudson (1990) refers to Kuwait, Syria, Jordan, and Libya as countries with extremely 
diverse political ideologies and to Saudi Arabia as a strictly traditional Muslim state which 
prohibits imported programming as immoral or decadent (Hudson, 1990: 188). Amin 
(1996) argues that the level of the diplomatic relations among Arab countries determined 
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the degree of exchange programming and the strength of their economy facilitated more use 
of ARABSAT. Yet, with the introduction of the new satellite technology, he views a 
change of attitude in Arab media organisations toward more co-operation and programme 
exchange. Most Arab countries have established exchange departments or are currently in 
the process of establishing them (Amin, 1996,108). 
The expulsion of Egypt from the Arab Telecommunications Union (ATU) in 1979 after the 
deal with Israel and its impact on the Arab media co-operation has also been regarded as 
important. The headquarters of the Arab Satellite Communication Organisation (ASCO) 
was moved from Cairo to Riyadh. It was believed that until Egypt becomes reinstalled as a 
member, television exchanges would continue to be minimal (Hudson 1990: 189). 
However, Negrine (1997) doubted that even with the return of Egypt to the ATU the 
religious, political and moral differences within the Arab world would have put the 
exchanges of television programmes and films at ease (Negrine, 1997: 60). The League of 
Arab States, the largest forum through which Arab's aspiration for unification came to be 
realised, has also been, at least in the political sphere, a gigantic fiasco. Political 
disintegration and ideological conflicts have kept the 22 Arab countries in a state of 
political disarray and social turmoil (Turkistani, 1988: 127). 
Abu-Argoub (1988) underlines the use of, for example, television in the Arab world for 
limited political ends instead of social and economic development. Broadcasting systems 
have been serving Arab countries as an instrument of propaganda against leaders of other 
Arab counties allocating time, planning, expertise, money, and effort, the Arab media 
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practitioners carry the political message of their governments and local authorities (Abu- 
Argoub, 1988: 25). The programming via the Arab satellite system "means taking into 
account the encrypting of community television broadcasts relayed by ARABSAT" (Abu- 
Argoub, 1988: 170,171). This is to avoid further political disputes which may arise from 
the content of these programmes. In his view, an unrestricted use of the community 
television channels and, thus, using ARABSAT as a means of unity is merely an ambition 
which is unlikely to be realised. In relation to the hope that ARABSAT could change the 
pattern of the existing media exchange within each individual Arab country, he further 
suggests: "There is no free flow of information in the Arab world. Communication is one 
way, often top-down from decision makers to people, elite to masses" (ibid. ). 
Blaming cultural differences as hindrance to the Arab media collaboration through 
ARABSAT seems to be controversial. Despite its heterogeneity in terms of politics and 
economy, the region, culturally, more than many parts of the globe, is a homogenous 
society. In fact, given my previous arguments in chapter IV, a promising point in favour of 
media co-operation through ARABSAT is strong cultural and religious links among the 
Arab nations. Stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Persian Gulf Sea, the 21 countries 
of Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, Syria, 
Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirate, Bahrain, 
Qatar, Oman and Yemen, all are Arab, sharing one language, one religion and a single 
civilisation (Warwick 1993, Mohammadi 1998). 
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Covering an area of 5.25 million square miles, the Arab world is connected together by 
powerful linguistic, religious, cultural, historical and psychological links (Abu-Argoub, 
1988: 15,40). More than 88 percent of the Arab world population consider Arabic as their 
first language and 92 percent are Muslim (Al Saadoon, 1990: 36). Concerning non-Arab 
Muslims such as Kurds, Pakistanis, Iranians, Hindis, Baluchis, Turks as well as non- 
Muslim Arabs, including Christians, Jews, and other religious groups in the Arab world, it 
should be noted that, such a diversity in ethnic and religious minorities also exist elsewhere 
in stable societies. For example, Barker (1999) argues: 
Britain has a population drawn from Cells, Saxons, Vikings, Normans, Romans, Afi"o- 
Caribbeans, Asians and others, so that the English language is a hybrid of words from all 
over the world. Likewise, the USA, whose divers peoples have a heritage derived fron? 
native American Indians, the English, French, Spanish, African, Mexican, Irish, Polish 
and too many more to mention (Barker, 1999: 37). 
Furthermore, the cultural characteristics of the Middle Eastern countries is tremendously 
influenced by the articulating factor of Islam. Ali (1995) puts the issue in this way: 
Islam is the dominant force that shapes almost all aspects of Arab life. It provides 
identity, courage, pride, continuity, and hope. Islam's major achievements were uniting 
the Arabs into a single nation and releasing their energy. Nevertheless, Islam, along with 
the Arabic language, remains the strongest force for enriching Arab thought and 
ensuring its viability and renewal (Ali, 1995: 21). 
Cultural distinction, for instance, between Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, UAE and Saudi 
Arabia are very small. The political borders between some of these newly separated states, 
213 
forged by the West for certain purposes in the early years of the 20`h century, do not 
determine the cultural ones. In contrast, despite these political walls, what may help the 
Arab nations to establish their collaborative frameworks, unite against the Western 
hegemony and challenge the long-standing internal dictatorship in each individual country, 
is, in fact, their potential resources of culture, history and, more importantly, the religion of 
Islam. 
So, disparities in the Arab world in terms of culture, ethnicity or religion is not a 
convincing explanation for the failure of ARABSAT policy-makers in establishing a 
successful model of media collaboration and exchange programming. The failure, 
however, is primarily due to their lack of knowledge and experience in dealing with the 
problems which somehow exist in almost any collective co-operation. The pattern of media 
collaboration and exchange programming within the member states of the European Union, 
as a base of comparison, may support my argument. In the construction of a European 
identity, Husband (1999) argues: 
the EU has made much use of a common Graeco-Roman tradition and a shared Christian 
faith. However, in comparing this with the Arab/Muslim world we would have to note 
that whilst in Europe Christianity is increasingly a symbolic ideology, in the Arab world, 
Islam is still a vital and lived theism (Husband, 1999). - 
Additionally, in most parts of the Middle East, Muslims share the same language, whilst the 
EU member states do not. (Arabic is the first language in 21 Arab countries and is partially 
understood and practised in the rest of the non-Arab but Muslim territories. ) In this respect, 
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the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), established by the six states of Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman in 1981 is a good example. "There are many 
points of method and objectives", Peter Mansfield (1992) comparing the European EEC 
and Arabian GCC argues, "which resemble those of the European Economic Community 
(EEC) with the important difference that the six have a common language and culture" 
(Mansfield, 1992: 369,370). Yet, the EU media co-operation and programming has not 
been hindered by their cultural differences which are not less than those of the 
Arab/Muslim world. Consider the fact that ARABSAT and its European counterpart, 
EUTELSAT, both started operation in 1985. Yet, while the former, in Forrseter's (2000) 
word, has been "ve, y much a local beast" the latter has achieved a global success and 
reputation (Forrester, 2000: Interview). 
Since the 1980s, in Western Europe, collaboration programmes in information technology 
(ESPRIT) [European Strategic Programme for Research and Development in Information 
Technology], and telecommunications (RACE) [R&D in Advanced Communications 
technologies for Europe] have been fostered within the European Economic Community 
(ECC) by the European commission (Shearman, 1986: 147). The Arab countries also 
established forums such as AIP (the Administration for Information and Publication), 
PCAM (the Permanent Committee for Arab Media) CAIM (the Council of Arab 
Information Ministers), ASBU (the Arab State Broadcasting Union) and its affiliated 
Engineering Committee, ATU (the Arab Telecommunications Union), and ARABSAT (the 
Arab Satellite Communication Organisation) to secure communication and exchange 
programming in the Arab/Muslim arena. However, for the foreseeable future, it is unlikely 
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that the latter could unite in a single framework, which promises a united 
communications/information policy-making system as it was realised in the EU, for 
example in the forms of ESPRIT or RACE. One reason, as Shearman (1986) argues, has 
been "the unique historical, political and social pre-condition which made the post-war 
unification of western Europe a relatively painless process and inspired the ambitious 
motives contained in the project from the beginning. In the specific area of 
communications, the recent European initiatives in collaboration is also to some degree a 
by product of the economic crisis or `technology gap' caused by the American and 
Japanese leads in global information technology markets" (ibid.: 147). 
To conclude, the Arab media collaboration through ARABSAT has suffered from the 
political and economic disparities among the Arabs. The failure of ARABSAT in exchange 
programming cannot however be adequately explained by the cultural differences in the 
region. The Arab world, in terms of culture, is rather homogenous. For a better 
communication through ARABSAT, the Arab nations need to define and utilise these 
common cultural fields skilfully and efficiently. The Arab media so far have been mainly 
used for limited political ends rather than serving wider social and developmental 
programmes. ARABSAT has hardly made a considerable contribution in changing this 
pattern of media programming. However, not only has the success of the system in 
providing a regional framework for media collaboration been challenged, but, so too has its 
ambition in resisting the global wave of liberalisation. This key issue as well as new trends 
towards commercialisation and privatisation of ARABSAT will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER VII 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PROTECTION 
THE CASE OF ARABSAT 
Introduction 
We have already discussed how the powerful feeling about the Western media-cultural 
influence in the Arab world has been intensified by prevailing religious and ideological 
discourses. The penetration of foreign satellites in the region, while renewing the charges of 
cultural imperialism, has strengthened the financial and economic concerns about 
ARABSAT. Pursuing the analysis of ARABSAT, this chapter aims to address a key 
question in the study of the Arab media, namely the philosophy and political economy of 
protection. The essence of the idea, and my proposition, is that the protection policies, 
cultural or otherwise, imposing their financial burden on ARABSAT, have their own 
political economy. In confrontation with its powerful transnational satellite rivals operating 
in the Middle East, ARABSAT has been facing two simultaneous challenges: being 
economically viable while achieving its cultural and political aims. Given the enormous 
investments in ARABSAT as a protective shield, the central question is how successful the 
system has been in its cultural and political ambitions. In order to address this question, we 
need first to discuss the global waves of liberalisation and deregulation, and their impact on 
the system, as well as new trends towards commercialisation and privatisation of 
ARABSAT. 
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The global wave of liberalisation: new challenges 
The global wave of liberalisation and deregulation of media, with world-wide flows of 
discourses, cultural representations, news and entertainment, raised issues of the power and 
superiority of the globalising media over less powerful nations/media. With the 
globalisation of the television market, according to Screen Digest, February 1995, there are 
over 850 million television sets in more than 160 countries watched by 2.5 billion people 
every day. In one decade, between 1984 and 1994, the number of television households 
expanded most quickly in the developing world. In Asia and Africa the number of 
television sets trebled, and in Central America the figure doubled, while in Europe and 
North America the growth was marginal (Barker, 1999: 45). American media 
conglomerates and a handful of other international players such as Rupert Murdoch's STAR 
TV, France's CANAL Plus and Britain's BBC are currently dominating the world. The Hong 
Kong based STAR TV, following its acquisition by News Corporation for $525 million, for 
example, has given Murdoch a satellite television footprint over Asia and the Middle East 
with a potential audience of 45 million viewers. Murdoch with his other television interests 
- BskyB (UK) and Fox-TV (USA and Australia) - has a global reach of some two thirds of 
the planet (Barker, 1999: 47,48). 
The Middle East and Arab world with an increasing number of television sets and an 
unprecedented hunger to watch Western programmes is now considered as a major market 
for Western cultural products and commodities. In the Persian Gulf region, with more than 
1.5 million satellite dishes available, over 40 percent of the population watch satellite TV 
channels. In North Africa, in Egypt alone, there are nearly 500,000 satellite dishes, with 
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more than two million viewers and a choice of 10 American TV channels, 12 British, 14 
French, 10 Turkish, 15 Hong Kong, and several African channels (Kaloti, 1997). The 
region, despite the regulatory restrictions in force by most Arab states, has become a 
diverse market covered by INTELSAT, EUTELSAT, PANAMSAT, THAICOM, 
ARABSAT, NILESAT and AMOSI satellites, among others (Careless, 1999). Most of 
what used to be considered the hard-core Islamic countries have been slowly and gradually 
opening up to Western satellite communications. The breakdown of political barriers is 
enhancing business for the digital video compression segments in these semi-traditional 
societies. Using the INTERNET, some international satellites companies such as 
INTELSAT, Hughes Network Systems and Alcatel Space are selling their products in the 
region. INTELSAT's INTERNET-based communications market in the region has 
witnessed a growth of some 45 percent in 1998 and expecting another 40 percent in 1999. 
The growth, it is argued, cannot be taken as a proof of radical liberalisation as many of the 
companies using the service are signatories to the INTELSAT agreement. In other words, 
they are PTTs and other state-run telecommunications firms, who, after all, understand that 
they need to stake out cyberspace in order to remain relevant (Careless, 1999). 
The global forces of liberalisation and deregulation of media, as well as the advent of DBSs 
(Direct Broadcasting Satellites) in the Arab world have faced ARABSAT, particularly, with 
two simultaneous challenges: being economically viable while achieving its cultural aims. 
On the one hand, the increasing number of satellite channels and commercial networks have 
forced the ARABSAT policy-makers to lay stress on the commercial aspect of the system. 
On the other, the political and cultural, notably religious, concerns among the Arab nations 
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have led them to invest heavily on protection policies. This has not always been in line with 
their financial, economic and commercial interests. 
Commercialisation of ARABSAT versus its cultural aims 
With the liberalisation and deregulation of the media world-wide, a major concern is the 
powerful impact of foreign satellites on ARABSAT. Its policy-makers have been puzzled 
how to establish a balance between the economic and cultural objectives of the system. 
This has led to a paradox in the expansion of ARABSAT, that is to say; commercialisation 
of the system versus its cultural aims. 
The assertive nature of global satellite channels and commercial networks, as mentioned 
earlier, left the ARABSAT policy-makers with no other choice but to adopt or, to be more 
precise, underline the new commercial policies. They found by experience that in this very 
competitive environment, they were confronted by several fierce rival TV satellite channels 
outpouring into the Arab Middle East, and a wide spectrum of audiences across the region, 
Europe, Asia and America. To run ARABSAT efficiently, at least to cover its costs, they 
therefore needed to promote its level of services. Consequently, despite ASBU's primary 
plan, various national Arab TV monopolies abandoned the use of the system for 
broadcasting and majored on telecommunications. In 1993, eight years after the launch of 
the first generation of ARABSAT, Warwick (1993) viewed the provision of Pan-Arab 
space-based broadcasting facilities initiated to serve the needs of cultural, educational, 
religious and entertainment sectors, as only partially realised (Warwick, 1993: 9). In 
practice, he suggests: "The backbone use ofARABSA Tfacilities developed into a `de facto' 
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telecoms system with significant transponder capacity given over to telephone and 
datacoms traffic, and only limited facilities being devoted to TV broadcasting" (ibid., 9). 
The supplementary modifications to the ARABSAT Charter, where emphasis was placed 
on ARABSAT marketing policy, may support Warwick's opinion. The ARABSAT 
General Assembly, in its 13th Session held on 14'x' May 1990 in Algiers, decided "to run the 
organisation on a commercial basis, taking into consideration the goals for which the 
organisation had been established" (ARABSAT Overview, 1998). 
Entering into an international marketing arena, the ARABSAT policy-makers concluded 
that if the Arab Satellite Communication Organisation (ASCO) wanted to be successful it 
would need an "efficient organisational structure, solid financial base and close continuing 
co-operation between the Organisation and its member states" (ARABSAT Marketing, 
1999). After all, the Organisation, responsible for, providing the skeleton of satellite 
communication in the Arab world, has been facing the challenge of foreign satellites which 
have entered the market and have been covering the Arab world. To meet the challenge, the 
ARABSAT Marketing Department announced the following strategies and plans in... 
Modification ofARABSAT's Tariff Manual to ensure the competitiveness of its tariff for 
different services provided by satellites. 
Creation of an independent marketing directorate to concentrate efforts on exploring new 
market elements and services, as well as conducting marketing studies for any new satellites 
and services that ARABSAT intends to create. 
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Signing different agreements for co-operation, sharing of information and studies between 
ARABSA T and similar organisations in the international arena. 
Maintaining ARABSA T's participation in international conventions and meetings relating to 
the satellite service sector and its technical. financial. and marketing aspects. 
Training ARABSA T technical and administrative staff in accordance with the most up-to- 
date standards to keep up a quality service. 
Endeavouring to take part in investment opportunities within the various satellite services in 
the Arab countries, as well as with the private sector. 
Setting the basis for productive co-operation with Arab administrations and with the 12rivate 
sector in the Arab region through consultation and by means of conducting studies relating 
to its prospects in the field. 
Employment of the principle of strategic planning and future exploration to keep ahead of 
developments and to plan in advance in order to deal with the rapid changes rising in the 
field in all respects-technical. marketing, and financial (ARABSAT Marketing: 1999). 
With a brief review of the above plans/strategies, one can confidently argue for a notable 
shift, at least in theory, from the political and cultural concerns to the economic and 
commercial ones. The most striking indicator in this respect may be seen in the last clause, 
which narrows the whole process to deal only with the `technical, marketing, and financial ' 
aspects of the system. Remember the fact that at the time of the establishment of 
ARABSAT, as discussed earlier in this chapter, there was no concern over economic, 
financial and commercial policies or even such motives behind the initiative. Now, 
ironically, what is absolutely missed in the new proposed plans/policies, is concern over 
culture and politics. At most, one may optimistically argue, the political and cultural 
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aspects of the system have been considered as secondary. Yet the policy, in turn, may be 
regarded as the only possible way through which the ARABSAT policy-makers can keep 
running the system, if not efficiently, then at least as financially viable. 
ARABSAT: Financial survival 
As discussed earlier, during its first 5 years of operation, from 1985 to 1990, there was 
doubt that ARABSAT could survive at all, and the television exchange of news and 
programmes continue. Now after nearly 15 years, ARABSAT not only has survived, but 
since the early 1990s the official statements made by ARABSAT authorities endorsed by 
the continuing expansion of the system, suggest financial stability. 
According to figures released by the Organisation, ARABSAT made US$12 million on 
operations in 1992. Faisal Ahmed Zaidan, ARABSAT's board chairman, said that profits 
from the venture have been used to finance the second generation of satellites (Satnews, 
1993a). In 1993, ARABSAT signed a US$104 million loan agreement with eight banks to 
part-finance the building and launch of two new satellites. The loan had been organised 
primarily through Middle Eastern banks. ARABSAT paid US$258 million for nearly 60 
percent of the total cost of building two new satellites set to be launched in 1995 from its 
existing cash reserves (Satnews, 1993b). In May 1996, Egyptian Minister of Transport, 
Communications and Civil Aviation Soleiman Metwally, reported the profits secured by 
ARABSAT which enabled it to finance part of the cost of the second generation of Arab 
satellites, the first of which was launched on July 5 of the same year. It was followed by 
the launching of the second satellite in the second half of 1997. Furthermore, concerning 
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the full use of the system, Metwally suggested that all channels of the satellite have been 
rented by Arab agencies and companies. Affirming the purchase and launch of "a most up- 
to-date third satellite of the second generation" by the end of 1998, he speculated a total 
revenue of US$ 2 billion for ARABSAT during the period from 1996 to the year 2001 
(Zormelo, 1996). In another development, Saad al-Bidnah, the Director-General of 
ARABSAT reported the full use of the system by administration and private sector 
companies, which indicate the system's profitability prospects (ibid. ). An article published 
in the Lebanese Daily Star paper in November 21,1999, noted that ARABSAT is now 
valued at $1.2 billion. Yet, it is reported that the ARABSAT profits have dropped to $57 
million during 1999, from $63 million in 1998. The decline has been mainly due to the 
ferocious competition from other regional and international satellite stations as well as 
reduced subscription fees. While the overall financial status of ARABSAT seems to be 
stable, the company "looks to new horizons" the paper reports. The ARABSAT 
administrative body is seeking to broaden its shareholder base to upgrade its services and 
reach more countries. In a conference held in Beirut in November 1999, the director- 
general of ARABSAT recommended selling part of the company to private investors. The 
introduction of INTERNET and digital broadcasting systems, he affirmed, would boost 
revenues in the long term (Arabia On Line, 1999). ARABSAT succeeded in launching its 
ARABSAT-3A satellite on February 26,1999. Built by Alcatel Space, ARABSAT-3A has 
20 Ku-band transponders for delivering DTH to the Middle East, plus much of Europe. It 
has been allocated with ARABSAT-2A at 26 degrees E, which means ARABSAT users can 
receive both analogue and digital broadcasts using a single antenna (Careless, 1999). 
ARABSAT-3A is confirmed as being full, save for three transponders (out of 20) which 
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have been deliberately held in reserve for the time being. Middle East pay platform, Orbit, 
will take six transponders, while rival platform Arab Radio & Television (AR7) has taken 
three (Interspace, 1999). 
Viability has also been pursued by new policies of privatisation and joint ventures. One 
may remember that before 1990 there was no interest in opening up the system for 
commercial use. For example, the request of the private company, Arab Space Television 
Incorporated, to rent six transponders for their commercial use, was ignored by Arab 
Ministers of Information. Now, ARABSAT has invested 10% in THURYA Satellite 
Telecommunications Company, which is planned to provide regional mobile personal 
communications, based on Geo-stationary Satellite System (ARABSAT Capital, 1998). 
Additionally, ARABSAT has bought a `large number' of shares in Qatar's 
telecommunications company, Q-Tel, the official Saudi news agency SPA, reported with no 
further information about the deal (ARABSAT Buys in Q-Tel, 1998). ARABSAT has also 
become the 60th shareholder of ICO (the global mobile communications company) by 
investing the small amount of $US3 million in March 1998. ICO plans to offer global 
mobile personal telephone services in the year 2000, enabling callers to connect to any 
destination in the world at any time. The ARABSAT Organisation has retained an option to 
increase its shares in the future. The decision to invest in ICO was approved by the 
ARABSAT Board of Directors. Saad A. al-Bidnah, the Director General of ARABSAT, 
expressed his satisfaction in partnership with ICO as "the era of global mobile personal 
communications by satellite begins" (ICO, 1998). Furthermore, recently in a new attempt 
towards privatisation of ARABSAT, the Board of Directors have decided to broaden its 
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shareholders and services. In November 1999, participants in the ARABSAT 92nd 
conference discussed the selling of part of the company to private investors (Xinhua News 
Agency, 1999). Besides, in order to cope with intensifying foreign competition, the 
company has been driven to introduce sophisticated technological upgrades. The 
introduction of INTERNET and digital broadcasting systems, is part of ARABSAT profit 
making policy (Arabia On Line, 1999). The financial stability of ARABSAT, to a large 
degree, is the by-product of the new commercialisation and privatisation policies. 
However, the compatibility of the new policies with ARABSAT's cultural and political 
aims is clearly under doubt. 
As noted earlier, a major motive behind the creation of ARABSAT was the preservation 
and promotion of Arab culture and identity. ARBASAT, to a large degree, was a response 
to the expansion of Western transnational media throughout the Arab world. We also 
discussed that with the advent of satellite technology, some media critics throughout the 
world, particularly in the developing world, calling for a new international information 
order, viewed the new technology as a real threat. Herbert Schiller, among others, in his 
early discussion highlighted the Western exploitation of satellite technology to exert their 
domination over the powerless countries, and at the same time the imminent danger of the 
elimination of the political and cultural sovereignty of these nations (Schiller, 1985). One 
of the possible ways of curbing the assumed `cultural assault' in the Middle East has been 
putting a ban on satellite dishes. As Barker (1999) stated: "satellite dishes have been 
declared illegal in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain and Iran" (Barker, 1999: 1). Yet, in 
pursuing their protection policies, the countries in the Arab/Islamic World did not follow a 
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similar path. A wide range of practices, including the expansion of terrestrial TV 
programmes and hours, putting a ban on satellite dishes, using alternative systems such as 
MMDS (Microwave Multi-Channel Distribution Systems), and finally launching their own 
national or regional satellite systems, took place across the Middle East. There has also 
been some overlapping in the adoption of the different methods of protection against alien 
satellites. The trend notably shows a great deal of investment on hardware technology 
rather than software. The following section aims to explain the development of ARABSAT 
in this context. 
ARABSAT: hardware and software 
A balance between the money spent on technical aspects, and that spent on planning and 
programming, is the key issue in the development of the Arab media. That is, to develop a 
logical and efficient relationship between hardware and software. Software, in its broad 
sense, "is the know-how to utilise the hardware such as programme production, content, 
manpower skills, and education" (Turkistani, 1988: 68). Underlining the content of 
programmes, and what is presented through the physical part of the media, he also 
suggested: "Even if the proper technology is available the key question is the content or 
information which the technology carries" (ibid., 73). Concerning the establishment of 
Arab transnational TV stations, Daoud Kuttab (1999), the Director of the Institute of 
Modern Media, Al-Quds (Jerusalem) University, said: "The hardware of getting the signal 
out in a professional way (has) become the goal, instead of the means, while the software 
as been) left to the existing diet of government news, cheap Arabic soap operas and the 
worst Hollywood programming" (Talaat, 1999). He also expressed concern that "the small 
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logo at the edge of the screen was, and still is, more important to those subsidising these 
stations than the programs seen on the screen (ibid. ). Alongside the investment on 
hardware, communicators in the Arab world need to carefully consider the "values to be 
promoted, understand the needs of their audience as the audience sees them, and must pay 
closer attention to the quality of their programming" (Kierstead and Kierstead, 1985: 226). 
For those who attach an exclusive importance to the channels of communications, or share 
McLuhan's idea and acknowledge that the medium is the message, the advent of 
ARABSAT might be simply described as the "climax of the information and 
communication revolution" (Abu-Argoub, 1988: 45). The creation of ARABSAT, like any 
other media outlet, however, is only the first step towards a long process of effort, thought 
and innovation. With the completion of the physical part of the system, the next and the 
most important issue is programming, production, and software. Out of five interconnected 
stages of planning, programme production, distribution, reception and lastly follow-up and 
feedback, only distribution and reception are mainly concerned with hardware (Abu- 
Argoub, 1988: 95). 
In 1977 the Arab countries established the Arab Committee on the Utilisation of 
ARABSAT (ACUA) with the principal aim of planning for software. The body, a 
subsidiary of Arab Satellite Broadcasting Union (ASBU), included members of the Arab 
League, the Arab Telecommunication Union (ATU), the Arab League Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organisation (ALESCO) , the 
Association of Arab Universities 
(AAU), the Arab Journalists Union (AJU), and the Arab Centre for Information studies 
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(ACIS). Later arrivals were two other Arab bodies: the Postal Union (APU) and the 
Council for Civic Aviation (ACCA). In practice, however, the Committee failed to 
continue its activities and collapsed shortly after its formation. This led to a big gap 
between hardware and software in the ARABSAT project. The failure was mainly due to 
lack of awareness about the importance of software. ARABSAT people believed 
"programmes present no problem, because they can be bought or produced very cheaply" 
(Abu-Argoub, 1988: 95). Considering the media as a means of modernisation, they focused 
almost exclusively on hardware, on the transfer of technology. They failed to understand 
that planning for software was more complicated, needed more time, preparation and co- 
ordination and costed more than hardware planning. "In a fully operating system the 
relation between hardware and software costs may be 1; 4" (ibid., 96). Abu-Argoub 
concludes that the cause of the problem was the lack of "a collective national will to 
mobilise creative talents for software planning" and not access to software production 
facilities in the Arab world. An obstacle in developing software programming, as advanced 
earlier, was, and still is, the problem of how to produce programmes that transcend political 
barriers or the geographical division of 22 Arab countries. Indeed, programmes involving 
politics cannot be sent out easily via ARABSAT (Abu Argoub, 1988: 95,96). In short, 
without a programming policy and plan, ARABSAT is a vehicle without direction. 
ARABSAT maintains no identity? 
As a pioneer in the field since the early 1960s, Douglas Boyd has written a lot on Arab 
media in the Middle East. His comments on my questions about ARABSAT (as he had 
preferred to give comments on my research questions instead of answering them) were clear 
229 
and straightforward. They were obviously aimed to clarify my particular questions about 
`the success/failure of ARABSAT in helping the Arab members states in resisting the influx 
of Western programmes' and `the likelihood of the system's playing a role as a vehicle for 
Islamic interests in the Middle East'? In his view, I seemed to be "confusing this 
organisation (ARABSAT) with one that actually makes or purchases programming to 
broadcast ". He explicitly asserted that "ARABSAT is only technology for rent,... a 
business, of sorts. They transmit for those who stand in line to do so. Thus, transponders 
are for rent to CNN, MBC, or any Arab television station... ARAB SAT is a vehicle for 
those who use its transponders. They are just a transmission facility for programmers, 
Islamic or not" (Boyd, 2000: Interview). 
This approach, with at least two implications, provoked me to rethink the system; this time 
in terms of identity. The first implication was about the nature of the media in general: 
whether the media including satellite technologies are value-free or maintain certain values 
and convey specific duties? The second concern brought about the question of whether 
ARABSAT, in particular, possesses any kind of identity: political, cultural, Arabic or 
Islamic? 
Debate about the nature of the new technologies including media is not the focus of this 
study. However, a brief review of the issue may provide more clarification. The 
technological innovations are viewed in very different ways. Some conceive of technology 
as `inanimate' depending absolutely upon people who utilise them. From this perspective, 
technology is value free. Therefore, there is no point in considering them bad or good, 
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successful or not. As mentioned earlier, some media critics hold that ARABSAT has not 
succeeded in providing better communications and exchanges within the Arab/Islamic 
world. I asked Boyd if he would agree with this. His approach, I would think, is fitting in 
the first category: "This has nothing to do with ARABSAT" he said, "It is those that use 
ARABSAT that have not been successful as you note " (Boyd, 2000: Interview). 
In this view, these are people who give colour to colourless inanimate things; their own 
colour of character, culture and identity. As the US gun lobby's slogan holds: "Guns do 
not kill, people do. " In contrast, there are some who attribute particular elemental duties to 
certain technologies, for instance designing computers. for more efficient data processing as 
an aid to business (Negrine, 1997: 57,58). 
Talking about ARABSAT, what I had in my mind, of course, was ARABSAT 
entrepreneurs and policy-makers; those who established the system in 1985 and now are 
running the system. Otherwise, ARABSAT, like any other satellite system such as 
INTELSAT, EUTELSAT, INSAT and so on, is nothing but simply a vehicle for 
transmission. I am, however, in doubt as to whether Boyd had missed this simple fact. For 
him, if I am understanding his opinion rightly, ARABSAT maintains no identity, at least 
cultural or political. 
Yet, whatever the situation might be, my concern is still valid. If ARABSAT "is only a 
technology for rent ", "just a transmission facility for others " how can one differentiate 
between ARABSAT and, for example, INTELSAT or EUTELSAT? And, if there is no 
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difference, what has been the rationale behind the creation of ARABSAT by the Arab 
countries? One probable, most logical, answer is the commercial and economic reasons; 
that is, ARABSAT was established to serve the Arab nations financially and economically. 
But, as we discussed earlier (chapter VI and the present chapter), the supporting documents 
including official statements released by ARABSAT authorities as well as academic 
analysis about the system state otherwise. In fact, there were no strong economic and 
financial indications behind the establishment of ARABSAT. Boyd (1993) himself 
suggested that the basic idea behind ARABSAT was Arab world satellite self-sufficiency 
while ARABSAT user charges were higher than those of INTELSAT. Since 1987 he 
viewed ARABSAT as a communication force in the Middle East, not as a means of 
connecting the electronic media but to connect Arab world broadcasters (Boyd, 1993: 9). 
The Arab broadcasters, however, were seeking for an Arab owned, controlled and operated 
international satellite broadcasting system to provide information, data, and entertainment 
services from the perspective of Arabic culture and society (Warwick, 1993: 8). Likewise, 
the Arab nations wanted to connect through their own space satellite system to exchange 
their cultural and educational television programmes (Martinez 1985, Abu-Argoub 1988, 
Turkistani 1988, Al-Saadon 1990, Hudson 1990, Boyd 1993, Amin 1996 ). It is also 
important to note that these Arab broadcasters, mainly Arab governments or those closely 
related to them, are ARABSAT shareholders and policy makers at the same time. Thus, it 
seems reasonable to claim that ARABSAT was established to be different from, for 
example, INTELSAT or EUTELSAT. The creation of ARABSAT was intended to provide 
an independent voice in the global media arena and a source of prestige, unity and identity. 
I believe that these have been the main motives behind the creation of ARABSAT in 1985, 
232 
though, one may correctly argue for a dramatic change in ARABSAT policies and direction 
since the early 1990s. The shift, however, strongly affected the system as a medium of 
exchange programming within the Arab territories, and also as a means of protecting the 
Arab nations against Western dominant satellites. Consequently, ARABSAT, despite the 
intention of its founders, has played a Trojan horse role for the West in the Arab territories. 
ARABSAT: A Protective Shield? 
ARABSAT, initially perceived as a protective shield against the threat of Western cultural 
invasion, may now it is argued, with the expansion of global satellite TV, play a reversed 
role. With the establishment of ARABSAT in 1985 the Arab/Islamic World was exposed 
to the powerful flow of information from the West. Thanks to satellite dishes then easily 
available, people might access various unauthorised channels incidentally or intentionally. 
The system ironically placed the Middle Eastern countries in the gateway of access to the 
information highway (Warwick 1993: 9, Mohammadi 1998 : 6,7). 
As to whether ARABSAT has been successful in resisting the domination of global media 
in the region, referring to the close relationship between the Arab statesmen and the West, 
Mowlana (2000) holds that "some attempts have been made in that direction" but he 
clearly doubts if "they have succeeded": 
They can not provide resistance to an influx of Western programmes as long as they are 
economically, politically, and culturally so closely tied to the West" (Mowlana, 2000: 
Interview). 
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In response to the question of "Whether ARABSAT has been successful in resisting the 
influx of Western programmes ", Forrester (2000) said: 
No, it has totally failed. The number of large-diameter antennas, and frequent local press 
reports of freely available 'pornography" - plus, of course, the dozens of other high-quality 
`Western' channels that are legitimately carried by ARABSAT, NILESAT as well as 
platforms like TURKSAT and EUTELSAT, show this (Forrester, 2000: interview). 
Forrester (2000) takes the example of Orbit where he argues: 
There is also the perfectly valid question of the `Western' channels now carried by Orbit on 
ARABSAT that contain Hollywood first-run movies in complete form, that is uncut other 
than for the most extreme sexually explicit scenes. They are no different in content to the 
Showtime head-to-head with other platforms and is quite prepared to show MTV-type 
material as well as sexually explicit material without complaint (Forrester, 2000: Interview). 
Most of the TV channels run on ARABSAT such as MBC, Orbit, ART, ANN, Future 
Vision, Dubai and LBC do not reflect a genuine Arabic or Islamic culture and identity. In 
fact, the majority of what one can find on satellites in the Middle East, ARABSAT 
included, as Progler (1997) argues, are "morally questionable diversion, and cyber- 
consumption of the mainstream corporate American and European media" (Progler, 1997). 
ART and LBC, featuring fashion shows, with Western models and Arabic voice overs, along 
with live music shows and MTV style music videos are "promoting an American way of life 
with an Arabic cultural gloss "(ibid). Other ARABSAT users such as ANN, Saudi Arabia, 
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Qatar, Iraq, Oman, Jordan and Dubai, using Arabic language and airing Islamic 
programmes, are also strongly influenced by Western patterns of ads and programming. 
The Arab/Islamic sentiments have had political and economic consequences. Dissemination 
of indecent materials, pornography included, is legally prohibited on ARABSAT. In 1997, 
France Telecom's technical fault in broadcasting some `soft core' led to the cutting of the 
station from the ARABSAT line-up. The French state-owned satellite TV Company took 
legal action against France Telecom for the broadcast of a pornographic film across the 
ARABSAT satellite in July 1997. At the time, instead of viewing a sports and culture 
programme, viewers on the ARABSAT were treated to around 20 minutes of 'Private Club 
in Portugal'. The incident resulted in a flurry of apologies from CFI to the Arab world, as 
well as the French government. ARABSAT subsequently banned CFI from transmitting to 
the Middle East for violating the strict Islamic views of decency (Dennis, 1998). The 
French company became recipient of a whopping US$3.9 million fine. "Although the 
award was quite hefty", according to Newsbytes, "things could have been worse for France 
Telecom, as CFI was seeking damages of up to US$20 million for the loss of its contract for 
ARABSAT" (Gold, 1998). In the same context, though not directly related to ARABSAT, 
Forrester (1996) reported the BBC broadcasting of a Panorama programme on 4 April 1996, 
which was critical of the Saudi regime with secretly-shot footage of a double execution. 
The programme, `Death of a Princess', was regarded as "a sneering and racist attack on 
Islamic law and culture" by Orbit, a subsidiary of the Saudi-owned Marawid Group. 
Dissatisfied with the programme, the Orbit President and CEO accused the British 
company of being insensitive to the Islamic issues. The breakdown in relations between 
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Orbit and BBC, and the ending of a ten-year contract directly affected around 250 
journalists and support staff in London, not to mention difficulties that extended right up to 
the highest levels of government (Forrester, 1996: 16). These are clearly some attempts to 
regulate the content of the media in the Arab world. 
One must bear in mind that these problems are not exclusively concerned with the influence 
of foreign satellites in the region, or technical or financial limitations of ARABSAT. 
Rather it is primarily concerned with the lack of competence among the policy-makers to 
clarify their cultural objectives, identify their priorities, rely on their own identity and stick 
to their Arab/Islamic principles, distinguished from Western satellites. 
As noted in chapter V, the conventional motivation behind the Western media, mass media 
in particular, is sales value which is governed by the market mechanism. In identification 
of their media-cultural principles, in contrast, Muslims put emphasis on moral and religious 
values which is based on their Islamic and Quranic teaching. Many Muslim media, 
however, Siddiqi (1998) affirms, have not been able to demonstrate that what they practice 
is inherently different from the secular media. Indeed, in some cases there is no distinction 
at all (Siddiqi, 1998: 1). This paradoxical pattern of Arab media expansion and 
programming was exemplified earlier in a joint venture between billionaire pop star 
Michael Jackson and the wealthy Saudi investor, Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Bin Abdulaziz. 
In the Arab world, with few exceptions, this similar pattern of media practice has been 
prevailing everywhere. The absence of any comprehensive policy drawn up by the Arab 
media organisations is a contributing cause of the problem. 
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Despite many meetings held by the Arab League, the Arab Telecommunications Union 
(ATU), the Association of Arab Universities, and a number of other regional organisations, 
as of 1988, Mowlana expressed concern over the ARABSAT cultural policy. The success 
of ARABSAT in fulfilling its cultural and programming targets, in his view, "depends 
greatly on whether authorities draw up comprehensive communications and cultural 
policies through which television via satellite may disseminate programmes of cultural, 
educational, and developmental interests" (Mowlana, 1990: 102). At the time, he suggested 
that "steps towards commercialisation of the system were underway" (ibid., 102). Now 
after a decade, I was wondering if there has been any change in this process. His new 
assessment of ARABSAT indicated no significant change: 
ARABSAT promised a good deal but delivered less. I think that the ARABSAT was very 
much influenced by the commercial considerations of international media as well as the 
disunity within the Arab world (Mowlana, 2000: Interview). 
One implication of the above statement is the direct relation of the ARABSAT 
commercialisation and, of course, the disunity of the Arab world, with the partial failure of 
the system in meeting its cultural objectives. This corresponds with my previous arguments 
concerning the contradictory performance of ARABSAT in the two areas of economy and 
culture. 
The future of ARABSAT 
These cultural, political and economic problems have faced ARABSAT with an ambiguous 
prospect. What is, therefore, the future of ARABSAT in terms of programming and 
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economic viability? Responding to the first question, Forrester (2000) compared the Arab 
spacecraft with the European EUTELSAT and ASTRA: 
Its programming future seems secure in the short to medium term, but it has been slow to 
launch new craft. As a comparison EUTELSAT, only slightly older as an organisation, now 
has 17 craft in multiple orbits, three more on the production line and a new Hot Bird (no. 7) 
on order. EUTELSA T is now a major global player, as is ASTRA its European competitor. 
Meanwhile ARABSA T is very much a local beast (Forrester, 2000: Interview). 
From this standpoint, he holds that the "financial outlook" of ARABSAT is 
"bleak". 
Satellites regardless of their final clients cost more or less the same in 
dollars, thus, he 
argues: 
Unless an organisation can grow organically by generating sufficient net profit to replace its 
totalfleet every ten years then it is being subsidised. ' There is nothing wrong with subsidy, of 
course, but it means that the organisation is economically non-viable in a wholly 
commercial environment (ibid. ). 
Emphasising the idea that "ARABSA T is not a programmer, but a service " Boyd expressed 
no opinion "about the future re programming". In response to the second question, 
however, Boyd (2000) believes that "unless ARABSAT builds more modern and powerful 
digital satellites, INTELSAT, PANAMSAT, and especially NILESAT will - and are - 
taking over" (Boyd, 2000, Interview). He also believes that in the future a few states in the 
Arab world will establish their own satellite systems. "They will use ARABSAT and 
NILESAT because it is cheaper and satellite technology has a short shelf life. ARABSAT 
2A is, for example, out of date " (ibid. ). 
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Responding to the same questions, Mowlana (2000) tends to establish a firm connection 
between the cultural, political and economic aspects of ARABSAT within a global political 
context. His great optimism about ARABSAT potentiality fades where he considers the 
non-Arab prevailing media policies in the region, as well as the Arabs' incompetence in the 
articulation of a coherent model of satellite broadcasting. He suggests: 
The ARABSA T has a great deal of potential for providing sound programming as well as 
having economic viability. However, this can be done only if the ARABSAT is modelled on 
an independent basis of operation aside from the prevailing ones in the region as well as the 
world. There lies the problem; the inability to articulate a coherent and well-tailored model 
of satellite broadcasting (Mowlana, 2000: Interview). 
Launching national satellites, Mowlana believes, is not a major undertaking economically, 
but also involves a good deal of technological know-how. Only co-operation and 
understanding between the countries in the region to minimise the cost and maximise the 
outcome will be sound policy (Mowlana, 2000: Interview). 
Conclusion 
ARABSAT emerged as a breakthrough in the Arab world with important implications for 
changing Arabs' attitudes towards new technologies, setting up a framework for their 
collective co-operation, and acting as a source of pride, unity and prestige for people of the 
region. ARABSAT, however, is an only `partially-realised dream'. The success of Arabs in 
accessing satellite technology, in fact establishing their own spacecraft, has not been 
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accomplished by an appropriate and efficient use of the system. The Arab media 
collaboration through ARABSAT has been suffering from the political and economic 
disparities among the Arabs. The Arab media have been mainly used for limited political 
ends, and ARABSAT has hardly made a considerable contribution in changing this pattern 
of media programming. Striking a balance between the economic, political and cultural 
objectives of ARABSAT has been another problem facing ARABSAT policy-makers. At 
the time of the establishment of ARABSAT, there was no concern over economic, financial 
and commercial policies, or even such motives behind the initiative. Ironically, in its recent 
proposed plans/policies, there is an absolute absence of concern about culture and politics. 
Since the early 1990s, ARABSAT has shifted from its previously emphasised cultural and 
political concerns, to new economic and commercial ones. The role and influence of global 
forces of liberalisation and deregulation, and of transnational satellite channels and 
commercial networks in this change of policy and direction, is undeniable. The 
development of ARABSAT represents the development of Arab media clearly. Yet, these 
small pieces of the ARABSAT picture have to be placed into a larger jigsaw of the future. 
The next chapter will address the future of the Arab media, and speculate on its most 
important areas of investment, development and policy. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
TRANSCENDING THE CONTRADICTIONS 
PROSPECTS AND PROPOSALS 
Predicting the future 
An Arab writer in the late 1980s, speculating on the `Shape of Inter-Arab Politics in 1995', 
said: "The fate of those who try to predict the future is usually an unenviable one. if not 
treated as madmen or fools, they are ignored when wrong and resented when their 
predictions prove correct. It is hard to decide which of these fates is preferable" (Khalidi, 
1988: 55). If there is no choice but to do the task, as in my own case, you must probably be 
prepared for both reactions. The ever-changing condition of the media in the world, and the 
pace and scope of these changes, make any speculation on the future of the media 
problematic. The problem becomes multiple when one decides to speculate on the media in 
the unstable management systems and unpredictable policies of the Arab world. The future 
of the Arab media, though not necessarily similar to its past or even its present situation, 
will include some elements from both. Prediction of the future of the Arab media, therefore, 
requires taking into consideration what has happened in the past, and being aware of what is 
going on at the present. 
The essence of my arguments so far has been the political, economic and cultural 
implications of media-cultural protection in the Arab world. That is, the Arab states, media 
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investors and policy makers, explicitly or implicitly, in confronting the presence and 
expansion of powerful global media, have sought to announce their own presence, restore 
their identity and preserve and promote their national, cultural and religious values. The 
development of the media in the Arab world has been suffering more than anything else 
from ambiguity and confusion in terms of policy. This unfortunate situation has facilitated a 
vacuum through which the Western countries and companies have become actively 
involved in the development of media policy and infrastructure during the last three 
decades in the Arab world. 
In analysing the Arab media in the preceding chapters, using a political economy approach, 
I have underlined the Arab-West relationship. A strong conviction of cultural imperialism 
has clearly dominated my whole study. Some may suggest that cultural imperialism is an 
outdated paradigm remaining from an expired colonial era which no longer exists except in 
library books and archives. They may also optimistically argue that Arab countries' 
increasing access to modern media, and their being relatively able to present themselves 
through satellite TV, has discredited the `cultural imperialism' argument. This assessment 
is too simplistic. I doubt that the era of cultural imperialism is over, ' and that the Arabs' 
access to the modem media has guaranteed their cultural autonomy. The old forms of 
control and domination have been effectively replaced by more complex and more 
'A quite considerable number of well-known researchers, whose works have been cited in this research, such 
as Smythe, Schiller, and Matterlart have made essential connection between cultural domination through the 
mass media and mass culture and the other forms of imperialism. In response to this tradition, however, since 
the 1980s, a group of media researchers began to contest the bases of cultural imperialism arguments; 
dominant ideology and the political economy of the media. For further discussion on the issue, I refer the 
interested reader to Herbert Schiller's ' Not yet post-imperialism era' in Roach Collins' Communication and 
Culture in war and Peace (1993). 
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sophisticated ways of media-cultural manipulation. This assessment has to be shaped by an 
understanding of `soft power' and the collusion of Arab media in its permeation by Western 
genres and values. 
With the ever-increasing global expansion of multi-billion and multi-national media- 
cultural businesses, the Arab nations, and the Arab media, are still, insecure and vulnerable 
in preserving and promoting their own culture and values. The ongoing hegemonic 
implications of new global media expansion in both areas of hardware (product) and 
software (programme), need to be carefully examined and monitored. 
Arab World: A growing market for the media 
The Arab countries compared with some other developing areas such as Brazil and India 
have been late entries in the modem media arena. The volume and pace of media 
investment and development, rising in the closing decades of the last century, have however 
been remarkable, with convincing evidence of more acceleration 
in the 21st century. 
Nowadays, Western media firms are actively planning further expansion in the Arab world, 
particularly in the field of telecommunications. 
`Egyptian mobile market prepares for the future' (by awarding a contract to Nokia); 
`Motorola GSM contract in Morocco'; `Competition planned for Lebanon' (with new 
equipment installed by Ericsson); Alcatel provides switching exchange lines for Amman; 
`Siemens has launched the SL45 mobile phone in the region'; `Marconi has been chosen to 
install a flagship asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) in Tunisia'; `Foundry Networks, 
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high- performance, end-to-end switching and routing solutions company, opens its regional 
headquarters in Dubai Internet City'. These examples have been randomly taken from one 
page (3) of `Middle East Communications', March 2001, volume 16. MEC, a specialised 
monthly journal for media in the Middle East and the Arab world based in Surrey in the UK 
and its two sister publications, `Middle East Broadcast and Satellite' and `Satellite Today', 
are good illustrations of the latest moves and developments in the Middle East media 
market. 
The Arab media in other areas of broadcasting, computing and publishing are also 
exploding in terms of number and capacity. There is nothing to prevent us in predicting the 
future of the Arab media as a growing one. The market appeal of modern media as well as 
the Arabs' increasing demand to establish their own media infrastructures, and their quest 
for accessing updated and on-line information, entertainment and news, will push the Arab 
media forward. The oil-rich Arab countries will further develop their state-of-the-art media 
technology, while the poorer countries in the region will also devise their own financial 
arrangements to address their media needs. The very considerable economic disparities 
revealed amongst the Arab states must necessarily confront them with quite different, and 
even conflicting, options as they each seek to balance internal state political agendas with 
the economic logic of negotiating the realities of media competition. 
The future of Arab media: some suggestions 
At this point, I have come to have a clear picture of my own perspective. The above 
speculation may raise questions and concerns. What is the future of the Arab media? How 
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successful will be the Arab media policy makers, public or private, in developing their own 
media policies and strategies? How different will be the structure and content of the Arab 
media in the future from the existing ones? How independent will be the Arab media from 
the Western media styles and values? What are the main priorities for investment, for 
example launching new satellites or enhancing the capacity and power of the excising 
satellite systems? And, more importantly, how aware are the Arabs of these issues; how 
determined are they to change the course and pattern of their media development; and 
finally how prepared are they for these challenges? Any attempt to address these questions 
must to some extent be a reflection of the values and aspiration of the commentator. In this 
case these are: 
-A capacity to respect, sustain and promote the Arab/Islamic culture, values and identity, 
-A capacity to facilitate and enhance the Arabs' level of internal co-operation, social and 
economic standards of living, and political freedom and participation, 
-A capacity to sustain and promote the Arabs' reciprocal contacts and co-operation with 
other nations outside the region, while maintaining their cultural autonomy from the West. 
Arab media strategists must develop their own initiatives so that the realisation of the above 
outcomes can be guaranteed. In order to facilitate these outcomes, my political economy 
approach underlines the importance of an autonomous Arab/Muslim media infrastructure. 
This is in fact a key aspect of my arguments, that the core and content of media 
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programming are determined by the political and economic implications of media 
technology. This approach provides a powerful linkage between `technology' and 
`ideology', between `hardware' and `software'. 
A need for a balanced media policy 
The Arab media policy-makers, public or private, need to draw up their own media 
strategies corresponding with their particular environment, their real demands and their own 
culture and values. The priority, as noted earlier, is a balance between products and 
programmes, the money spent on the technical part of the technology (hardware) and that 
spent on intellectual part (software). `Software' in its broad sense, is the ability to master 
the hardware in the different stages of media research, . planning, programming, 
training and 
so on. As we have seen, the pace and volume of investment on hardware technology, in 
most Middle Eastern and Arab countries, as in many parts of the Third World, has been far 
ahead of their investment on `software'. Moreover, and confusingly, the purchase of 
modern media technology and access to hardware has often been perceived by these nations 
as the entire process of media development. The Arab policy makers must not miss out this 
simple fact, that access to the physical part of the technology is only the first step in the 
long process of development; and that the development of the media will not be 
accomplished without advancing the knowledge and ability to use the hardware. 
A key factor in the development of software technology is the issue of technology transfer. 
The best criterion for assessing the degree of success in the Arab world in establishing their 
autonomous media infrastructure, is perhaps, their degree of success in receiving technical 
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knowledge rather than purchasing the technology itself. An important question here, which 
can be the subject of an independent inquiry, is how successful have the Arab countries 
been in this respect? As an example, Motorola has long been involved in Kuwait's GSM 
infrastructure, perhaps since early 1990. After nearly 10 years use of Microcellular GSM, 
can the Kuwaiti's Mobile Telecommunications Companies (MTC) stand technically 
independent from its American contractor, Motorola? To what extent can Kuwaiti MTC or 
Jordan's state-owned TCC (another Motorola's partner), rely on their young technicians 
and engineers to follow up their projects in case of any unexpected breakdown in their 
relationship with the US firm? (Microcellular GSM for Kuwait's MTC, MEC, July 1997: 
5). I myself have no clear response to the question, yet I believe that continuing Western 
technical control can lead to continuing economic and political pressure on the Arab 
nations. As an example, though perhaps in a different context, one may remember that the 
Arab states in the early stages of the creation of ARABSAT were pressured to modify their 
policy of sanctions against companies that dealt with Israel. The American Congress also 
opposed the Ford Company's participating in a project that included some countries that 
were considered unfriendly toward the United States (Al-Saadon, 1990). The Arab nations, 
will not, therefore, be independent from the West and Western companies unless they prove 
their technical competence in both areas of hardware and software. In this respect, the 
transfer of technology must be placed at the top of their media technology agenda. 
The Arab nations, in establishing their media infrastructures must also consider their real 
and urgent needs. It is important to note that modernisation has not much helped them to 
change their attitudes towards outdated methods of media management, old-fashioned rules, 
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procedures and structures. Instead, as a symbol of status and prestige, modernisation has 
meant mainly renewal and replacement of old equipment, machinery and the extensive 
purchasing of state-of-the-art technology. To give an example, following Saudi Globalstar's 
launch in September 2000, there has been much self-congratulation that Saudi Arabian 
mobile facilities now cover 100 per cent of the Kingdom. One may, however, ask which 
particular need the expansion of mobile phone networks in Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich 
countries has answered? This trend of investment' on, one may say, luxury things, 
unfortunately prevails all across the region, particularly in oil producing countries. They do 
not seem to understand that the natural and financial resources in the Middle East are 
limited in the longer term. In short, in establishing their new media infrastructures and in 
concluding agreements, the Arab nations must be aware of the ideological aspects of the 
technology. To be successful in developing their own media programming, and 
guaranteeing the autonomy of Arab/Muslim culture and values, the Arab media policy- 
makers need to develop an efficient relationship between their available resources and the 
real demands of their Arab audiences. 
But it is not always easy to define what these `real demands' are. A major difficulty arises 
from the tension between a Western definition of media genre which has shaped the media 
expectations of Arab audiences, and Arab production values. Another problem is the 
diversity in their own understanding and definition of Arab/Islamic principles and values. 
An even more important problem is, reconciliation between sometimes contradictory Arab 
and Islamic values and criteria, and agreeing upon 'common areas, in order to forge a 
practical code of media conduct. If the Arabs differentiate between, for example, their 
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Islamic media values and those of Western secularism, they need to clarify the principles 
and bases of these differences. Secular media, it is argued, are based upon, and promote, a 
commercial ideology and market values. Any media outlet which claims to challenge this 
pattern must determine its own principles and practices. In the Middle East, the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, for example, has been rather successful in developing its own version of 
Islamic art and audio-visual programmes whether in cinema, television series, music and 
theatres, since the 1980s. The Egyptian television and cinema has also been a major source 
of aspiration and promotion of the Arab culture and identity for a long time. These isolated 
media attempts must be generalised and disseminated throughout the region. The Arabs' 
degree of success in these areas, will undoubtedly determine the position and credibility of 
Arab media in the 21st century. 
However, the task of generating Arab world marketing in programming is fraught with 
difficulties; the bases of which have been rehearsed earlier. Whilst the Arab states may 
substantially share a common core culture, history, language and religion, they also have 
many fractures in this unity. A common history also includes the basis for specific 
resentments. For a European comparison, Germany and the UK are both prominent 
members of the EU and have many things in common culturally, yet because of recent 
history there is a certain rivalry and even resentment between them. In the Arab world this 
also applies to, for example, Saudi Arabia and Yemen because of border conflicts. 
Also, highly urbanised audiences in different countries may have more in common, than 
they do with rural dwellers in their own country. And whilst it is conceivable that 
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audiences may share a common Islamic sentiment, they may have little affinity with dramas 
set in countries seen as economically far removed from their national experience. As the 
European Broadcasting Union (EBU) has found, imagined culturally spaces are very 
definitely fragmented by national differences, and consequently transitional programme 
production cannot be expected to be easily developed and sustained. 
Privatisation 
The immediate consequences of globalisation, namely liberalisation, deregulation, 
commercialisation and privatisation of the media, have swept through the world since the 
early 1980s. Removing regulatory responsibility from the PTTS, privatisation of the 
telecommunication sector in the Arab world has been proceeding since early 1990. While 
still the lowest level in the world, 24 percent of the Arab states have now established new 
bodies regulating privatisation- an important step forward (Hartshorn, MEC, February 
2001: 8). It appears that the trend will be pushed forward by both regional and global 
imperatives. Given the wide diversity in the Arab countries one cannot suggest a single 
privatisation policy for the whole region. Different countries in the region have different 
attractiveness to investors and also have different aims for privatisation. These include 
securing their financial resources, sharing a strategic partner, or adopting technology inflow 
to improve their services. For example, Egypt seeks for a powerful partnership with 
financial support; Bahrain does not need any of this. BATELCO (Bahrain 
Telecommunication Company) and the overall telecommunication market in the Persian 
Gulf are well ahead of all European countries in terms of cable and wireless penetration 
rates; they have a sophisticated package and value added services. 
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The Saudi Telecommunication Company (STC) is just another example. STC aims to move 
into some sort of partnership with a foreign investor in order to import technologies for a 
number of services. The key issue here is that the government and some influential groups 
will effectively lose control; some have financial shares in emerging telecommunications 
players and a strong partner coming into a privatised PTO could effectively spoil their 
investments. This always makes the privatisation debate very complex. In the coming 
years, it is more likely that a public-private partnership model in the Middle East will 
emerge to ensure market development, while retaining control over the operator (El- 
Lakkani, MEC, December 2000: 9). A relative advantage for the Arab world is that if 
privatisation programmes are implemented, significant investment for telecommunications 
development can be raised largely from sources of capital within the region. This has 
already been proved by privatisation programmes in the GCC countries of UAE, Bahrain, 
and Kuwait as well as the Palestine self-rule Authority. The success/failure of countries 
which have liberalised first, such as Jordan, Morocco and Egypt will define the direction of 
the other governments in abandoning control over telecommunications operations. 
Terrestrial broadcasting systems in almost all countries in the Middle East are a state 
monopoly and are financed through licence fees or government subsidies. In contrast, all 
major transnational Arabic newspapers and most of the main satellite stations are privately 
owned. These international media enterprises, unlike the terrestrial systems, are growing in 
a competitive environment and are generally driven by the pursuit of commercial profit. 
Concentrating on the return of their investments, the private owners of these enterprises are 
not deeply concerned about politics and culture, Arabic or Islamic. Even those who are 
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closely associated with the religiously conservative countries in the region such as Saudi 
Arabia, have selected the policy of adaptation to the global media conditions. Influenced by 
the strength of global media and inclined to Western methods of programming, these Arab- 
origin media have effectively abandoned even the rhetoric of preserving Arab/Islamic 
identity. There has been a great deal of criticism of these transnational media on the 
grounds that they are dominated by Western programmes and values, with no serious 
commitment to their homelands' culture. As noted earlier, in chapter V, there is doubt that 
the Arab transnational televisions such as MBC, Orbit, LBC, ANN and ART have been 
inherently different from their Western counterparts operating in the Middle East. The main 
concern for these private media enterprises in the short term is economic viability, while in 
the long-term they will attempt to be commercially profitable. Along with other powerful 
global media networks, these Arab transnational media enterprises are exposing their 
people in the Arab world to Western culture and values. Consequently my aspiration for the 
character of the Arab media environment, sketched above, are challenged at the outset by 
the potential implications of the commercial priorities of current developments in media 
ownership. 
The Islamic wave and the media 
In the study of Arab transnational media one can clearly find signs of the emergence of a 
form of media pluralisation in which the Western and secularly-oriented media are 
expanding very fast. However, this trend is not as assertive and controversial as the Islamic 
trend. The Islamic wave encompasses a wide range of media forms and practices, from 
fax machines to satellite systems, from radical guerrilla groups in Lebanon to most 
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conservative regimes in the Persian Gulf. Though sometimes initiated and backed by 
powerful Arab economies such as Saudi Arabia, as in the case of IQRA, these new Islamic 
media practices are not usually financially rich. This powerful Islamic wave has however 
affected the Arab media since 1980, and at the same time has benefited from the 
technological speed and strength of Western media development in the area. The main 
feature of the new phenomenon, and what actually makes it distinctive from the other 
media trends in the world, is its anti-secular and, perhaps incompatible, character in relation 
to the prevailing unitary global media system. The new wave, in its purest sense, denies 
being Western (Gharbi), Eastern (Shargi), European, American or even Arabian. Within 
the context of the Arab world, while nobody disputes the existence of the phenomenon, 
some have regarded the wave as a mere renewal of `Arabism' which intends to be `Islamic 
leaning rather than secular' (Alterman, 1998). 
The long-term impact of the new Islamic media wave may be analysed in the general 
context of the rising global Islamic movements. Since the victory of the Islamic revolution 
in Iran 1978-79, the Muslim media have developed a new 'global awareness' and new 
forms of `Islamic self-consciousness' (Mowlana, 1990: 100). The revolution in 
communication and information helped Iran to export its revolutionary message to other 
places. The Arab Islamic movements and groups such as Palestinian Intifada and Hizbollah 
in Lebanon, which are resisting Israeli attacks and its expansionist policy, owe much to 
transnational media which have been partly established by Muslims themselves. The 
creation of new collective media frameworks such as an Islamic satellite television network 
has been an important item on the Muslim media agenda. The realisation of these plans 
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already facilitates a proper dialogue among Muslim nations. It also poses an increasing 
challenge for the Western and particularly US interests in the Islamic world and Arab 
territories. 
As Eickelman and Anderson (1999) have pointed out, the complex diversity of means of 
communication available through contemporary media technologies "open channels to an 
expanding public sphere" (Eickelman and Anderson, 1999: 4). The great diversity of 
identities, interests and demographic characteristics to be found within the Arab world, can 
to a degree be creatively given voice through the wide range of current technologies. From 
fax to email, and from local radio to transnational satellite footprints, it is apparent that 
there is a creative energy working within the current `Islamic wave' to exploit the 
possibilities of defining and serving new media audiences. In the assertive summary of 
Eickelman and Anderson (1999), "the new technologies of communication facilitate 
distinctively modern senses of religious and political identity that, rooted in specific local 
contexts, are also systematised on a translocal 
horizon opened by new forms of 
communication" (Eickelman and Anderson, 1999: 10). 
The paradox of control 
The phenomenal expansion of trans-border media e. g. satellite and Internet, while lessening 
the extent of national control and, to a large degree, governmental censorship, has created 
and strengthened the problem of `external' control. The globalisation of media, while 
limiting the power of national control and dictatorship, extends the realm of a new global 
totalitarianism in which the less powerful nations are at present defenceless. Ironically, 
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people's increasing demand for political participation, along with the progress in 
technological innovations, will further help the continuation of this trend in the future. 
Scholars and other thoughtful people in the Arab/Islamic world are seeking to find a 
solution for the dilemma. 
From the Muslims' viewpoint, there is no straightforward answer to this problem. They are 
currently striving to lay the foundations of their civil societies as they understand it. A 
number of powerful movements are underway, questing for a new kind of democracy, 
political tolerance, freedom of speech and press, of political parties and labour, student and 
journalistic syndicates. Some of these movements are consistent with my aspiration for a 
culturally sensitive media facilitated communication environment. A media environment 
that is responsive to change, while remaining reflective of Islamic history and values. 
Outside the Arab world, the Islamic Republic of Iran, effectively using the media, is 
heralding a nation-wide movement to establish its own `Islamic civil society'. From a less 
religiously committed viewpoint, the Qatari international television channel, al-Jazeera, is 
heading towards a very new (to the Middle East) way of media presentation and dialogue. 
Al-Jazeera, a relative newcomer to the regional scene (November 1996) aims to provoke 
thought in presenting issues that matter to Arab viewers such as religion and politics, 
relations with Israel, regional unity, and others. As noted earlier, Faisal al-Qasim, the host 
of the controversial programme, `al-Ittijah al-Mu'akas' (The Opposite Direction), in an 
interview with an Arabic magazine in 1998, claimed that he has had much more freedom 
of expression on the Jazeera channel compared with his freedom on the BBC during his 8 
years co-operation with the British media company (1988-1996) (Alterman, 1998). These 
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movements, the former religious and the latter secular, are both facing severe opposition. A 
major part of these protests is voiced by those who sincerely believe that even these 
movements, if they are not inherently Western or initiated from the West, will end with the 
hegemony of the Western culture, values and politics. As can be seen, the concern over 
Western political and cultural dominance, not less than domestic totalitarianism, will 
continue to be the most critical issue in political and media-cultural debates and forums in 
the region for the first half of the 21st century. If Arab Muslims can wisely utilise their 
financial and cultural-religious resources as well as the Western technological 
achievements, they can be hopeful of an ultimate, though not an easy, success in both areas 
of challenge in the foreseeable future. 
Policy recommendations 
The Arab world is passing through a very critical stage which requires the Arab countries to 
take joint media actions. They have already established their own media frameworks and 
institutions such as ATU, ASBU, ASCO and ARABSAT. What they need now is a new 
vision, a new thinking and a new working mechanism to use these organisations more 
effectively in developing their media policy in the 21st century. 
Arab media scholars, administrators, policy makers and investors should take part in 
scientific seminars about the future of the Arab media. Special media summits should be 
held to discuss the political, economic and cultural aspects of the Arab media. These Arab 
media summits could assess the present situation of Arab media and discuss ways of 
enhancing the strength of the Arab media in the future. Arabs need to consider ways of 
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representing a more realistic picture of their culture, history and civilisation through the 
media to their global audiences. Such an effort is necessary in view of biased regional and 
international media networks in existence. Given everything that has been argued above, it 
cannot be assumed that this process would be either comfortable or easily successful. But it 
is an option that should be traced. 
The Arab countries should also conduct constructive dialogue with other non-Arab nations 
in the region and with European countries to enhance their cultural and media exchange and 
co-operation. This exchange will not be safely conducted unless the Arab media can 
technically and culturally compete with their European counterparts. In this media-cultural 
communication, the Arabs' existing weaknesses in technical aspects of the media, can be 
relatively compensated for by the richness of their culture, art and literature if, and only if, 
they actively invest in these unlimited resources. 
Arab media and occupied Palestine 
An important area which must be highlighted is the significance of adopting a united stance 
against the Israeli dangers threatening the Arab nation. An urgent need is to improve the 
role of the Arab media to counter the biased perspective and misinformation on the critical 
situation in Palestine. Arab broadcasters and journalists must provide their people with the 
facts and accurate information about the confrontations in the occupied territories. The 
distorted face of the Islamic militant groups represented as terrorist and murders must be 
restored. They also must show the world how oppressed and defenceless the Palestinian and 
Lebanese women and children are in the hands of Israel. 
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Arabs are living in the midst of challenging situations, which need to promote Arab co- 
ordination and a unified strategy to counter the regional and global problems. A major 
obstacle hindering the Arab world's media collaboration, as we have seen, is the political 
and economic disparity in the region. First of all, serious efforts must be made to find 
solutions for the long standing political and territorial disputes e. g., between Iraq and 
Kuwait and between the two Gulf countries of Qatar and Bahrain. Secondly, the more 
powerful economies in the region, especially the Persian Gulf oil rich countries, must 
financially support their less privileged neighbours, in any possible way, in establishing and 
improving their media infrastructures, and actively participating in the global media 
revolution. Otherwise, it is not unlikely, that a destructive war such as the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait, or national/regional uprisings and revolutions may determine the status of the 
distribution of wealth in the Middle East. 
In this chapter I have built upon the analysis developed in this thesis in order to 
prescriptively offer some policy agenda for the future of the Arab media. Whilst many of 
the factors examined in this thesis may give grounds for reasoned pessimism, there are also 
developments that hold out the possibility of positive changes in the direction of aspirations 
I have declared. In the next, and last chapter, I will provide an integrative overview of the 
previous analysis and conclude this thesis. 
258 
CHAPTER IX 
OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSION 
There is much about the Middle East in the media but little about the media in the Middle 
East. It appears that the media research tradition has not found its appropriate place in this 
strategic region. In this context, despite the rapid expansion of the Arab national terrestrial 
systems and the phenomenal development of their transnational networks particularly since 
the early 1980s, Arab media research and literature has not been appropriately developed. 
In an era within which the information and communication revolution is conceived as the 
major driving force of global transformation, and especially when media research and 
development is a top priority in the industrialised world, this region is still far behind in the 
global media competition. Despite respectable efforts conducted both by Arab and non- 
Arab media scholars to fill the existing gap, there is still a long way ahead and an urgent 
need for more research and academic activity in this area. 
A major motive behind this enquiry has been responding to this urgent need. As noted 
earlier, in the construction of their media infrastructure most of the Arab countries have 
been spending millions of dollars in US and Western contracts. A large section of the Arab 
world including the oil-rich Arab states, it is no exaggeration to suggest, has now become a 
laboratory for the latest outputs of Western media manufacturing system. In the absence of 
adequate studies in this field, the trend of Arab media growth and acceleration inspired me 
to concentrate on the region. What concerned me and attracted my attention most was the 
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historical background of Western interference and interest in the Middle East and the 
replacement of regional policies by the Western ones. Throughout the twentieth century, 
Western policies were effectively translated into domestic languages and implemented by 
Middle Eastern authorities. During the later decades of the century, the affluence of oil 
incomes witnessed the ominous marriage of Middle Eastern money and Western policies. 
The Middle East's opening up to the influx of Western media programmes and products in 
recent decades is somehow reminiscent of colonial domination over the region's natural and 
human resources in the past two centuries. In this respect, Herman and McChesney's well 
selected title of `The global media; the new missionaries of global capitalism', for their 
book published in 1997, may well explain my approach towards the global expansion of 
Western media throughout the Arab/Muslim world. This general outlook formed my 
primary thoughts, questions and hypotheses. 
Perhaps the researcher is on a journey the end of which he does not know, but it is 
absolutely useless to fantasise a journey without initial direction. Research questions and 
hypotheses define and clarify the direction of the study; and the formation of a theoretical 
framework for a research project owes much to this clarification. The first stage of this 
research began with my initial questions. These questions, though helpful to outline a 
theoretical framework for the study, were later significantly changed. Thanks to new-born 
questions and through my extensive literature review of the field, the key factors involved 
in shaping the media policy and infrastructure in the Arab world, namely oil, globalisation 
and Islam, were identified. These enabled me to establish a new, but solid, framework for 
the analysis. Within such a framework, I suggested that the development of the Arab media 
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could be better seen as a by-product of the interaction between the external forces of 
globalisation, with Western political, economic and cultural power at its heart, and the 
internal resources of oil (economic) and Islam (political and cultural). At this stage, in 
order to be able to build up the infrastructure of my arguments and, therefore, to represent 
my ideas more clearly, I myself needed to be more specific and more clear about the 
research assumptions and hypotheses. After several months thinking, reading, writing and 
analysis, once again I was asking myself, what was the main focus of this enquiry? To 
which particular question(s) was this examination, going to offer answer(s)? Which 
ambiguity in the field was intended to be clarified by this contribution when it would come 
to the end? In response to these questions, the following research hypotheses, though not 
exactly with the same wordings, were formed: 
The development of the Arab media a) has been directed and subtly driven by the external 
powers, and b) is characterised by reactionary internal policies fuelled by the oil revenues, 
and cultural and political sentiments, overwhelmingly Islamic, but neither pre-thought nor 
planned. This research in its final analysis reflects my concern about the absence of clarity 
in developing media policies by the Arabs in the region; and claims that the existing 
theoretical and practical ambiguity has left the global powers with unassailable influence 
over the Arab national and regional media market and policy. 
Given the centrality of Western power and influence in shaping the contemporary regional 
development strategies and economic transformation, I established a firm relationship 
between the three central influences mentioned above, and the West. Indeed, in this 
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research, the role of oil in the formation of developmental strategies has been analysed in 
conjunction with the Western powers' presence and interference in the Middle East. 
Globalisation and its immediate correlates of liberalisation, deregulation and 
commercialisation have enabled Western hegemony over the rest of the world. And, 
finally, Islam and, particularly, the rising Islamic political movements, have been identified 
as the most formidable barriers' to domination by Western culture and civilisation. 
For the purpose of the study, I have selected a political economy approach. The particular 
character of the political economy approach lies in its emphasis on power. Since the Arab 
media, as I have argued, are being developed in the context of a power confrontation 
between the Arab world and the West, the use of this approach can appropriately serve my 
analysis. The centrality of power in the formation of West-Middle East relationships was 
further emphasised when from among the most important theories of political economy, 
including the classical, neo-classical, Marxian, Keynsian and so on, I decided to select a 
power-centred approach. This approach holds that politics is defined by the use of power; 
and since economy maintains power, it claims that economy is political. 
My account of the Arab media has been written in a global context, and, therefore, has to be 
read and understood with a sense of globality. The question of power, politically and 
economically, can be better identified by the wide gap between North and South, rich and 
poor. The literature on power, however, mainly focuses on the traditional discourse of the 
colonial predominance of great powers over less powerful nations mostly embodied in the 
forms of exclusion; and prevention of their access to the resources which they need for a 
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meaningful participation in the global arena. This interpretation of power now sounds 
inadequate to explain the emerging media developments in most parts of the developing 
world, particularly in the Middle East and Arab world. In other words, the new Western 
media strategy is mainly focused in their growing desire to provide these nations with the 
most advanced media technology. This fact led me to rethink the old notion of power and 
look for an alternative understanding. Through the works of Herbert Schiller, I came across 
Joseph Nye's `soft power': "the ability to co-opt rather than command", which according 
to him "rests on intangible resources: culture, ideology, the ability to use the international 
institutions to determine the framework of debate ". As discussed in chapter II, directly- 
exerted power (hard power) has now been mainly replaced by `soft power', and the 
exciting point is that the control of the media and information is at the core of soft power. 
Having extended the new notion of power, and in order to explore the power relations 
involved in the construction of media enterprises in the Arab world, I have placed emphasis 
on the political and economic relationships between the Arab countries and the West rather 
than inter-Arab trade transactions. In this respect, the example of `Arabian oil-Western 
media' trade has been taken as a case in point. In the formation and development of Arab 
media during the last three decades, a major factor, nationally, regionally and globally, has 
been oil. Chapter III, titled `Oil, Development, and the Great Powers', specially was 
designed to reveal how the Arab oil reserves and revenues, while attracting the Western 
powers' attention to the Middle East, at the same time affected regional development 
policies and structural changes. Highlighting the Oil Boom of 1973 as a turning point in the 
fate of the Middle East, I scrutinised the key role of oil, particularly in the last three 
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decades, in the formation of regional and international policies in the region. The traditional 
competition among capitalist societies for a share in the wealth generated by oil led me to 
think of their currently increasing interest in the Arab media markets. I put forward the 
proposition that the Arab world in its course of transformation into a semi-modem society, 
has now become a new arena for the industrial powers to develop their interests in the field 
of communication policy and marketing. To examine the question, the development of the 
telecommunication sector, which is often taken as a valid index for economic growth, was 
the focus of my arguments. The result of the analysis, while revealing the determination of 
the Arab states to establish and advance their telecommunications infrastructures, did not 
lessen concern about ambiguity in the process. 
One observation, which constituted a significant part of the third chapter, was concerned 
with the political implications of economic and commercial deals between Western 
countries and the Arab states. In this respect, I focused on the two leading Arab countries of 
Egypt in North Africa, and Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf respectively, as the main 
representatives of the non oil-rich nations and the oil producing economies in the Arab 
world. I underlined the vital part that these two geopolitically important countries have 
played in the success of American politics in the Arab world. I assume that my arguments 
in this respect have been clear and convincing enough to let me conclude that most of the 
Arab states, regardless of their economic and financial weakness or strength, in their 
dealing with Western countries, have failed politically. Indeed, contrary to their peoples' 
wants and expectation, I suggested these governments on many occasions have been 
dealing with Western companies and policies at the cost of their national or regional 
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interests. Since I do not intend to reiterate my previous arguments, I refer the interested 
reader for more detailed discussions on the issue to chapter III. In short, in that chapter, I 
firstly examined the long-standing presence and influence of the Western powers in the 
Middle East and Arab world. Secondly and acting on each other, I identified and discussed 
the two major driving forces behind the development of the Arab telecommunication sector, 
namely oil revenues and Western policies. And thirdly, I argued that the regional states, by 
and large, have not been successful in establishing their own developmental and media 
policies independent of the Western powers. 
Along with oil, globalisation was highlighted as crucial in shaping the media policy and 
infrastructure in the Arab world. In order to examine the role, significance and influence of 
globalisation in this strategic region, particularly in the process of formation and 
development of the Arab media enterprises, I selected and developed a widely held, though 
dialectic model of analysis. In this model, the process of globalisation has been seen either 
as a threat or as an opportunity. The first approach holds that globalisation, securing the 
global interests of the great powers, has functioned as the principal agent of transnational 
corporations. In this view, the economic, cultural and social disparities around the world, 
have not been diminished, rather the powerful forces of globalisation destroy the last 
remaining borders of national and political sovereignty, cultural autonomy, moral values, 
and religious beliefs. 
The second approach contests this interpretation of globalisation as misleading. According 
to this, it is wrong to conceive of the process of globalisation as necessarily weakening 
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nation-states' sovereignty or to consider the emerging third cultures as a process which will 
lead to homogenisation. Rather, the process may lead to the hybridisation of Western 
culture and eventually to the displacement of Western culture from its present peak. This 
approach tends to underline the impact of non-western cultures on the West; the re- 
emergence of powerful Asian, African and Latin American cultures; and the influence of 
Islam, Hinduism and other world religions within the West. 
This simplified `black and white' model of analysis, within which Herbert Schiller and 
Mike Featherstone lead the way in highlighting respectively the negative and positive 
aspects of globalisation, actually contains some grey areas of overlapping, or neutral zones 
of agreement. Throughout this research, particularly in my theoretical debates in chapters 
III and IV, I have underlined these common points. Yet, this is not to deny my own 
preference for the first approach, which highlights the very existence of unjust and 
disappointing elements in this growing global system. In this respect, my political economy 
approach initially stemming from such a preference has also contributed to further 
development of my critical debates on globalisation. 
As far as the international system is concerned, a growing gap prevails in terms of power. I 
have addressed the question of power imbalance between the developed and developing 
countries in three domains; of economy, culture and the media. Placing a particular 
emphasis on the globalisation of culture, globalisation of the media and particularly 
globalisation of media-cultural products, I have argued that the prevailing will for power 
and domination which characterises the Western nation-states and transnational 
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conglomerates, precludes establishing a legitimate global media system. The presence and 
threatening power of some unassailable global media giants such as Time Warner, Disney, 
Bertelsmann, Viacom, News Corporation with their world-wide `footprints' and financial 
muscles has caused a growing sense of uncertainty among national and regional media 
entrepreneurs about the future of their economic and financial investments. One may add to 
this, the political and cultural concerns which are being increasingly expressed by states, 
opinion leaders, and political and religious activists all around the world. 
This integrated global media system, seemingly successful in dictating its rules of conduct 
across the world, has not gone without contest from the Third World. In chapters IV, V, VI 
and VII of the research, I have traced some signs of resistance to the domination of the 
West particularly in the media arena. During the 1960s and 1970s, UNESCO as an 
international forum played a vital part in the development of the New World Information 
and Communication Order (NWICO). Led by the Third World and non-Allied nations, the 
principal aim of the campaign was to challenge the Western, mainly American, domination 
of world news, information and cultural flows. The development of national and regional 
satellite systems in the developing world such as ARABSAT, has been seen in this context. 
One of the main reasons for the creation of ARABSAT, as discussed in chapter VI, was 
reacting to INTELSAT which Arabs believed was dominated by the West. 
A significant point in the development of ARABSAT, particularly in its early years of 
preparation and planning (1960-1970), was the decisive role of the national and pan-Arab 
movements. Broadly speaking, response and resistance to the hegemony of the Western 
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countries in most parts of the Middle East in the three decades after the end of the World 
War II, has been mainly manifested in the form of nationalistic movements. The glorious 
national movements of, for example, Hamid Mossadegh, during his nationalisation of 
Iranian oil against the British Empire (1953), as discussed in chapter III, and that of Gamal 
Abdel Nasser in Egypt for the nationalisation of the Suez Canal and, more importantly, his 
quest for the unification of the Arab nations (1950-60) against Western imperialism, are 
well remembered. In such an atmosphere, the Arab League member states including the 21 
Arab countries, plus the Palestine self-rule authority, in the 1950s and 1960s developed 
their first media framework within which they succeeded to establish their own collective 
media spacecraft, ARABSAT in 1985. This Arab patriotism was later overshadowed by the 
new wave of religious resurgence. 
In chapter V, in a chronological study of the Arab media, I developed a three-wave model 
of analysis through which the last 50 years of development of the Arab media, particularly 
transnational and co-operative media, have been analysed. The first wave (1950-1970) was 
characterised by the significance of Arab nationalism and Pan Arab thought, and its impact 
on the development of the first Arab media framework and institutions such as ASBU, 
ASCO and ARABSAT itself. The second wave (1970-onward) reinforced by the rise of 
globalisation (1980) was identified by the power and domination of Saudi Arabia over the 
Arab media within and outside the region. The main character of the third wave (1980- 
onward), inspired by the Islamic revolution of Iran (1979) and grown greatly in the early 
1990s, is an Islamic appeal for media values and practice. Given the assertive and 
protective nature of Islamic-type media in resisting the global media mainstream, including 
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the secularly-oriented Arab media trends, I have regarded this development as important for 
the purpose of this study, and have analysed it in the general context of the world-wide 
Islamic resurgence. 
The interaction of modem Islam and modern media, one supporting the other, has 
constituted an important part of chapter V. In fact, while the Islamic resurgence has been 
influential in shaping media in the Middle East, the role of modern media in the formation 
of the new Islamic wave has also been crucial. New Islamic media campaigners, through 
the content of their media programming and by controlling media infrastructure as a source 
of independence and prestige, have been seeking to prove their Islamic identity. They have 
also attempted to utilise the media for the greater unification of different branches of Islam 
as well as achieving more common interpretations of Islamic events. Not only the regional 
states, but political oppositions and even militant groups such the Shiite Muslim 
organisation, Hizbollah in Lebanon, have been extending their access to the Internet, 
satellite televisions and video cameras in recent years. Internet and satellite broadcasting 
systems have also been used to link Muslims residing abroad with their homelands. In this 
respect, a significant point on which I have placed emphasis is that portraying these 
attempts as hostility to the West is not a true reflection of the reality. The fact is that 
Muslims, like other nations concerned about what matters to them, are developing their 
own familiar methods of protest and protection. For them, Islam is increasingly discovered 
as a reliable source of character, identity, independence and power. For understanding the 
new Islamic developments, as Eickleman (2000) argues, buzzwords such as 
fundamentalism' and catchy phrases such as Samuel Huntington's `West verses the rest', 
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or Daniel Lerner's Mecca or mechanisation', are of little use. In chapter IV and V, I have 
attempted to present a more realistic picture of Islam and the cultural and political Islamic 
movements. 
In chapters VI and VII, I have detailed the process of development of ARABSAT since the 
late 1960s. A remarkable point in the political economy of ARABSAT has been the 
ultimate success of Arab countries in establishing their own satellite system. With its 22 
initial shareholders including 21 Arab countries plus the Palestine self-rule authority, the 
system is the largest collective media network in terms of participants in the Third World. 
Regarded as a breakthrough, the creation of ARABSAT, has had some important 
implications, more important among them, the change of Arabs attitudes towards new 
technologies, setting up a framework for their collective co-operation, and acting as a 
source of pride, unity and prestige for people of the region. ARABSAT, though successful 
at this stage, and presenting itself as the first and the foremost collective media outlet in the 
Middle East and Arab world, has raised questions and concerns since its early years of 
establishment. These questions have primarily been concerned with the financial and 
economic aspects of the system. Concerns have also been expressed over the ultimate 
success of ARABSAT in its cultural and political ambitions, namely media co-operation 
and exchange programming within the Arab/Islamic word, as well as resisting the global 
wave of liberalisation. 
In order to address the above issues, I have started with the main reasons for the creation of 
ARABSAT given the availability of the same services from the International 
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Telecommunication Satellite Systems, INTELSAT during the 1960s and 1970s. Along with 
the main officially acknowledged objectives of the creation of ARABSAT- none of which 
is economic- three main issues have been particularly raised about the relationship between 
ARABSAT and INTELSAT: 1) the Arabs' dissatisfaction about the INTELSAT's tariff 
rates, 2) the presumed Western domination over INTELSAT, and 3) the Arabs' concern 
over the powerful position of INTELSAT in dictating its rules and policies. 
As can be seen, with the exception of the concern over the INTELSAT tariff rates, the other 
reasons for the establishment of ARABSAT hold no strong economic and financial 
implications. ARABSAT emerged in a political and ideological sphere with an obvious 
psychological tendency towards the restoration of Arab identity and unification. The 
establishment of the system was perhaps a reaction to the deterioration of the international 
image of the Arabs following the 1976 war between Egypt and Israel which had resulted in 
the Arab loss of communication installations. A comparison between ARABSAT and 
EUTELSAT also shows that the latter has pursued technical and economic targets to serve 
the expansion of European research and development, while the former has clearly reflected 
the political motivations behind regional and national satellite networks. While the political 
motivations behind ARABSAT have been clearly strong, the initiative has been less 
powerfully driven by its cultural aims and with almost negligible concern in terms of 
economics. This fact as well as the other technical and financial problems, may imply the 
failure of ARABSAT policy-makers to address the economic viability of the system from 
the outset. One may conclude that at the time of the creation of ARABSAT, there was no 
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clear economic or financial policy or even economic motive behind the initiative. At most, 
the financial and economic objectives of the system were considered as secondary. 
How can one explain the Arab media co-operation through ARABSAT in terms of the 
political; economic and cultural differences in the region? I have noted that the diversity in 
the region in terms of politics and economy has had an inverse impact on the Arab media 
collaboration. These differences have been reflected in the use of ARABSAT for the 
exchange of television programming. Amin (1996), for example, argues that the level of 
diplomatic relations among Arab/Muslim countries has determined the degree of exchange 
programming and the strength of their economy has facilitated more use of ARABSAT. 
The expulsion of Egypt from the Arab Telecommunications Union (ATU) in 1979 after the 
deal with Israel has been widely discussed in this context. A major concern for Arab media 
policy makers, therefore, has been to create programmes that transcend political barriers or 
the geographical division of 22 Arab league member states. Acknowledging the preventive 
role of the Arab political and economic disparities in the process of media collaboration 
through ARABSAT, I have, however, concluded that the failure of ARABSAT in exchange 
programming cannot be adequately explained in terms of cultural differences in the region. 
Rather, the cultural, particularly Islamic, homogeneity, has been regarded as a uniting factor 
which may facilitate Arab media collaboration. 
A major part of the difficulties obstructing the process of exchange programming through 
ARABSAT, has been explained in terms of the political and economic disparity in the Arab 
world. Yet, the Arab media collaboration has been suffering much more from a lack of 
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clarity in terms of ARABSAT planning and policy. ARABSAT was an ambitious project 
with no realistic thought given to how its basic and potential services could be used. 
Despite its huge basic and potential capacity including telephone, telegraph, telex, 
television and radio services as well as educational broadcasting, emergency 
communication, telemedicine, newspaper printing and data exchange, the actual use of 
ARABSAT has been disappointing. One may add to this, lack of professionals, training 
shortage and technology transfer policies. ARABSAT has been facing some other financial 
and technical problems such as the increasing use of VCRs in the region, lack of earth 
stations for picking up the signals and the absence of a high level penetration of basic 
telephone services. Since its establishment until 1990, there has been a general consensus 
over the 'under utilised' and 'debt-ridden' status of the system. In order to compete with its 
global rivals, being economically efficient and, covering its expenses, ARABSAT needed 
to improve its activities and services. At the time, the efforts to regulate the system and 
open it up for commercial use did not materialise. The early 1990s, however, witnessed a 
dramatic shift in ARABSAT's broadcasting policy towards a new commercial and 
telecommunications emphasis. This change of direction has been understood as a passive 
reaction to the global forces of liberalisation and deregulation. The new policy, though it 
helped ARABSAT financially survive, heavily compromised the success of ARABSAT as 
a medium of exchange programming within the Arab territories. 
On a global level, the liberalisation and deregulation of the media and the powerful impact 
of foreign satellites have challenged the ARABSAT policy-makers as to how to establish a 
balance between the economic and cultural objectives of the system. In this context, a valid 
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question, given the enormous investments on ARABSAT as a `protective shield', has been 
the success/failure of the system in achieving its cultural and political ambitions. The 
results of my analysis in this respect confirm that despite the efforts made in that direction, 
the overall performance of the system has not been satisfactory. ARABSAT's close ties 
with the West has been regarded as a disabling factor in its resistance to the influx of 
Western programmes. Some have gone even further to suggest that ARABSAT has played 
a Trojan horse role for the West in the Arab territories. In this view, with the establishment 
of ARABSAT, and thanks to satellite dishes being easily available the Arab people were 
exposed to various unauthorised channels incidentally or intentionally. Furthermore, most 
of the TV channels run on ARABSAT such as MBC, Orbit, ART, ANN, Future Vision, 
Dubai and LBC do not reflect a genuine Arabic or Islamic culture and identity. The 
Western channels now carried by, for example, Orbit, on ARABSAT contain Hollywood 
first-run movies in complete form, that is uncut other than for the most extreme sexually 
explicit scenes. 
To conclude, the Arab media policy-makers have not been able to devise comprehensive 
media policies to guide their practice and direction. There seems to be no consensus over 
the competence and capacity of the Arab media, ARABSAT included, to resist the influx of 
global media into the region. Despite the vast investment on their media infrastructures, the 
success of Arab media in protecting, restoring and propagating the Arabic/Islamic culture 
and identity in their homeland and throughout the world is not a matter of agreement. In 
the second half of the twentieth century, the Arab media, despite all their ups and downs, 
succeeded in having their existence acknowledged in a regional and global arena. The 21st 
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century is the century of new hopes, attempts and challenges for the Arab media investors 
and policy makers. 
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APPENDIX I 
Research questions for the interview 
Q1. Some media critics suggest that there is not a clear media policy in the Middle East. 
How would you describe the current media policy in the region? 
Q2. Since the Second World War, some Arab media organisations have been important 
players in developing media policy in the Middle East. Do you think any of these 
organisations have played a significant part? 
(In the Arab World, for instance, the Arab League's mass media co-operation (1951), the 
Permanent Committee for Arab Media (PCAM) (1960), the Council of Arab Information 
Ministers (CALM), Arab State Broadcasting Union (ASBU)(1969) and the Arab Satellite 
Communications Organisation (ASCO) (1976), have been established by the Arabs. ) 
Q3. In the Middle East region do you think that there have been different agendas being 
developed by Arab, Muslim and global players? In other words, do you think there have 
been attempts to develop media that specifically reflect these interests? 
Q4. Within the countries of the Middle East are there any national media interests that stand 
out as challenging a collective media strategy? 
Q5. To what extent do you think the costs associated with the purchase of communication 
hardware have shaped the development of media in the Middle East? 
For example: 
- in requiring collaboration between media providers in purchasing hardware; 
- in limiting new innovation because of the existing costs of being committed to a particular 
technology. 
Q6. Can you tell me in what ways you think politics and religion have shaped the 
development of media in the Middle East? Can you give me some examples? 
Q7. In the context of what we have been discussing what do you think has been the role of 
Arabsat? 
Q8. Some media critics believe that Arabsat has not succeeded in providing better 
communications and exchanges within the Arab/Islamic world. Would you agree with that? 
Q9. It was hoped that Arabsat would help the member states in resisting the influx of 
Western programmes. Do you think that it has been successful in this? 
Q10. To what extent do you think that Arabsat has been a vehicle for Islamic interests in 
the Middle East? 
Q11. What do you think is the future of Arabsat 
- in terms of programming 
- in terms of economic viability? 
Q12. And now to finish - can I ask two questions about the role of satellite technology in 
the Middle East in general? 
a) Firstly, do you think that, contrary to some people's intentions, the development 
of satellite communication in the Middle East has in fact opened the door for more Western 
influence in the region? 
b) What do think will be the consequences of different Middle East states launching their 
own satellites? 
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APPENDIX 2 
How my attempt to interview ARABSAT officials failed. 
ARABSAT officials refused to be interviewed or even respond to my research 
questionnaires. The following shows my approach to the ARABSAT Organisation and the 
failure of my attempts to interview the ARABSAT Director General or one of the members 
of the Board of Directors. 
First message 
Date: Mon, 15 May 2000 17: 32: 09 +0100 (GMT Daylight Time) 
To: albidnah@arabsat. com 
From: Mahmoud Karimi Alavi <m. karimialavi@bradford. ac. uk> 
Subject: Request for interview 
Arabsat Director General 
Dear Mr. Al-Bidnah 
Salamo Alaikom 
I am a research student at the Department of ASS (Applied Social Sciences) in the 
University of Bradford, UK, working on Political Economy of Arab media, particularly 
Arabsat. The nature of my study requires interviewing some of Arabsat's high ranking 
officials. 
I would be grateful if you could help me by responding to a brief research questionnaire that 
I would like to send to you. If you are able to agree, I would then send you a short outline 
of the project and the questionnaire via the Internet. With thanks for giving consideration to 
this request. 
Yours sincerely 
M. K. Alavi 
**** 
Second Message: 
Date: Thu, 18 May 2000 10: 58: 50 +0100 (GMT Daylight Time) 
To: albidnah@arabsat. com 
From: Mahmoud Karimi Alavi <m. karimialavi@bradford. ac. uk> 
Subject: Second request for interview 
Arabsat Director General 
Dear Mr. Al-Bidnah 
Salamo Alaikom 
This is my second request for the interview. My first attempt had no further response. I am a 
research student at the department of ASS (Applied Social Sciences) in the University of 
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Bradford, UK, working on Political Economy of Arab media, particularly Arabsat. The 
nature of my study requires interviewing some of Arabsat's high ranking officials. 
I would be grateful if you could help me by responding to a brief research questionnaire that 
I would like to send to you. 
If you are able to agree, I would then send you a short outline of the project and the 
questionnaire via the Internet. Thanks for giving consideration to this request. 
Yours sincerely 
M. K. Alavi 
**** 
Third Message 
Date: Tue, 11 Jul 2000 15: 05: 29 +0100 (GMT Daylight Time) 
To: saidgahtani@arabsat. com 
Cc: saidgahtani@arabsat. com 
From: Mahmoud Karimi Alavi <m. karimialavi@bradford. ac. uk> 
Subject: Request for interview 
Dear Sir 
Salamo Alaikom 
During the last two months I have sent two messages to your organisation asking for 
interviewing the ARABSAT Director General with no further response. Could you please let 
me have your response on this mail. 
Regards 
MK Alavi 
ý*** 
Forth Message 
Date: Tue, 11 Jul 2000 15: 09: 22 +0100 (GMT Daylight Time) 
To: albidnah@arabsat. com 
Cc: saidgahtani@arabsat. com 
From: Mahmoud Karimi Alavi <m. karimialavi@bradford. ac. uk> 
Subject: request for interview 
Dear Sir 
Salamo Alaikom 
I have sent three massages to you and your colleagues to interview yourself or one of the 
ARABSAT's members of Board of Director during the last two months. Unfortunately I 
have had no response from your organisation. Could you please let me have your response 
on this last mail. 
Regards 
MK Alavi 
**** 
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First response from ARABSAT 
Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2000 13: 02: 30 +0300 
To: "'m. karimialavi@Bradford. ac. uk"' <m. karimialavi@Bradford. ac. uk> 
From: Mohammed Islam Arif <MislamA@arabsat. com> 
Subject: REQUEST FOR INTERVIEW 
Mr. Mahmoud Karimi Alvai 
Sorry for the inconvenience in responding to your e-mail but obviously there is a 
miscommunication. This is the first time I see this mail, so could you please: 
- clarify, the subject matter and objective of the interview. 
- who requests and where he wants the interview to take place? 
Thank you and best regards. 
SAAD A. ALBIDNAH 
DIRECTOR GENERAL 
ARABSAT 
**** 
On 14th of July I dispatched an outline of my research, the subject matter and the objectives 
of the research through the INTERNET to Mr Islam Arif, and suggested that I would be 
happy to see Mr Al-Bidnah in London any time in July or September. The next day I 
received the following email: 
Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2000 13: 31: 02 +0300 
To: "'m. karirnialavi@Bradford. ac. uk"' <m. karimialavi@Bradford. ac. uk> 
From: Mohammed Islam Arif <MislamA@arabsat. com> 
Subject: REQUEST FOR INTERVIEW 
FROM: D. G. OFFICE 
ARABSAT, RIYADH 
TO: MR. MAHMOUD KARIMI ALAVI 
Dear Mr. Alavi, 
Thank you for your e-mail message dated 14 July, 2000, please be informed that Eng. Saad 
A. Albidnah, Director General - ARABSAT is on vacation up to 2nd of September, 2000. 
So, please you can call us after this date. 
Thank you very much and best regards. 
ARABSAT, RIYADH 
D. G. Office 
**** 
On Third September I sent the following email to Mr Islam Arif to set up a time for the 
interview: 
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Date: Sun, 3 Sep 2000 17: 46: 24 +0100 (GMT Daylight Time) 
To: Mohammed Islam Arif <MislamA@arabsat. com> 
From: Mahmoud Karimi Alavi <m. karimialavi@bradford. ac. uk> 
Subject: Re: REQUEST FOR INTERVIEW 
Dear Mr Islam Arif, 
Salam 
I am referring to your response of 15 July 2000 regarding my request for the interview. I 
am hoping that Eng. Saad A. Albidnah, Director General of ARABSAT, is now back healthy 
and successful. While thanking you in advance for your support of this project I look 
forward to hearing from you about the time and venue of the interview. 
Best regards 
MK Alavi 
***ý 
On Tuesday 5 of September I receved the following email: 
Date: Tue, 5 Sep 2000 11: 19: 38 +0300 
To: "'m. karimialavi@Bradford. ac. uk"' <m. karimialaviaBradford. ac. uk> 
From: Mohammed Islam Arif <MislamA@arabsat. COm> 
Subject: Request for Interview 
Dear Mr. Mahmoud Karimi Alavi, 
Assalamo Allaikum 
Thank you very much for your continuous interest in ARABSAT. Mr. Saad Albidnah, 
Director General, ARABSAT is back in Riyadh after his annual vacation. 
Please be informed that ARABSAT is purely a regional technical organisation providing up 
to date telecommunication services to its member states and other users. 
Mr. Albidnah has no plan to visit London in near future. As you are not working in Saudi 
Arabia, you cannot visit Riyadh without visa procedures, thus a meeting for said interview 
looks difficult in near future. Therefore, we suggest that you visit ARABSAT WEBSITE 
(www. arabsat. com <http: //www. arabsat. com>) for general and technical information. We 
can dispatch you some available ARABSAT brochures, if you wish so. We will be happy to 
provide you with any other general and technical information requested by you through fax 
or email. (ARABSAT fax no. 966 1 488 7999) 
Sorry for unavailability of Mr. Albidnah for said interview. Wishing you all the success in 
your research work. 
With best regards. 
DIRECTOR GENERAL OFFICE 
Dictated by Mr. Albidnah 
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